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1. Statement of the Problem 
This study is based upon the recognition that doubt has been an import-
ant concern for religious leaders throughout the centuries. Realizing that 
doubt may take various forms and may pervade numerous areas of life and 
thought, it is the purpose of this study to consider specifically doubt as 
it appears in the life and thought of Blaise Pascal. 
Doubt is an attitude of the mind. As such, it is primarily an intellectual 
problem. However, it is increasingly recognized by both psychologists and 
philosophers that one's thoughts cannot be d.ivorced from the rest of one's 
life. There are no completely "intellectual" problems and no completely 
"emot.ional" problems. All are a part of the living whole of the personality, 
and though they may be meaningfully separated for purposes of analysis, 
their final interpretation must be made in their relation to this whole. It 
is therefore assumed in this study that to understand doubt in the life and 
-1-
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thought of Pascal it is necessary to relate it to the total pattern of his 
personality by means of a careful examination of the variety of influences 
which affected his personality s·o profoundly. 
This is no new problem for investigation.. Philosophers 1 theologians 1-
scientists 1 philolog.ists and psychologists have long been aware of the 
existence of doubt in the life and thought of Pascal. Their writings reflect 
their interest in this problem. Not all of them have dealt with the problem 
overtlyi in some I doubt appears more by implication than explicitly. Other 
. 1 
studies refer to the scepticism of Pascal rather tha.n to doubt. Nevertheless 1 
a number of these works might be considered significant antecedents of this 
study and their contributions should be briefly summarized. The following 
investigators and their research are dominant in such a grouping: 
2. Previous Studies of the Problem 
Victor Cousin 
In his report to the French Academy in 1842 r Victor Cousin made an 
ardent plea for a new edition of the Pens~es of Pascal. It was in this report 
that he formulated his basic concepts concerning the scepticism of Pascal. 
The scepticism of Pascal was considered by Cousin to be the natural out-
2 
come of the Jansenism which he criticized so sever~_ly. Human nature was 
represented by Jansenism 1 according to Cousin, as completely corrupt and 
1. See p, 10 of this study. 
2. See pp. 2 0-21 of this study. 
3 
therefore incapable of comprehending the truth. Such a theological basis 
was considered a logical antecedent of a bas.ic sceptic.ism. 
It was this assumption that led Cous.in to conclude that Pascal gave 
ultimate allegiance .in philosophy to Pyrrho, the arch sceptic. Cousin con-
sidered Pascal a sceptic in his religion as in his philosophy; for rejecting 
philosophy was essentially the same as rejecting religion. Th.is rejection 
-
of philosophy by Pascal was considered by Cous.in as an attack upon the 
basis for religion. Cousin reacted against such a doctrine as he felt Pascal 
proposed, and in his presentation of this doctrine in h.is consideration of 
/ 
the Pensees, he presented it in one of .its most unfavorabl~ forms, making 
it appear to be not only false, but feeble as well.l 
Although Cousin d.id consider the doctrine of the heart to be a lapse 
from the otherwise consistent scept.icism of Pascal, he regarded it as an 
illustration of human weakness and refused to assign it any value in h.is 
interpretation. 
Ernest Havet 
The rationalist, Ernest Havet, 2 though fascinated with the man Pascal, 
interpreted him largely from a perspective of amazement rather than of empathy. 
1. Dorothy M. Eastwood, The Rev.ival of PascaL(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1936), p. 5. 
2. Ernest Havet, Pense"es de Pascal, (Paris: Dezubry et Magdeleine, 1852). 
4 
His conclusion was that Pascal was a thoroughgoing Pyrrhon.ist. 1 However, 
the point of departure for Pascal was viewed as one of faith from wh.ich h.is 
2 
courageous doubt proceeded. The strategy of Pascal's thought, accord.ing 
to Havet, is built upon the assumption that the natural man is sentenced 
to utter darkness since God is hidden and is discernible only by the elect. 3 
Us.ing the blindness of the unbeliever as an evidence of the terrify.ing wrath 
of God, Pascal evolved a faith wh.ich, according to Havet, was nourished 
on the void of doubt itself. The final form of Pascal's thought as .interpreted 
by Havet is a synthesis resulting from the union of scepticism and Jansenism 
. 't t t' . 4 1n 1 s mos exac 1ng express1on. 
This view, consequently, represents a noticeable contrast to that pre-
sented by Cousin. For while Cousin had interpreted Pascal's scepticism 
as the inevitable outgrowth of Jansenist.ic tendencies, its relation to 
Jansenism becomes far more direct in Havet where it is regarded as the proof 
of his religious dogma. One therefore d.iscovers in Havet a strong appeal 
for an .interpretation of Pascal inclusive enough to embody both h.is scepticism 
and his Jansenism as two inseparable components of his total view. 
1. Ibid. I p. xviii. 
2. Ibid. I p. vi. 
3. Ib.id. I p. xxi, xxii. 
4. Ibid. I p. V.i. 
5 
Responding to this appeal in his own analysis, Havet has presented 
Pascal as an enthusiastic and basically affirrnative individual who is 
nevertheless confronted with the obstacle of intellectual scepticism . 
Havet, therefore, has d escribed a sensitive th inker, acutely aware of 
some of thefund a m ental antag onisms which are inherent in the conflict 
between reason and the w ill, between "instinct" and "experience". 1 
The conflict between the affirmative, positive ele m ents in Pascal and 
those which are opptsing , questioning and denying is clearly d epicte d 
by Havet, and he concludes that it was in Jansenism that Pascal was able 
to find a d o gma which would include both the element of scepticism and the 
personal affirmative princip le which is expresse d in an act of faith. Though 
Havet is critical of Pascal and presents Jansenism as a severe doctrine, 
he concludes that Christianity can be defend ed log ically only by the plan 
which Pascal followed. 
Have t 's g reatest contribution to an understanding of Pascal is his 
emphasis upon the Janseni stic d octrines such as the doctrine of the h i d den 
God , and Pascal'l· s use of these doctrines to reconcile the two extremes 
p ositions' the sceptical and the dogmatic. 
l. Le"on Brunschvic g , Pierre Boutroux, F~lix Gazier, (editors), Oeuvres de 
Blaise Pascal publ iees sui vant l 1ordre chronol ogique avec d ocuments 
. / 
complementaires, introductions, et notes (Les Grand s Ecrivains de la 
France) 14 vols. 3rd. s~ries, (Paris, Hachette, 1904-14), Pensees 
Number 396. Unless otherwise ind icated, all subsequent references 
to the Pensees will refer to this edition of PascaFs work w h ich 
app ear in volumes 12, 13, and 14 of this collection, and will be listed 
as follows: Blaise Pascal, Pense'es, ( ed. Brunschvic g ), Number 396. 
6 
C .A. Sa.inte-Beuve 
The origin of the faith of Pascal, according to Sa.inte-Beuve, lies .in 
h.is moral energy wh.ich .is ex pressed .in a contempt for the world and the 
"natural man". 1 Whereas other writers regarded Pascal's religion as the 
real fulfillment . of Pascal's per,sonality, Sa.inte-Beuve saw in it simply· a 
2 
means to that end. 
Though Sa.inte-Beuve wrote in 1848 that the theory that Pascal was a 
scept.ic had been f.inally refuted, he st.ill described him as one in whom doubt 
3 
struggled "like a caged lion". However, to th.is assertion he added that, 
"he was the f.irst to bring to the defense of religion the ardour, the anguish , 
the lofty melancholy that others have since carr.ied .into scepticism. ,. 4 
Indicative of the attitude of Sa.inte-Beuve toward the work of Pascal .is 
his famous and oft-quoted statement that "one can rema.in an unbeliever 
after havi ng read Pascal, but he is no longer at Liberty to scoff or blaspheme 
5 
II 
1. C.A. Sainte-Beuve, Port-Royal, (5th ed.ition; Paris: Hachette, 1888); 
III, 106-7. 
2. Ibid . .~ p. 343. 
3. Ibid. I III, 415 
4. C .A. Sa.inte-Beuve, Portraits of the Seventeenth Century, trans. 
Katharine P. Wormeley, (New York: G.P. Putnam's. Sons, 1904L II, 173. 




Jacques ChevaLier concluded that the scepticism which many have dis-
covered in Pascal is of a merely prov.isional k.ind and his pes s .imism was 
1 
entirely relative. Chevalier contrasted Pascal w.ith Monta.igne, pointing 
out that Monta.igne delighted .in doubt whereas Pascal, "doubts only where 
he must" .in order that he "may be certa.in where he must be certa.in, yielding 
where yield.ing is necessary." 2 Rather than viewing our weakness and im-
perfections as a justification for despair, Pascal considered them an .ind.ic-
at.ion of our greatness. 
It should be kept .in mind in evaluat.ing Chevalier's interpretation of 
Pascal that he is overly zealous in demonstrating the perfect orthodoxy of 
Pascal. 
Charles Renouvier 
In his Esquisse d'une classification systematique des doctrines 
metaphysiques I 3 Renouvier contended that because Pascal was a sceptic 
concerning the intellect, his final reason for belief must be emotive, not 
intellectual. In matters of religion, Pascal was not regarded as a sceptic 
1. Jacques Chevalier, Pascal, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), 
p. 190. 
2. Blaise Pascal, Pense"es, (ed. Brunschv.icg), Number 2 68. 
3. Charles Renouvier, Esquisse d'une c1ass.ification systematique des 
doctrines metaphysiques I (2 vols; Paris: Bureau de la Critique phil-
osophique, 1885-8). 
8 
by Renouv.ier but as one who was conv.inced by all k.inds of reasons other 
than rat.ional. Pascal's appeal to the unbel.iever .is l.ikew.ise an exhortation 
to recogn.ize the reason's l.imitat.ions and therefore to solve the relig.ious 
quest.ion by some other means. This solut.ion for Pascal, as .interpreted by 
Renouv.ier, was to be found • .in the Wager argument which was considered 
by him to be a bas.ic ph.ilosoph.ical propos.it.ion whenever one had reLinquished 
a completely deduct.ive system. 
The v.iewpoints wh.ich have been br.iefly rev.iewed represent a wide array 
of .interpretations. To make a composite presentation of these views should 
be d.ifficult indeed. However, certain conclud.ing statements should be made 
about these works as a means of class.ifying past research on the problem 
of this study. 
Some critics have represented Pascal as a sceptic in ph.ilosophy because 
of his d .isavowal of reason. Others, adm.itting his scept.ic.ism in philosophy, 
have taken the position that in matters of rel.igion he has never ev.idenced 
any degree of doubt, but has throughout his l.ife remained fa.ithful to his 
Church and to his faith. Still another viewpo.int has been assumed by those 
who have not only found a basic doubt in his philosophy and in his reLigion, 
but also have seen in that doubt the very basis for h.is quest for truth. 
Because of the inclusive nature of these views when they are considered 
collectively, .it m.ight appear that there is no need to raise the problem 
which provides the focus of this study. It has been raised and answered 
9 
and ra:ised aga:in. Yet the problem pers .ists, poss:ibly because we cont:inue 
to find new quest.ions wh.ich seem relevant to the central problem. As T. S. 
Eliot has suggested, :it :is not Pa.scal who changes, but we who change. 1 
It .is :in this att:itude that the present study is undertaken. The old 
problems, .in a very real sense,. are no longer old problems but become 
startlingly new as they are cast :in the context of new disciplines of 
thought and new perspectives. The problem of doubt :in Pascal which would 
at one time have been regarded as pr.imar.ily a theolog:ical or ph:ilosoph:ical 
problem, now seems highly relevant as a psycholog:ical problem. Indeed, 
without some understanding of the. psychological factors which sur:round 
this problem .in Pascal, .it .is highly quest.ionable if any adequate descrip-
t:ion of .its function in his Life and thought can be provided . . 
3. L:imitations 
In order to ask questions mean.ingfully and to seek answers for those 
questions .it .is necessary to limit and define. Therefore, the limitations 
of this study must be stated. Br.iefly they are as follows: 
1. Th:is study is not a systematic presentat:ion of the history of the con-
cept of doubt in theology and philosophy, nor an appraisal of doubt 
in the psychology of rel.ig.ion. 
2. No attempt w.Ul be made to present or expla.in the thought of Pascal 
1. T.S. Eliot, Essays Ancient and Modern, (London: Faber and Faber, 
1949), p. 137. 
10 
in its entirety. Therefore, the diverse contribut.ions wh.ich he made 
to science and religion will be cons.idered only as they are s.ignif.icantly 
related to the concept of doubt .in his life and thought. 
3. No attempt will be made to explain the recent revival of interest in 
Pascal nor to assess his contributions to contemporary theological 
movements. 
4. Though certain .implications concerning the place of doubt .in relig.ious 
life .in general will be forthcoming .in this study, . this is not the pr.imary 
aim of th.is analysis . 
4. Definitions 
In addition to the limitations wh.ich have been outlined, it is important 
to consider briefly some of the most important and frequently used c·oncepts 




Doubt is the absence of a definite conclusion in support of or in opposi-
tion to an idea. It is an attitude of suspended judgment emerging from a 
1. The writer is indebted to the following sources .in stating these 
definitions: Vergilius Ferro, An Encyclopedia of Religion, (New York: 
The Philosophical Library, 1945); James Hastings (ed.), Encyclo@dia 
of Religion and Ethics, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925); 
Sha.iler Mathews and Gerald B.irney Sm.ith (ed.itors), A Dictionary of 
Religion and Ethics, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1921). 
11 
1 
question.ing, critical perspect.ive. Doubt can be described as an attitude 
of 11 I know not .. , an inability to aff.irm or to deny. The particular expressions 
which this attitude assumed in Pascal and the explanations for them constitute 
one focus of th.is study as we seek to understand what doubt meant in his 
life and thought. 
Disbelief 
Doubt is not to be confused with disbel.ief for to d.isbelieve impLies 
taking a definite attitude against a proposit.ion. It is a 11 positive conviction 
2 
of falsity." As such .it .is an inverted beLief, whereas doubt .is an absenc·e 
of belief. 
Scepticism 
More akin to doubt is the view that certainty of knowledge is impossible. 
This attitude is generally referred to as scepticism. In its milder expression 
it assumes the form of critical .investigation, refusing to g.ive assent to the 
truth of a proposition until a cogent explanat.ion .is reached. In .its more 
extreme form .it assumes that either because of some cognitive limitation 
of the learner or a metaphysical Limitation imposed from without, truth 
is inaccessible. 
1. James Hastings (ed.), Encyclopedia of Relig.ion and Ethics, (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), N, 862. 
2. Ibid. 
12 
The term life as .it is used in this study emphasizes those exper.iences 
of Pascal bear.ing a s.ign.ificant relationship to h.is doubt. Admittedly the 
life of a person cannot be completely separated from his thought, and such 
.is not the purpose of this study-- even with its dual focus. For purposes 
of discussion and clarity,. however, it seems advisable to dist.inguish be-
tween the ex per.iences whi. ch one encounters in life and upon which one 
may or may not reflect, and the thought of a person as it is officially 
recorded in the form of books, art.icles, letters, etc. 
Thought 
The thought of Pascal encompasses many subjects,. the whole of wh.ich 
ex ceeds the limits of this study. As the thought which bears direct re-
lation to doubt is recorded primarily in the Pens~es, it will be to this work 
that most references will be made. 
The thought of Pascal, as it was concerned primarily with his own life 
and his own solution of doubt, will be distinguished wherever poss.ible 
from his thought in which he speaks to the doubt of others. This d.ist.inction 
is not always d.iscern.ible, but wherever pos s .ible .it will be helpful to inter-
pret the thought in .its proper context and in v.iew of its purpose. 
5 . Goals of this study 
Having considered the limitations of thi s study as well as the terms 
wh.ich will be used .in defining the area chosen for research, .it is necessary 
13 
to state the goals of this study. They are as follows: 
F.irst. To clarify our understanding of the place of doubt .in the life of 
Pascal by cons.ider.ing significant external events and his response to them. 
Second. To def.ine the role of doubt in the thought of Pascal in the three 
f.ields of science, philosophy, and religion, and to consider significant 
relat.ionships of the doubt in each to that in the others. 
Th.ird. To analyze Pascal's reflect.ions on doubt recorded in the Pensees 
in which he speaks to the doubt in the exper.iences of others, a.nd to in-
vestigate any s.ign.if.icant relationship between his description of doubt .in 
others and his own experiences of doubt. 
Fourth. To clar.ify the solutions Pascal sought for the problem of doubt, 
either exper.ientiallY . or .intellectually, and to evaluate these solutions 
in terms of the.ir adequacy for Pascal. 
None of these goals, of course, will be fully real.ized .in this study. 
But .it is hoped that further light may be shed , from a psychological per-
spect.ive . on the doubt of PascaL As we wrestle with his doubt, and his 
methods of working through it to faith, perhaps we shall also gain insight 
concerning our own search for certainty in the midst of the uncertain 
struggle of Life. F"or doubt is never merely an historical or a theological 
problem. In the final analys.is, .it .is always contemporary and personal. 
Two statements, one from Pascal and the other from a great religious 
thinker who has been called the ''Pascal of Denmark", S,iren Kierkegaard, 
14 
provide an appropriate conclus.ion to these introductory remarks by placing 
an old problem .in a new setting. 
If anyone maintains that what I say .is the same as what everybody else 
.is say.ing, I will raise no object.ion, if it is taken in the same sense 
as the remark Leucippus once made, that a tra<jedy and a comedy consist 
of the same letters, only that the order .is different. I 
Let nobody say I have said nothing new: the arrangement of the mater.ial 
is new; when people play at tennis, it is the same ball which .is used 
by both players, but one places it better. I should be as pleased if 
I were told that I have used old words. As if the same thought d.id not 
form a different body of discourse by being differently disposed, just 
as the same words form different thoughts by being variously arranged r 2 
I. Stfren K.ierkegaard, Journals I834-I854, trans. Alexander Dru, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, I938), I, 181. 
2. Blaise Pascal, PensE:fes, (ed. Brunschvicg), Number 22. 
CHAPTER II 
DOUBT IN THE LIFE OF PASCAL 
1 . The France of the Seventeenth Century 
Statements such as the following excerpt are frequently found in the 
literature concerning Pascal: 
In many respects Pascal may be regarded as the man who most fully 
represents the spirit of the French. What Plato is to Greece, Dante 
.is to Italy, Cervantes and St. Teresa to Spa.in, and Shakespeare to 
England, Pascal is to France. Quite as much as, and poss.ibly more 
than, any of these national examples Pascal is the incarnation of the 
finest spirit of his country . 1 
If Pascal reflects the sp.irit of the French, an understanding of the 
man will be fostered and enhanced by a knowledge of the world in which he 
Lived, and more spec.if.ically, the France wh.ich he knew. 
French thought in the early seventeenth '. ~ntury was pregnant with new 
ideas wh.ich, though often contrad.ictory .in nature, contr.ibuted to new ad-
vances in many mental disciplines. These ideas and the eagerness with 
1. Jacques Chevalier, Pascal, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1930), p. 12. 
-15-
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which they were rece.ived were born out of the uneas.ines s which held the 
people of Western Europe .in its grasp. There was no longer the unity which 
the nations of Christendom had once enjoyed. Civ.il wars, poLitical, 
economic and social crises had produced severe disturbances .in the social 
and intellectual spheres wh.ich were placing excessive demands upon the 
leaders in these areas. New questions were being asked, and what is even 
more .important, new answers were be.ing discovered by means which pre-
v.iously had not been employed. 
i. Science . 
In the realm of science there was a rejuvenation of the spir.it which 
had been inherited from the Greeks. Pascal reflected this sp.irit in his 
scientific researches .in which the method of investigation was one of 
experiment and observation. This empir.ical emphasis was not limited to 
the realm of natural science, but was exp8l'lded as well to include the 
study of the ind.iv.idual. Some of the early traces of modern psychology 
are to be found .in this era. 
Through the efforts of such men as Gal.ileo and Descartes· the scientific 
method was revolutionizing the thought of man. Yet the conclusions and 
answers which .it was providing were not easily discovered, for paradox.ical 
as it may seem, this unrest which held the people of Western Europe in 
its sway led both to a revolt against that wh.ich was restrictive and to an 
increased love of regulated order, tradition, and authority. This duaLity 
17 
in the minds of the rrench people of the .seventeenth \Century was to create 
one of Pascal's basic problems. As a Frenchman, a representative of his 
age and his nation, he was caught up .in th.is dilemma. And a new dimension 
was added to h.is struggle· when he not only sought to master the confusion 
.in h.is own mind, but took upon himself the added burden of persuading 
others that the apparent contradictions of l.ife could be resolved. 
i.i. Stoicism 
Similarly new developments were emerging .in the realm of philosophy. 
Stoicism, through such men as Justus L.ipsius and Guillaume Du Va.ir, was 
revived and combined with other new movements. Attempts were made to 
relate Stoic.ism to Christianity in general and to the Roman Catholic Church 
in particular in such a way as to strengthen both. Evidence, however, 
points to the contrary results, for as Cheval.ier says, "he, LL.ipsiuy 
Christianized Stoic.ism and rationalized Christianity, probably to excess . " 1 
The attempt to combine Sto.icism with Catholicism met with little real 
success, for a philosophy which rests bas.ically upon the assumption that 
man is an autonomous creature seemed highly antithetical to a dogma which 
insists upon indiv.idual submission and allegiance. Even though Du Vair 
was more sensitive than other Neo-Stoics to this incongruity, he still 
failed to grasp the nature of man's essential weakness and his ceaseless 
l. Jacques Chevalier, Pascal, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1930), p. 20. 
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need for the grace of God. 
Pascal learned much from the Stoics and he frequently paid tribute to 
Ep.ictetus, the "Father" of them all. Yet .in all h.is .indebtedness, h .is tri-
butes bear an undercurrent of disdain for a ph.ilosophy which in str.iv.ing 
to portray the greatness of man had fa.iled to establish .it on philosophical 
presuppositions wh.ich Pascal could accept. He never forgave the Stoics 
for th.is att.itude of arrogance and the s .in of pride . 
.i.i.i . Scepticism 
In Monta.igne and his followers, Pascal discovered a different k.ind 
of philosophy. Based originally upon the doctr.ines of Stoi cism, Monta.igne' s 
conclusions were remote from those which were to be found in Du Vair. 
The attempts of Montaigne to '"philosophize" life into a bed of roses resulted 
.in a scepticism which rejected reason, not because .it was .incapable of 
resolv.ing the mysteries of life 1 but because they were incapable of being 
resolved. Thus the security provided .in this scepticism was of little mer.it 
in the mind of Pascal for .it evaded many of the fundamental though com-
plex problems of life. Such an apprai sal of man's .inability to grasp the 
essence of life's meaning as was to be found in Monta.igne was judged by 
Pascal as both desperate and deplorable. By asserting that man .is .incapable 
of knowing from whence he came and whither he goes, Montaigne had left 
his followers in a stat e of despair which can be resolved only by a scepti-
cism which Pascal rejected s .ince such a scepticism refuses to face the 
19 
hard facts of l.ife. Pascal was, however, .indebted to Montaigne for a picture 
of man's deprav.ity which seemed to refute successfully the Stoic's portrayal 
of unmitigated pride. Nevertheless, the s cept.ic.ism which Monta.igne em-
braced was considered by Pascal as a form of mental arrogance falling 
l.ittle short of the s .in of pr.ide wh.ich was so prevalent .in the Stoics. 
Therefore r though Pascal was .indebted to Monta.igne, a.s he had been 
.in quite a d.ifferent way to Ep.ictetus, he ultimately turned his back upon 
both .in his apologet.ic· work dedicated to the l.ibert.ines . 
.iv. Libertines 
The free thinkers or l.ibert.ines (l.ibertins) who flourished .in the time 
of Pascal presented another facet of the confus.ing and changing France 
of his day. Unlike the Stoics or the followers of Montaigne, this group 
pledged no allegiance to any form of organized rel.igion. Though there were 
some in their m.idst who openly attacked the Church, for the most part their 
approach was more oblique and subtle. They were characterized by a lax-
ness of moral.ity as well as a liberty of thought which permitted them to 
scoff and r.idicule all existing forms of religion. Turning f.irst to science 
and later to philosophy, especially the formulations of Pierre Charron, 
l 
they found a basis from which they could attack religion. 
1 . Pierre Charron contended that virtue may be found without rel.ig.ion and 
religion, without virtue. "Religion" was. considered superfluous; a 
rational belief .in God was all that was believ·ed necessary. For a de-
tailed description of his philosophy of religion see Pierre Charron, De 
la sagesse, (Paris: P. Douceur, 1613). 
It was this group in particular to which Pascal's projected Apology 
of the Christian Religion 1 his Pens~es 1 was addressed. 
v. Revived Cathol.i.cism 
The religious crisis in France in the early part of the s eventeenth 
·century was brought about largely by the influences of the Protestant 
Reformation and the Renaissance. 1 Both of these movements deviated 
from the trad.ition of the Middle Ages. The Reformation confined its 
efforts to the restoration of the Gospel to a central place in religion 
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whereas the Renaissance turned .its attention to the rev.ival of the paganism 
of the anc.ient classical tradition. 
Opposing these devel0pments was a marked renewal of Catholic life 
.in France 1 highlighted by the conversion of Henry N. No fewer than fifteen 
d.ifferent orders ga.ined status in the Church in France in a relatively short 
time. Such leaders as St. Franc.is de Sales and St. Vincent de Paul became 
prominent in the spiritual guidance of the Church. 
The struggle between the Jesuits and the Jansenists was yet another 
contributing factor to the revival of Catholicism. At times because of 
their b.itter arguments these fact.ions seemed united only intheir common 
enemy. The Jesuits 1 inspired by a missionary zeal which has always 
characterized their educational work 1 were criticized by the more orthodox 
1. Fortunat , Strowski, Histoire du sentiment religieux en France au dix-
septieme siecle: Pascal et son temps I (3 vols: Paris: Plon 1 1907) I III. 
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groups with.in the Church because of their willingness to comb.ine the 
Catholic conception of truth with the new .intellectual trends and contemp-
orary political c.ircumstances. They were also denounced for their essenti-
ally optimistic conception of man's moral capacities. The Jesuits re-
proached the Jansenists for sacr.if.icing men to truth r on the basis that they 
had made themselves the .inexorable judges of the good and the true, 
thus ra.is.ing barriers everywhere for those who might otherwise be converted 
to membership in the Church. 
The Jansenists opposed the miss.ionary tactics employed by the Jesu.its 
and in general res.isted all reconciliation between truth and error. They 
.ins.isted that truth should be presented .in .its entirety, and moral.ity should 
be presented in .its most demanding form, regardless of the number of 
converts which such a str.ict doctrine might win. Consequently, the 
Jansenists condemned the Jesuits for sacrificing truth to the interests and 
pass.ions of men, on the basis that they were thereby encouraging error 
rather than excluding .it from the fa.ith. The Jansenists held that the Jesuit 
doctr.ine was too human and not suffic.iently divine. 
vi. Summary 
France in the seventeenth ' Century provided a complex background 
which rriust be understood in order to appreciate the environment in which 
Pascal was reared. It was in the realm of scierice, a per.iod of scientific 
progress. There was a new emphasis upon the empirical approach to 
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knowledge. 
In the realm of ph.ilosophy, through the influence of such men as Du 
Vair, there was a revival of interest .in Sto.i.c.ism. Opposing this develop-
ment was Montaigne and h.i.s ph.ilosophy of scepticism. Another important 
.influence upon scept.i.cal philosophy was the effect of the libertines or 
free thinkers. 
In contrast to these forces wh.i.ch threatened the influence of the 
Church, there was a renewed interest in Cathol.i.cism. A particularly im-
portant aspect of this revival was the struggle b-etween the Jesuits and the 
Jansen.i.sts. 
All of these influences were to have important consequences in the 
life of Pa~cal. 
2. The Origins of the Pas.cal F'amily 
i. The Grandfather and Father of Pascal 
The great-grandfather of Pascal, Jean Pascal, early in the :s.i.xteenth 
century took up his res.i.dence in Clermont, or as it is called today, Clermont-
Ferrand, the capital of Auvergne in central France. It was here that both 
; 
Blaise Pascal and his father Etienne were born. Though the family was 
of noble stock, they were surrounded by peasants who seem to have borne 
some of the characteristics of the land itself. In a land of extinct vol-
canoes stretching out into a bleak granite plateau, it .i.s perhaps not 
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surpr.is.ing to find these people ste~ped .in sorcery and dark and mysterious 
legend. The world was a strange and myster.ious place for these people, 
and the.ir endeavor to solve its mystery may seem somewhat of a mystery 
in itself as one attempts to explain it. 
I 
Emerging from this background, Et.ienne Pascal early grew .into the 
behavior appropriate to h.is noble birth. His family, desiring a life of 
public· service for h.im, sent h.im to Paris as a young man to be educated 
as a magistrate. · Important .influences which came .into his life during his 
study .in Paris were his acqua.intance with Antoine Arnauld, as well as h.is 
growing interest in science r particularly mathematics. These .influences 
were to assume even greater s .ign.ificance as they were later shared with 
his son, Bla.ise. 
In 1617, after he had completed his study and returned to a govern-
ment post in Clermont, Etienne Pascal married Antoinette B~gon, the 
daughter of a prominent merchant of this region. To th.is union four 
children were born, three of whom survived: Gilberte, the eldest, born 
about New Year's Day, 1620; Blaise, born on June 19, 1623; and Jacqueline, 
born on October 5, 1625. One year later, .in 1626, Antoinette B~gon Pascal 
, 
d.ied, leaving Etienne Pascal with the total respons.ibility of rearing his 
family of sensitive, talented, and somewhat unusual children . 
.i.i. The Motherless Home 
Little .is known about the life of Pascal's mother, Antoinette B~gon 
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Pascal. Most descriptions of her can be summarized by stating that 
she was a very pious and devoted woman who spent much of her time 
visiting the poor. 
With this limited knowledge it is d.ifficult to assess adequately the 
influence which she had upon Pascal during the first three years of his 
life. There seem to be no personal accounts left by Pascal as to her 
influence on him while she was still alive, or the void which . he felt 
after her death. 
From the point of v.iew of contemporary psychoanalysis we do know 
the importance of these first formative years in the life of a child, and 
it is quite possible that though all three of the Pascal children seemed 
to have close bonds to their father, yet in matters of piety .it was more 
to the mother's than the father's example that they turned. At one point 
in his Pensees, Pascal refers to the lack of love as being the basis 
of doubt. Whether he is here reflecting his own experience, and whether 
he is referring to the void in his own affective life -- as a child or as an 
adult -- can only be a matter of speculation. 
Some evidence for conclud.ing that there was considerable impairment 
in the parent-child relation in Blaise's very early years is forthcoming 
from the oft-told accounts of his aruiious crying at the sight of his mother 
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and father together. He was also described as being a very listless child 
and death for him often seemed quite imminent. 
Whatever might be said of the brief influence of the mother upon Pascal, 
the void which her death created in the home did contribute to an unusual 
atmosphere in the fam.ily constellation. Especially was this the case in 
/ 
the Pascal household, for Etienne Pascal was determined to assume the 
responsibilities which had previously been undertaken by his wife. By 
giving up many of his official duties as a public servant he had more time 
to devote to the routine matters of the household as well as to the educ-
ation of his children . 
.iii. The Education of Pascal 
Several factors concerning Pascal's education are worth noting: 
first, .it was private; second, it concentrated heav.ily upon science and 
literature; third, it was based on the axiom that a ch.ild should be held 
I' 
above his task. By this latter educational principle, Etienne meant that 
a child should be instructed in a new form of knowledge only when he had 
reached a period of readiness for this task. 
Pascal was given unusual freedom in his education as compared to 
educational trends of that day or the pres.ent. He was encouraged to ask 
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questions freely and to seek for truth wherever it could be found. 1 As 
Pascal evidenced a readiness for learning, he was soon taken by his father 
to the meetings of the Academie libre where, in company with such men as 
Roberval and Descartes, he learned to appeal to reason rather than to rely 
upon the authority of the ancients as the scholastic philosophers had done. 
For him the method of empirical, objective investigation replaced the more 
traditional speculative approach to learning. 
As a result of this, Pascal found himself at liberty to experiment and 
probe. A part of the discipline which was .imposed upon him forbade him 
to accept the answers of others w.ithout first testing their hypotheses and 
checking their conclusions. Thus, in matters of science he was taught to 
give no allegiance to any doctrine until after careful investigation .it was 
found to be empirically valid. 
This does not .imply that Pascal automatically reduced all knowledge 
to such a test. In matters of religion he refused to maintain a completely 
objective attitude, .insisting that truth is a matter of personal experience 
involving a kind of subjective commitment which surpasses reason. 
Therefore, concerning the effect of his education upon doubt in his 
1. For a detailed account of the education of Pascal see Gilberte Perier, 
; 
La vie de M. Pascal ed. Louis Lafuma, (3 vols. Paris: Editions du 
Luxembourg, 1951), Documents, p. 20. 
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life and thought, it can be said that in matters of science, the attitude 
of doubt (that is, suspended judgment) was increased. In matters of 
religion, the influence is much more difficult to evaluate. 
iv. Religion in the family 
Religion in the Pascal home was largely a formal matter during the 
/ 
youth of Pascal. There is no reason to believe that Etienne Pascal was 
opposed to religion. He, like many of his contemporaries in France, 
combined the seriousness in religious matters considered proper to the 
legal nobility with the free thinking so characteristic of learned society. 
As one who knew well the requirements of an honn~te homme he did not like 
to discuss religion in public, even though he felt some personal conviction 
about it. He would acknowledge the Chr.istian tradition at a safe distance, 
but did not seek occasions to propound it. His interests lay more in the 
realm of science and linguistics. 
/ 
However, to say that Etienne Pasca1 was a free thinker would be over-
stating the case, just as it would be misleading to say that he was a 
devout man in the usual meaning of that word. He was not a "religious 
man". Yet he always remained submissive to organized religion. He 
maintained, and early in the life of Blaise taught him to believe, that 
faith and· reason played quite diverse roles. An object of faith, because 
of its nature, could not be an object of reason. Correspondingly, he 
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believed that faith was inappropriate in the realm of natural phenomena. I 
It was based upon the assumption that Etienne posited in the three orders 
. of reality which were so fundamental in the th.inking of his son, namely 
in the order of matter, the order of mind, and the order of charity. It 
was such a distinction which made it possible for Pascal to be a "free 
thinker" : in science while remaining, on a different basis, submissive in 
2 
the realm of religion. 
Propriety, therefore, was considered by Etienne to be essential in 
religious matters. Religion was respected by him and this respect was 
communicated to his son, Blaise, who learned from his father "more of 
respect possibly than profound piety". 3 The formal education of Blaise 
included the study of religion in which he was taught to read the Bible, 
excerpts from the Church Fathers, and ecclesiastical history. 
3. Physical and Spiritual Sickness and Death 
i. The Many Illness of Pascal 
The life of Pascal was filled with illness. His knowledge of suffering 
I 
1. Emile Cailliet, Pascal, Genius in the Light of Scripture, (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1945), p. 31. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Jean Mesnard, Pascal, L'Homme et L'Oeuvre, (Paris: Boivin et Cie., 
1951), p. 22. 
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was first-hand, for he knew pain intimately. The biographer who knew 
him best has said, " ... since the age of eighteen years, he did not 
pass a day without suffering ... ,.l Though it is ·quite possible that 
there is in this testimony the same tendency to exaggerate details as is 
found in other writings of Mrs. Perier, Pascal's sister I there are many 
medical journals which devote considerable Space to a diagnosis of his 
sufferings. 2 We need not be particularly concerned with the various 
diagnoses which have been put forth as attempts to solve the problem of 
Pascal's illnesses, except as these diagnoses cast light upon our under-
standing of the problem of this study. 
The periods during which Pascal's illnesses seem most severe are as 
follows: during the first year of his life; in 1647, when he was twenty-
four years of age, and at which time he returned to Paris to live: and 
from 1658 or 1659 until the time of his death in 1662. It is difficult 
1. Gilberte Perier, La Vie de M. Pascal, ed. Louis Lafuma, (3 vols; 
I 
Paris: Editions du Luxembourg, 19 51) , Documents, p. 2 3. 
2. For a discussion of Pascal's illnesses see the following sources: 
Journal des Debats, June 20, 26, 1925i Ghronique Medicale 1 January 1, 
August 1, 1926, January 1, 1927; Fran9ois Nautiacq, Blaise Pascal 
malade (Bourdeaux·, Impr. de L 'Academie et des Facultes, 19 30) i 
I , ' M. Chedecal, Quelques reflexions medicales et para-medicales a 
propos de Blaise Pascal, (Lyon: Bose Freres, 193l)i Emile Roux, M.D. I 
La maladie de Pascal, (Paris: cours professe au College libre des 
sciences sociales de Paris par le Dr. Emile Roux, 1926). 
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to account for the recurrence of Pascal's malady on the basis of a single 
diagnosis. The diagnosis offered by Dr. Just-Navarre of peritoneal 
tuberculosis is generally accepted as explaining the symptoms which 
appeared in Pascal's suffering both early in life as well -as the later 
symptoms. In all periods. of illness there seemed to be the recurrence 
of the langour which was sim.ilar to the listlessness which he ex perienced 
duri ng the period of infancy. 
During the siege of illness during 1647, when Pascal went to Paris 
for medical treatment, he suffered a paralysis which affected the lower 
part of his body and which prevented him from walking ex cept with the 
aid of crutches. 
Despite these sufferings of the body and the added burden of sub-
mitting to what seems to us today as ex cruciating medical treatment,. 
Pascal gave no evidence of embitterment or of any mental disorder such 
as hysteria. 1 His reaction according to Gilberte was that, 
He would often say that previous"ly his infirmities diverted him from 
his studies, and he was troubled by them1 but that a Chr.istian dis-
covered his benefit in every thing, and especially in sufferings, 
because one knew in them Jesus Christ crucified, who ought to be all 
the science of the Christian and the unparalleled glory of his life. 2 
l. Jacques Chevalier, Pascal, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1930), p. 48. 
2. Gilberte,Perier, La Vie de M. Pascal,. ed. Louis Lafuma, (3 vols1 
Paris: Editions du Luxembourg, 19 51) Documents, p. 2 5. 
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Of particular note in connection with this study is the fact that there 
does seem to be a correlation between P'ascal' s research work in science 
and the occurrence of h.is illnesses. In 1647 and again in 1659 when he 
was overc om e by severe painr Pascal was actively engaged in scientific 
research. In both these instances it appears that his illness served as 
something of a cause as well as a result of his scientific pursuits. F'or 
example, in 1647 the arduous efforts to perfect his calculating machine 
contributed heavily to his loss of strength. Again in 1659, after his 
research on the cycloid, because of his .illness he was obliged to relinquish 
his work. In both of these oases, however, there is no clear-cut dis-
tinction made as to the onset of the illness, and particularly if we accept 
the account given by Gilberte of the latter illness r we gain evidence to 
support the view that his researches were sometimes more ambitious when 
he was suffering the most. 1 
Therefore,it seems quite possible that his illnesses may have given 
an added compulsive character to an already alert and inquisitive mind, 
which in an effort to" solve" the mystery of suffer.ing, turned to the 
interpretation of the physical universe instead. To imply that his scientific 
queries had, therefore, something of the quality of compensation in them 
I. Ibid. 
32 
does not detract from their worth either as scientific contributions or as 
efficient means for minimizing human suffering. It does point, however, 
to a consideration which s.eems relevant to the problem of doubt in Pascal's 
life, namely that Pascal hoped to find in science a relief from his distress. 
If the relief sought seems little more than an evasion of the real problem, 
.it may well be indicative of the way in which Pascal sought many of the 
answers to life's problems first through the scientific method; only after-
wards I when he found this to fail, or see.ing its inappropriateness, did 
he turn to a religious solution. The statement of Gilberte in speaking of 
her brother's suffering seems particularly relevant at this point when she 
comments " •.. he would often say ... Jesus Christ crucified ... 
ought to be all the science of the Ohr.istian . .,l 
If Pascal could not fully explain his. sufferings either from a scientific 
and .intellectual perspective or from a rel.tg.ious and philosical point of 
view, he could accept them existentially through submission to Christ and 
the way of suffering. There was thus in Pascal an attempt first to explain, 
which is an out-growth of doubt .in the scientific method as well as in 
religion. When this failed, he humbled himself to an acceptance of his 
fate 1 and prayed .in his . ,, Priere pour le bon usage des maladies that his 
sickness might be spent in the service of God rather than in .idleness and 
1. Ibid. 
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petty achievements . He prays, 
... LLorgf, thou hast given me health to serve thee, and I have 
made a comp-letely profane use of it. Thou sendest me sickness now 
to correct me; do not allow me to use it to anger thee by my impatience . . 
I have made poor use of my health, and for that thou hast justly 
punished me. Do not allow me to make poor use of thy punishment. 
And since the corruption of my nature is such that it makes thy 
favors pernicious, grant, 0 my God, that thy almighty grace render 
thy chastisements beneficial. If my heart was full of affection for 
the world while it had some v.igor 1 destroy this vigor for the sake 
of my health; and render me incapable of enjoying the world, whether 
it be due to weakness of the body, or zeal of charity, in order that 
I may enjoy thee only . . . "1 
These references to the use of his ~ time by Pascal reflect his chang-
ing attitude toward science and its ultimate value 1 as well as a judgment 
in general of the manner .in which he had spent his time and efforts during 
2 
the "worldly period". The doubt which appears here is not a doubt 
concerning God's existence, but rather a doubt concerning his own worth!-
ness as a vessel of God's grace. Basic to this assumption is the pervasive 
attitude that in order to enjoy God one must be senseless to the world 
around. This prayer reflects the tendency to separate completely the 
realm of religion from the realm of sc.ience and philosophy-- a separation 
, 
which Etienne Pascal had taught his son, but which Blaise emphasized 
1. Blaise Pascal, Priere pour Demander 'aDieu le Bon Usage des Maladies, 
Oeuvres Completes I ed. Jacques Chevalier, (Paris: Librairie Gallimard 1 
1954), p. 606. (translationmine). 
2. See p .. 42f. of this study. 
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only in his later years of life. 
One can but wonder as he reads this passage and others following 
it in the prayer of Pascal as to the psychological significance of religion 
in his life at th.ts time. In his submission he was learning a new and 
quite different discipline from any he had previously experienced in 
s c.ience. If the prayer is placed during the period from 165 9 to 16 60, 1 
it casts a different light not only upon his worldly per.iod, but als·o upon 
his life after the time of his second conversion. 2 Though .Pascal had 
not relinquished science even after his second conversion, he admittedly 
saw it from a d.ifferent perspective. The judgment which he makes of it 
at this time seems even more severe, and causes the reader to wonder 
if the fame and glory which he so earnestly sought in his earliest scientific 
researches have not now added to the remorse which he feels, thus 
deepening his own sense of unworthiness and his need for God's assurance. 
The retributive theme raised in the book of Job appears here again. Pascal 
as·sumes that his suffering is for a purpose,. and this. purpose is first 
that of punishing him for his lack of devotion, and second, to awaken him 
1. Jean Mesnard and Louis Lafuma both ascr.ibe this prayer to this period 
and are supported in this ascription by Gilberte's account. The editors 
of the Port-Royal edition of the Pensees relate the prayer to an earlier 
period, probably the period of his. first conversion. 
2 • See p, 6If.of this study. 
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to the real purpose of his life. 
The doubt expressed in this prayer seems, therefore, to be a doubt 
emerging from his own ethical and religious failings rather than from an 
uncertainty concerning the existence of the supernatural. This is a 
basic and a necessary distinction to make in assessing the place of doubt 
in the life of Pascal. 
This same attitude is reflected in the clos.ing months of h.is life. 
The sufferings of Pascal increased in severity. If any one activity domin-
ated the br.ief periods of relief from his illness, it was the v.is.it.ing of 
the s.ick and the poor wh.ich he undertook with great zeal. In this work, 
as in his associations during this time with members of his family, he 
continually emphasized that God alone is the acceptable goal for our 
love and our service. On August 17 , 1662, he was seized by violent 
convulsions and died two days later on August 19, 16 62 . 
Let us summarize briefly the importance of Pascal's illnesses: 
First, they steadily weakened an already frail constitution and made it 
increasingly difficult throughout his life to engage in any vigorous physical 
activ.ity; second, they predisposed him to a life with ample time for re-
flection and meditation] third, his intense mental activity was both a 
cause and a result of excessive suffering; fourth, his illnesses caused 
him to question seriously the purpose of his life and that upon which it 
had been expended and to increase his devotion to God in sickness as 
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in health. 
There seems to be no evidence either ~n h.is own writings or .in the 
records of his biographers that his suffering ever caused him to doubt the 
ex istence of God or the value of serving him. There does seem to be 
evidence that his health improved during the worldly period. But this 
can be attributed more to lessened physical and mental activity than to 
any presumed relat.ion between his moral seriousness and his sickness. 
That there was in Pascal's .illness a natural channel to his acceptance 
of Jansenism and .its austere doctrines cannot be denied. But the as soc.i-
at.ion of sickness with h.is acceptance of Jansenism provides neither a 
suff.ic.ient explanation for this phenomenon nor an invalidation of it. 
Por as Peyre has stated: 
A good port.ion of humanity is not composed of healthy and absolutely 
normal people. As to the rest, the vision of a Proust or of a Pascal 
continues to be more revealing than that of a healthy optimist who 
has never suffered from dyspepsia. 1 
It becomes increasingly evident in the pursuit of the mystery which 
engulfed Pascal that this ve.il which allowed him to be ever like ourselves 
and yet ever different is not to be removed by any simple process. The 
explanation of the doubt .in the life of Pascal is not to be found .in a medical 
1. Henri Peyre, "Pascal et la critique contemporaine" 1 The Romantic Review 1 
vol. 21, no. 4, October-December, 1930, p. 326. 
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or psychometric diagnosis. These will "explain" his illness only a.s they 
are incorporated into a larger view of the man in which they lead to a 
comprehensive view in which his illness .is seen as only one aspect of 
a total, suffering and striving man of God. 
i.i. The First Conversion 
The general religious atmosphere of the Pascal household has been 
depicted as one of general conformity to the dictates of the faith, but 
one in which there was relatively little vital concern for personal aspects 
of devotion. However, after the Pascal family had moved to Rouen, where 
the father had been appointed to a government post, this picture was 
I 
changed qu.ite suddenly by an accident in which Etienne Pascal seriously 
injured his hip in a fall on the ice. 
In order to care for the elder Pascal, two brothers who had gained 
considerable reputation in Rouen for their bone setting and their piety, 
were summoned to the home. These brothers, Adrien and Jean Deschamps 
had both been influenced by the expansion of Jansenism which was parti-
cularly pronounced in this area. They were well received by the Pascal 
" household, and by the time of their departure three months later, Etienne's 
injury was completely healed. 
The brothers' influence upon the members of the Pascal family was 
more profound, however, than the mere healing of the father's hip. The 
Page 38 lacking in numbering onq. 
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Deschamps brothers were enthusiastic representatives of the Jansenist 
point of view and sought to bring the Pascal family under its influence. 
The enthusiasm of Blaise was not difficult to kindle. He read eagerly 
the books which they lent him and he spent long hours with the brothers 
1 discussing the problems raised by his reading. The result of this ex -
perience was the winning over of Pascal to Jansenism, or what is commonly 
referred to as his 11 first conversion 11 • 
This conversion has often been compared to the first conversion of 
Augustine in the sense that it persuaded the head rather than the heart. 2 
Perhaps some of the disagreement which has grown up around such a compar-
ison has resulted from a confusion of what conversion meant at this time. 3 
Despite the confusion which has reigned over the function of the first 
conversion, it seems s .ingularly evident that the rigorous logical and 
metaphysical system to which the Jansenists adhered held particular 
1. His reading included: Cornelius Jansen, Augustinus,; Arnauld d'Andilly, 
Discours sur la retorme de l'homme interieur; Antoine Arnauld, La 
fnfguente communion; Saint-Cyran, Lettres. 
2. H. F. Stewart, The Holiness of Pascal, (Cambridge: The University 
Press, 1915), p. 60. 
3. J. Lhermet, Pascal et la Bible, (Paris: Librairie J. Vrin, 1930) p. 69. 
Lhermet maintains, for example, that conversion in the seventeenth 
6 entury meant merely "the transition from a more or less dissipated 
and worldly life to a life of austere and profound piety", and did 
not denote a radical transformation which makes believers out of 
unbelievers. 
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appeal for Pascal. 
In any event, the first conversion did not br.ing an end to Pascal's 
interest in science, as one might be tempted to conclude on the basis of 
. . 1 
the account provided by his sister, Gilberte. If anything, his conversion 
bore a close relationship to his researches in science, for it helped 
to increase his awe at the secrets which religion allowed man to discover 
and thus to be led closer to the ultimate truth about himself and his world. 
Coming as it did in the midst of Pascal's struggles with the concept of 
infinity in his researches on conic sections, the conversion to the Jansenist 
theology corroborated his .interest in law and order which he had come 
to respect in science. Thus, though Pascal had not discovered God through 
science, he had come to appreciate the coherence of His universe. There-
fore, the Jansenist doctrine of a God who had predestined some for salva-
tion from the beginning of the world appealed to Pascal, for it indicated 
to him a God of order and one in whom reason found expression. 
In spite of the appeal which this new doctrine had for Pascal it 
cannot be assumed that it put an end to his misgivings as he sought for 
a principle which would give unity to life in all its various expressions; 
it was in no sense a final conversion. Intellectually it did seem to reflect 
1. Gilberte Pe'rier , La Vie de M. Pas.cal, ed. Louis Lafuma, (3 vols; 
I 
Paris: Editions du Luxembourg, 1951), Documents, p. 2 3. 
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the entrance of Pascal into a more personal and devout Christian life. 
However, there seems to be little support for the contention that from 
this point on, he turned his back upon science and ·the world and devoted 
himself solely to religion. In terms of the fruits of his living t bro account 
of Chevalier captures the effect of the first conversion upon Pascal when 
he states: 
... he continued to live as he had hitherto lived. He pursued his 
researches and his attempts to perfect the calculating machine; he 
began his experiments on the vacuum; he waged war upon his opponents 
and vindicated h.is own rights at the same time as those of truth. 
He does not appear to have changed his habits, or practiced poverty, 
mortification ofi'the flesh, and obedience 1 as he was to do in so 
simple and sublime a way in the later years of his life. . . At that 
time he thought less about reforming himself -- a task which is the 
sign of a true conversion -- than of reforming others . . . 1 
The pursuits which Chevalier describes here are the activities which 
occupied Pascal's interest following his first conversion. Such a pursuit 
as his concerted effort to produce his calculating machine on a mass 
scale, discourages one from concluding that h.is interest was solely 
on religion and not on the world. The reverse seems more nearly the truth. 
It .is to this much debated question of his worldly period I and the activities 
which this involved, that we now turn. 
1. Jacques Chevalier, Pascal, (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 
1930), p. 78. 
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iii. Interlude -- The Worldly Period 
The worldly period in the life of Pascal is that period which covered 
approximately six years of his life from about 1648 to the fall of 1654. 1 
It seems reasonable to assume that it began shortly after Pascal was 
advised by his doctors to cease his scientific inquiries and to find some 
form of distraction. 
Despite what Gilberte has said concerning her brother, this was a 
period of intense scientific research for Pascal, though he regarded his 
studies less as ends in themselves than in pervious years. He was now 
busily engaged in the research on the vacuum, and the developments of 
his calculating machine. 
In matters of religion also, Pascal was active, debating with Jacques 
Forton, the Sieur de Saint-Ange; over the attempt of the latter to reconcile 
faith and reason in such a way as to dispense with Revelation. In his 
own personal life, as well as that of his family, Pascal evidenced a 
1. There is much disagreement among critics as to the dates covered by 
the worldly period. Gilberte and Marguerite Perier ass.ign it to the 
return of Blaise and Jacqueline to Paris in 1647. Jean Mesnard in 
Pascal, L'homme et L'oeuvre, (Paris: Boivin et cie., 1951), p. 32 
coincides. Others, such as Fortunat Strowski, Histoire du sentiment 
religieux en France au XVIIe siecle, Pascal et son temps. . . trois-
ieme partie, (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et cie., 1908), II, 232, speaks of 
the date as coming in 165 3. Morris Bishop, Pascal, The Life of 
Genius, (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1936), p. 114, dates the 
worldly period from the "Voyage en Poitou" which he ascribes to the 
spring of 1651. 
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greater personal piety as the result of his first conversion, but there was 
no radical transformation such as one might expect to follow a conversion. 
The Pascal family did not relinquish as a result of the conversion experience 
any desire for social status which was an accepted feature of their noble 
JlO.sit.bn, nor did they remove themselves from the active social intercourse 
to which they had grown accustomed. The conversion, therefore, was · 
in no sense "complete". Hence the worldly period of Pascal is to be 
interpreted less as a denial of his conversion than as a proof of its 
partiality. He should not be accused of running away from something 
which in actrrality he had never reached. 
(1) Concern for Fame 
As Pascal pursued his scientific labors from 1647 to 1651, he gave 
still further evidence of a worldly attitude. There is above all a persistent 
concern for his own reputation. Pride in his achievements is reflected 
also .in his writings, especially in his reply to Father Noel .in defense of 
his pamphlet, Nouvelles Experiences touchant le Vide which he published 
in 1647. The famous teacher of Descartes, rather Noel, was not accustomed 
to being addressed in the condescending manner in which Pascal wrote 
concerning Noel'·s criticisms of his discoveries. The same excessive 
concern for his own reputation is detected in his letter to Monsieur de 
Ribeyre, who had accused him of "stealing" Torricelli's experiment on 
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the vacuum. 
In general, then, it can be said that the most obvious signs of the 
worldly period .in the life of Pascal at this t .ime were "an attachment to 
science, an attachment to fame,. a rather too imperious sense of his own 
1 
genius." 
(2) Conflict with Jacqueline over the Dowry 
Jacqueline, Pascal's younger sister, had returned to Paris with Pascal 
2 
in 1647. If this· date ushered in a new era for Pascal, .it also brought 
a new way of life for Jacqueline. It was shortly after her return to the 
city that she made her decision to withdraw from the world., with the 
hope of becoming a nun at Port-Royal. She began, consequently, to 
prepare herself for the convent which she would eventually enter. 
At f.irst, Blaise responded favorably to this new development. He 
spoke · in her behalf; only to find that their father was violently opposed 
to such a decision on her part to become a nun. Not only did the elder 
Pascal criticize Jacqueline for this decision, but he blamed Blaise for 
influencing her in this direction. So great was the opposition from the 
father, that Jacqueline promised that she would not enter the convent as 
1. Jean Mesnard, Pascal (New York, The Ph.ilosophical Library,. 1952) p. 39. 
2. F'or a detailed account of the relation of Blaise Pascal to his sister, 
Jacqueline, seeM. V. Woodgate, Pascal and His Sister, (London, 
B. Herder Book Co., 1945). 
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long as he lived. For all practical purposes, however, her life was that 
of a nun. She withdrew increas.ingly from the world, spending most of her 
time in prayer and meditation. 
The long period of waiting for the day when she might enter the 
" 
convent at Port-Royal came to an end, when in the fall of 1651, Etienne 
Pascal died. The pathway for the carrying out of her decision now seemed 
open. Soon, however, there were complications. These complications 
seem relevant for this study because they reflect an attitude on the part 
of Pascal which is further evidence of a worldly period in his life. 
Blaise, who had previously shared Jacqueline's enthusiasm for her 
chosen work, now reversed his stand. In drawing up the conditions of 
the estate left by the father, Blaise threatened to w.ithhold her property 
if Jacqueline should take . the vows of a nun. Accounts of this arrange-
ment are often deceiving for they make .it appear that Blaise was making 
it .impossible for Jacqueline to become a nun. Actually, all that he did 
was to deprive Gilberte, his older sister who was now married to Florin 
Pe"rier, of her share of the inheritance by making himself heir-general of 
Jacqueline's property. 
The reasons for his opposition to Jacqueline's plans and the direction 
which this opposition took may be numerous 1 but at least two seem obvious: 
he was lonely and he had lost his best friend, counselor and teacher by 
the death of his father. He had lost in still another sense I in terms of 
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his competition with Jacqueline. Close as they may have been in their 
relation throughout life, there was beneath their love for each other a 
subtle spirit of competition which can be traced from the earliest achieve-
ments of Blaise i n science and the earliest successes of Jacqueline with 
her poetry. Throughout their youth there had been an intense desire to 
1 
ex cel, and the competition which each felt came from the other. 
From nearly every vantage point, it would appear that Pascal had 
won at least temporarily this race for achievement. His scientific works 
had been well received and applauded at home and abroad. His name was 
not only recognized, but respected. There was, however,- one vantage 
point from which the perspective varied, and that was the religious, In 
this realm d t was not Blaise but Jacqueline who had excelled. At least 
outwardly she had made a commitment, her faith had been sealed by her 
vow to Port-Royal. Pascal could make no such claim to achievement 
in the realm of the spirit. 
One may imagine that Pascal felt this triumph of Jacqueline to be a 
personal defeat, and furthermore a great personal loss. He had lost his 
fathen now he was to lose the only other close affective relationshi p 
which he had known. He had never felt as close to Gilberte his older 
I. For a more detailed discussion of the effect of this competition between 
Pascal and his sister, Jacqueline, upon Pa.scal's religious development 
see: Morris Bishop, Pascal. 'ir.he Life of Genius, (New York: Reyna! and 
Hitchcock, 1936) p. 20. 
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sister as he had to Jacqueline, and even if he had, he could no longer 
look to her for consolation, for she was .involved .in her family activities 
in far-off Clermont. 
Whatever one's bias, Pascal seems to have been ego-centric in his 
actions. Intellectually he had and could support Jacqueline in her decision; 
emotionally he was forced to disagree and in this instance, h.is intelil.ect 
lost. And Pascal also lost 1 for Jacqueline was not to be deterred from 
the decision which had become more definite .in her long months of pre-
paration and waiting. Consequently, she made her first retreat at Port-
Royal .in the fall of 1651. 
Pascal's relation to Jacqueline at this time .is especially significant. 
First, it helps one to see him as a lonely man .in the world, and makes 
us ask: "To whom will he turn?" Second; it suggests the strong poss.i-
bility that in turning again-st Jacqueline he had also 1 for the time being 
at least, turned his back formally on her decision and on religion. Th.is 
represents a step into the deeper phase of the worldly period. 
/ (3) Effect of the Death of Et.ienne Pascal 
, 
The death of Etienne Pascal had certain immediate effects upon his 
son, Blaise, some of which have been discussed above. The most .immediate, 
of course, was the emotional and intellectual void which he ex perienced 
at the loss of his only teacher, his constant companion, and friend. Next 
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in importance were the effects of the death upon Jacqueline's opportunity 
to implement her decision to enter the convent and the consequences 
which this had for Blaise. 
, 
But there were also positive effects. The death of Etienne made it 
possible for Pascal to claim his share of his inheritance and thus to 
become the administrator of his property. Though claiming this inherit-
ance involved some difficulties in collecting debts owed to his father, 
Pascal was able, after a period of investment, to realize an income larger 
than he had been accustomed to. In this way, Pascal had more money 
for his scientific work -- work which required a considerable investment. 
Moreover, he now possessed more means to move .in the circles in which 
science was being discussed along with other matters of the world. Thus, 
his inheritance became the means to the achievement of new fame and 
greater accomplishments. This is an important consideration, especially 
as it is considered in connection with his relation to his sister, Jacqueline. 
For even though Pascal felt out-distanced by her i n the religious realm, 
by wise planning and use of his inheritance, he could achieve greater 
prestige in scientific investigations. This was a realm in which he had 
already achieved eminence, and therefor·e it seemed more safe and secure 
for him than to launch out into a relatively new realm such as religion 
represented for him at the time 0 1 
1 0 Ibid 0 p 0 l 07. 
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The ambivalent feelings and mixed emotions with which Pascal 
obviously responded to the death of his father elucidate the austere tone 
of "the letter of comfort" which he addressed to his sister Gi lberte and 
" her husband,- Florin Perier. The letter .is a perfect example of formal 
Jansenist theology concerning death. Whatever it lacked .in depth of 
personal feeling, it compensated for .in the realm of scholarly erud.it.ion. 
Just as some of hi s earlier writings at the time of his first conversion 
reflected the superficiality of the ex perience and the dominant note of 
an intellectual re-alignment, so now his att.itude as reflected in this 
letter .is pr.imari!y one whi ch grows out of dogma rather than personal 
ex perience. The letter bears the imprint of defensiveness, which Hr 
very likely ex plained by the fact that Pascal is asking others to accept 
piously an event which he himself finds it d.ifficult if not .impossible to 
accept fully. His reliance upon theology in the way in which it is ex -
pressed in h.is letter reflects an inability of Pascal to accept the hard 
fact of death as well as his failure to have found a basis in ex pet1ence 
for its interpretation. The dogmatic attitude which he therefore assumes r 
most likely emerged from the suppression of his real feelings about death, 
and particularly the death of hi& father. Being unable to accept these 
feelings openly 1 he reverted to a dogmat,ic theological ap13eal, which in 
the first place reflected his exaggerated concern for an .interpretation of 
the ex perience. Second, his appeal to his readers to as s.imilate the 
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ex perience as a natural part of the life-cycle discloses .in its austerity 
a projection of his own difficulties .in achi eving such an assimilation. 
Evidence to support this contention .is to be found in Pascal's own state-
ment to the effect that had the death occured s .ix years earLier, he would 
1 
have been lost. Though the ex perience of his father ' s death has now 
not completely overcome ~; him, he appears far from being in a pos.it.ion 
to accept .it fully as he .is asking his sister to accept .it. 
Finally, .it cannot be discounted that this episode which brought 
him closer to the cruel experiences of life than ever before, confronted 
his search.ing mind with the alternative of either finding an adequate 
ex planation for the phenomenon or running away from it. This seems to 
be an instance .in which Pascal chose the latter alternative after he had 
failed in his attempt to give a.n explanation. But sensing, as must Gilberte 
and the reader of today, the artificiality of the consolation which is offered,. 
he seems to have sought his solution for the time being in what Gilberte 
called going into the world w.ith even more ease. 2 There is ,. therefore, 
in the distraction which he sought in the worldly period a kind of doubt 
1. As quoted .in Jean Mesnard, Pascal, (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1952) p. 42. 
2 . Leon Brunschvicg r Pierre Boutroux I F-elix Gazier (editors) Oeuvres de 
Blaise Pascal publiees suivant l ' ordre chronolog.ique aveo documepts 
complementaires, introductions, et notes. (Les Grands ecrivains de 
la France) 14 vols. 3rd series, (Paris, Hachette, 1904-14) V, 393. 
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which avoided the real .issue before him. It was a doubt of distraction 
which was not so much an absence of attention, but rather a shifting of 
attention to those spheres. of life where answers seemed a bit more immediate. 
If the doubt of the worldly period d.id not present him w.ith the answers 
which he was s·eeking, at least .it carried him along on the tide of .its 
/ 
activ.ities. The experience of the death of Etienne Pascal, therefore, 
provided Blaise not only with a new motive for the worldly period, but 
with a new goal as well . 
(4) Chevalier de Mere and the Concept of the HonnJhe Homme 
During Pascal's stay .in Paris during the year 1648, he came to know 
the Due de Roannez. Though cons.iderably inferior to Pascal in scholarly 
realms, he did possess a keen .interest .in science which drew the two 
of them together. It was through this acquaintance that Pascal came to 
know Antoine Gombaud, Chevalier de Mere'. 
Mere possessed a keen mind. He was widely read, a student of many 
fields. In addition to his scholarly abilities, he embodied the traits of 
the perfect gentleman and host. He was sought by important persons 
to be a prom.inent guest at courtly functions. His philosophy was an 
outgrowth of the concept of the honn~te homme wh.ich he conceived as 
the des.ire to please men in the deepest sense of the word. This desire, 
. . . proceeds from both heart and mind; its constituents are correct and 
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subtle discernment, k.indliness, uprightness, sincerity, and above 
all, moderation ... this art of good breeding and decorous behavior 
cannot be imparted; it has neither rule nor law, .its sole rule being 
to have none, but to vary with people and occasions. It enables 
one to adapt oneself read.ily to the circumstances of life, to judge 
clearly all that presents itself to the mind, to accustom oneself to 
read people's thoughts and feelings by almost imperceptible signs, 
and to maintain strict IIJ_Oderation in all one's actions • . . it depends 
upon mental alertness. 
The attraction which Mere' held for Pascal seems natural. Mere 
embodied what Pascal's father had extolled but never quite reached in 
his own life. Many of the same principles that Mer~ propounded had 
I 
guided the actions of Etienne Pascal, but in the latter the fulfillment of 
them lagged because of public and family obligations. Therefore 1 Mere 
provided for Pascal a substitute for his father, not only in his friend-
ship, but in his philosophy as well. The word substitute is here to be 
taken literally, for Mere was not an imitation of or a replacement for 
I 
Etienne. There were too many differences .in their personal life and 
their philosophy for th.is to happen; for example, Mere paid no formal 
respect whatsoever to religion. Mere did, however, reflect a deep 
seriousness and alertness of mind which are reminiscent of the elder 
Pascal. 
The essence of Mere's philosophy was summed up in three key words: 
1. Jacques Chevalier 1 Pascal, (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 
1930)1 p. 85. 
v 
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honnetete, esprit and coeur. Properly combined, these produced the 
honnete_homme. Honnetete is best defined in the context· of the s even-
teenth 'Century and in relation to the other two words, esprit and coeur. 
Mere considered it the "qu.intes sence of all the virtues. " 1 
"Esprit •.. consists of understanding things, of being able to 
consider them in every aspect, of judging clearly what they are ... 
2 
and of discerning their mutual relations and distinctions." When l'esprit 
is combined with le coeur, man achieves h.is objective of the honn~te 
---
homme. For . . . "only the heart and the .intelligence give true advant-
ages; ... all the rest is only a vain show ... the language of the 
·heart cannot be imitated what ever one may do, by the language of the 
3 
mind." 
These words which are repr~sentative of what was considered the 
epitome of good behavior in the seventeeth 'c entury had a profound effect 
upon Pascal. It would be an over-statement of the situation to say that 
Pascal learned them ex clusively from Men~, for these ideas were widely 
held during this era. However, it was largely from Mere that he had come 
to know them intimately and to appreciate their worth. 
1. E. Chamaillard, Le Chevalier de Mere, (Paris: Niort, 1921), p. 132. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
An analysis of these key words held by Me're indicates that they 
bear a strong resemblance to .ideas which Pascal had been taught by 
his father· and which he was later to expand and implement in his own 
Pensees. The method of intuition in science which Pa.scal had already 
formulated corresponded to !';esprit. His analysis of reason and the 
heart which appeared later in his apologetic writings show the in-
fluence of the key concepts held by Mere. 
Thus the chief contributions which Mere made to Pascal can be 
summarized as follows: first, as an outstand.ing exponent of a 
w.ide-spread way of Life of that time, he helped to fill the intellectual 
as well as emotional void which Pascal felt as the result of the 
death of his father; second, he helped Pascal to crystallize his 
thinking in the area of the necessary qualities in the good life around 
honnetete, esprit and QQmi third, he facilitated the entrance of 
Pascal into the world by his knowledge of the world and by the readi-
ness with wh.ich he was received by the leaders of the courtly society. 
(5) The Cynicism of Damien Mitton 
54 
It was through his associations with Mere that Pascal cane to know 
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1 
Damien Mitton. The attitudes which Mitton expressed towards religion 
were much more devastating than those of Mere'. Whereas Mere' had at 
least strongly believed in man, even if he discounted God, Mitton looked 
upon the whole of life as a va.in achievement. Pascal criticized Mitton 
for this attitude in one of his Pensees by saying, "LH_w' indeed sees that 
human nature is corrupt, and that men are not v:irtuous, but he does not 
2 
know why they cannot rise higher. " 
Of M.itton's few writings, fewer still are extant. But it was not 
so much in the realm of thought that he is to be remembered as in his 
actions and the impressions which he created among his assoc.iates. 
He was in every sense, a man of the world, who prided himself on his 
charm while earning a living by gambling. Mitton knew the libertines 
well, and it was through associat.ions with him that Pascal came to 
know the ways of the free thinkers of the Paris salons. The complete 
1. Mitton, Mere, the Due de Roannez, and Pascal made a trip to Poitou 
probably .in September 1653. There is considerable dispute as to 
whether Pascal was the fourth member of the party and also as to the 
exact date of the journey. For a more detailed discussion of the 
problems involved in establishing an exact date for the journey, see 
Oeuvres de Mere, ed. Boudhors, II, p. 86; Fortunat Strowski, Histoire 
du sent.iment reliqieux en France au XVIIesiecle, Pasca1 et son temps 
... troisieme partie, II, 23ln. i H.A. Grubbs, Damien Mitton, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1932), p. 2 3. i Morris Bishop, 
Pascal, The Life of Genius, (New York, Reyna! and Hitchcock, 1936) 
p. 360-362. 
2. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, (ed. Brunschvicg), Number 448. 
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scepticism which Pascal found in Mitton, was reminiscent of the attitude 
expressed by Monta.igne. 
It is difficult to know just what impression M.itton made upon Pascal 
at the time of his worldly period, and especially on the journey to Poitou 
when Pascal came to know him most intimately. Pascal left no written 
records which allow one to say conclusively what he derived from Mitton. 
The problem of tracing this influence is especially difficult in the light 
of Pascal's later writings in which he severely condemned Mitton. Never-
theless, Mitton did seem to reflect a conflict which was going on in the 
rapidly-changing mind of Pascal during this period. Th.is helped him to 
objectify this conflict concerning the nature of man and to write con-
cerning it: "The self is a hateful thing; you, Mitton, conceal iti you 
1 
do not remove it thereby; you are, then, always hateful. " 
On the basis of this statement one could conclude tha.t Mitton's 
influence upon Pascal was solely negat.ive. To be sure, Pascal did not 
accept his philosophy or way of life. But he was profoundly affected 
by him in the direction of a better understanding of the libertines' opposi-
tion to religion. By associat.ing with Mitton and other libertines during 
this period, Pascal's perspective on life was greatly modif.ied. As com-
pared with the rather cloistered life -- socially, intellectually, and 
1. Blaise Pascal, Pens~es (ed. Brunschvicg), Number 455. 
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emotionally-- which he had led previous to this interlude, he was now 
caught up in a new dimension of ex perience. Without this first-hand 
knowledge of people to whom he wrote in h.i.s Pensees, .i.t .i.s questionable 
whether his approach would have had the astute psychological .insights 
wh.ich have had such a personal appeal to readers of his apology. Mitton's 
.influence, therefore, upon Pascal at the time of h.i.s worldly period is both 
positive and negative. Pascal could not accept the answers which Mitton 
gave, but he could not avoid taking note of the cynical attitude which 
kept the libertine in an extreme state of doubt. Consequently the in-
fluence which M.itton had upon Pascal must be evaluated by oonsider.ing 
the challenge which their relationship had upon the latter's thinking, 
particularly as it caused him to define his own religious att.i.tude, and 
later to further clarify his position as he wrote to others concerning their 
doubt. 
(6) The Worldly Period and Doubt 
The question of Pascal's doubt during the worldly period is of special 
importance to this study. The tendency of some critics is to think of 
this era as the one time during the life of Pascal when he succumbed to 
doubt if he ever did. This seems to the writer an over-simplification 
of the problem. An understanding of the peculiar nature of his attitude 
during this per.iod requires a more careful consideration of terms. 
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That Pascal became an unbeliever during this period would be diff.i-
cult to substantiate on the basis of the available facts. As Mesnard 
has indicated 1 there is only one document which would give this assumption 
1 
any credence. And this evidence seems highly questionable. 
Though this is the period of Pascal's life when he was most intimately 
involved with the temptations which are associated with "the world" 1 there 
is no conclusive evidence that he was ever overcome by these temptations. 
Gilberte provides only one statement of clarification and it adds little 
to the confusion of attitudes toward the per.iod. She dismisses the worldly 
2 period by saying 1 "it was the time of his life that was worst employed." 
This is at best a relative statement and one in which it would be d.ifficult 
indeed to place much trust because of Gilberte's interest in preserving 
a blameless record of her brother's life. In another context she does 
suggest concerning his behavior during this period that he did not parti-
cipate in serious vices. 
1. Jean Mesnard, Pascal, His Life and Works I (New York: The Philosophical 
Library, 1952L p. 53,. refers to the Memoirs of Father Rapin in which 
Rapin relates an ex per.iment in witchcraft conducted in Paris in 1649 1 
by Mere, Mitton, Thevenot Lo-mathematic.ia:Dl, and Pascal. Rapin's 
assumption that these men were ,.coarse scoffers", that Pascal knew 
Mere at this time, and that Mere was in Paris at this date have not 
been validated. 
2. Gilberte Perier, La Vie de M. Pascal, ed. Louis Lafuma, (3 vols; 
I 
Pa:t.is: Editions du Luxembourg, 1951), Documents, p. 26. 
Page 59 lacking in numbering onl.J". 
UNIVERSITY MICIDFILMS, INC. 
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On the basis of this knowledge and what can be gained from other 
impressions about Pascal during this period, it would be false to conclude 
that merely because Pascal opened himself to an ex perience of these 
events and ideas that he necessarily fell victim to their control. 
If one accepts the def.init.ion of doubt as it is given in the introduction 
of this study r it appears much more likely that th.is was a period of doubt 
1 
rather than of disbelief. And since the stated definition easily allows 
2 
an interpretation of degree (or levels) of doubt it follows that this was 
a period in which there was in Pascal a greater neutrality toward religion, 
and a greater indifference to the void created by the absence of religion 
in his own life than there wa.s before or after this worldly interlude. 
An aspect of this indifference was the inner uncertainty and confusion 
which Pascal experienced in the variety of new soc.ial, intellectual, 
and emotional ex periences wh.ich accompan.ied this period. He describes 
his reaction to this new experience and its accompanying disillusionment 
l. See p. 11 of this study. 
2. This study assumes that doubt is not an either-or matter; neither 
is .it an aU-or-none matter; instead it is assumed that. doubt may 
operate on different levels and degrees of intensity and inclusive-
ness. Though these degrees tend to form a continuum r the expression 
of different levels of doubt reveals qualitatively different forms, 
depending upon the level of intensity of the doubt. 
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1 
in his conversations with Jacqueline .in September, 1654. These reactions 
of temporary confusion and uncertainty, however, tended to clarify and 
enrich Pascal's philosophy of life rather than to destroy it. He did not 
ally himself with the denial of Mitton . . When this period is considered 
by itself, it may appear that it is a time when Pascal more or less stood 
st.ill as far as his own relation to religion was concerned. However, 
when this period is considered from the perspective of his total life 
it becomes more apparent that this period was not one necessarily of 
stand.ing still, but rather one of preparat.ion for the events of his later 
religious devotion. Such a perspective is the one that is assumed .in this 
study since .it allows this period to be seen as one of preparation rather 
than of defeat --- an interlude rather than a po.int of no return. 
iy. The Second Conversion 
Probably no exper.ience in the life of Pascal has been more frequently 
discussed than his second conversion. Frequency · of discussion, how-
ever, has not always clarified what is usually considered the dividing 
line in the life of Pascal. The reference here, of course, is to that famous 
night on the twenty-third of November, in the year 1654. 
For a clar.if.ication of Pascal's spiritual status at this time and the 
1. Jean Mesnard, Pascal, (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1952), 
p. 59. 
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period immed.iately preceding it, one must turn to the letters which Jacqueline 
Pascal, now Soeur de Saibte-Euphemie, wrote to her sister, Madame 
Perier. It is in one of these letters that she refers to the contempt which 
Blaise felt for the world and the people in it beginning at approximately 
the end of the year, 1653. Despite this contempt, this was for him a 
period of prodigious activity. Whatever may have been his motivat.ion, 
either the escape from the world or the attempt to alleviate the physical 
suffering which was increasing during this time,- he made some of his 
greatest contributions to the world of science. · He furthered his treatises 
on the equilibrium of liquids and on the weight of the mass of air, as 
well as clarifying his theory of numbers in the field of mathematics. 
But these advances, as well as his worldly exploits which he en-
joyed with the Due de Roannez, left Pascal with a miserable feeling of 
failure in the search for the real meaning of life. If Jacqueline's words ,-
then, seem to over-dramatize the i mpact of this abrupt change of atti-
tude toward the world, they may well serve to remind the reader of 
the grow.ing concern which Pascal had for his religious life, a concern 
which must be dated at least as early as the beginning of 1654. 
In addition, Pascal was now more alone than ever before. His family, 
for all practical purposes, was gone. His father was dead. Gilberte 
was living at some distance and had the responsibilities of her home and 
family. Jacqueline was in the convent. It was in this lone!ines s that 
Pascal turned for consolation to other disciplines as well as science. 
He began to read more devotedly the writings of the philosophers, 
especially those of Epictetus and Montaigne. In them he found a kind 
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of consolation, as Epictetus talked of the dignity of man, and Montaigne, 
of man's depravity. Both were worthy reminders of what Pascal considered 
to be essential in man's nature. However, by themselves they see med 
.incomplete, and there seemed no basis for their combination into one 
whole. Even the Bible which Pascal read during this time reminded him 
of the degree of alienation which he witnessed in his own life without 
providing for him a solution to this separation. Pascal, thus was obsessed 
with contempt for the world, without being at the same time possessed 
with a desire to resolve this conflict in God. 
It was in this state of torment that he turned to his sister, Jacqueline, 
for guidance and consolation. This in itself is significant. Both brother 
and sister had sought at various time to out-do one another in their 
sp.iritual achievements. Jacqueline seemed to have captured the "prize" 
.in her renunciation of the world and her assumption of the role of a nun. 
Pascal's turning to his sister at this point of his life, may have represented 
to him more vividly than we apprec.iate, a sense of personal failure. And 
this humiliat.ion on a human level provided a good background for the con-
trition which was to be demanded of him as he sought to relate himself 
to the divine. The initial resistance that Pascal felt in seeking guidance 
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from his sister, vanished as he came to find in her a stable guide to 
a way of life which he sought now with eagerness. Her demands were 
not always easy. A case in point was her insistence that he must submit 
to a spiritual director, a s this almost inevitably involved submitting 
himself to M. Sing lin, the only member of the solitaires at Port-Royal 
who would accept the task of guiding Pascal and who in turn would be 
acceptable to Pascal. Even though Pascal had gone frequently with Jacqueline 
to hear M. Sing lin at Port-Royal de P'aris 1- he res i sted the suggestion 
of submitting himself to a spir.itual director. He considered it too costly 
to his own sense of i ndependence to submit to a human spiritual director, 
even to such a distinguished man as Sing lin. 
This 1 in general, is what preceded Pascal's. conversion experience 
in November, 1654. Of the i mmediate circumstances, we are uncertain. 
However 1 of the ex perience itself, Pascal has left a record which has 
been preserved in copy form , as a testimony of the dramatic entrance of 
1 
God into his life. 
, 
It was a copy of this Memorial that Pascal carried w:ith him the 
1. Blaise Pascal, Oeuvres Completes de Pascal, ed. Jacques Chevalier, 
(Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1954)1 p. 553-554. 
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rest of his life, sewn into the lining of his doublet. The Me'morial 
was certainly not intended merely as a record of this experience, for 
it is not likely that Pascal would have easily forgotten it. Rather the 
record was carried more as an amulet, as something sacred. It was 
not .intended for publication; in fact, it was only after Pascal had died 
that this record was discovered by a servant. 
I Bremond, in discuss.ing the Memorial, has divided .it into three 
natural parts: f.irst, a mental anguish accompanied by an impres sian 
of fire; second, the coming of a mystic grace, that is of God made 
manifest to the mind; and third, the transports and tears of the grateful 
. 2 
obJect of grace. 
Using this framework it is possible to note the following progression 
in this experience. At its onset, Pascal recognizes God, a God whom 
he describes by the symbol of f.ire. It is made quite clear both in this 
1. Jean Mesnard, Pascal, L'homme et L'oeuvre, (Paris: Boivin et Cie., 
1951), p. 63, .indicates that this was not an unusual custom .in the 
.'seventeenth 'century. The original sheet of paper contains the notes 
of the mystical ·. experience, written immediately after it occurred. 
The parchment copy which he carried with him was undoubtedly written 
down some time later, possibly with some changes being made as 
he reflected upon the original record. For example, the concluding 
phrases of th.is copy may be taken as a later addition because of 
their different rhythm. It is in these phrases that he refers to total 
submiss.ion to Christ and to his director. 
2. Abbe Henri Bnfmond, Histoire litteraire du sentiment religieux en 
France, (Par.is: Bloud et Gay, 1920), IV, 350. 
record and .in later references to it by Pascal that this .is not a God who 
.is to be known through metaphysical proofs or ontological arguments, 
1 
but rather that. He is to be known through experience. He is the God 
of Judaeo-Christianity 1 the God of the living. 
66 
Thes·e words of Pascal describing the nature of God and his ex per.ience 
of Him are of extreme importance in our understanding of Pascal's religious 
exper.ience. They indicate to us that he was no longer searching for 
understand.ing by way of mathematics, science 1 and philosophy. He 
ceased to be a Cartesian .in his conception of the grounds of knowledge. 
Reason alone, he discovered1 did not give proofs of the truths of Christ-
ianity. He no longer felt as he did in his early visits to Jacqueline at 
Port-Royal-des-Champs that it was his reason and his own mind that 
were exc.it.ing him to what he knew to be the best thing. Instead he had 
been qu.ickened by the movements of God's spirit in his being. Thus 
Pascal attaifled assurance,. not merely assurance of the mind, but of the 
soul -- an assurance that engendered affection, joy, and peace. 
The next step .in Pascal's ex perience was his real.ization that God 
is the God of Jesus Christ. And it is through the Christ alone that we 
are to know God. Correlated with this was the realization that God 
l. Blaise Pascal, Pensees (ed. Brunschvicg), Number 556. 
67 
is to be found only in the ways which are described in the Gospel. 
With the joy of having found .God, Pascal became aware of his own 
anguish and his own unworthiness of the joy which he· now experienced. 
Thus began a period of self-evaluation of his sinfulness. But from this 
sudden realization of grief carrie new consolation made possible by Christ's 
promise to realize his joy in us. 
The path that Pascal must follow was now much more visible to him 
than ever before in his life. He realized that to possess God, to know 
God,. was possible through submission of his life to Jesus Christ. He 
found himself at the cross-roads of the Christian paradox: life is death, 
and death, life. It was no longer he that lived, but rather God living 
in him. 
In losing himself, Pascal was won over to faith, 
... a faith which, transcending reason and custom, reaches its 
aspirations through humiliation; which teaches reason that its right 
use is to give place and recognize that there is an infinity of things 
that surpass it. It is a faith that quickens all our actions and trans-
forms the soul; that; without giving it new knowledge, makes it 
see all things .in a new light, and makes it realize what it before 
had merely conceived or repeated. He knows God with his heart, 
that is, by faith working through love. God has manifest Himself 
to his inmost soul; He has bestowed on him the truth in its entirety, 
his rule of life, felicity; He has revealed to him a logic beyond 
argument, namely, the order of charity, in the heart of which the 
contraries of incapacity and greatness meet and are reconciled in 
the person of Christ Jesus, God and Ma,n. 1 
1. Jacques Chevalier, Pascal, (New York: Longrnans, Green and Co., 
1930), p. 96-97. 
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It was the vivid impress.ion of this personal exper.ience which gave 
to Pascal's later defense of the Christian religion its highly personal 
quality. As the result of this convers.ion experience Pascal could no 
longer content himself with abstract appeals to reason, but sought ever 
after to stress the personal and experi:mtial aspect of religious devotion. 
Before leaving the discussion of this experience in the life of Pascal, 
it is necessary to mention two inc.idents which are frequently related 
in the discussions which have centered about .it. The f.irst is an accident 
at the Bridge of Neuilly in which Pascal narrowly escaped being thrown 
into the water when the horses draw.ing his carriage became frightened 
and leaped into the river. As the tale has been told it assumes that from 
this time Pascal resolved to give up his drives abroad and to live in 
1 
total ret.irement. The other story concerns the h.ighly debated importance 
of the sermon which Pascal heard Monsieur Sing lin deliver on December 8, 
1654. According to Marguerite Perier, niece of Pascal, this was the 
occasion for his second conversion. 2 Both of these incidents, however, 
probably tend to over-dramatize the conversion of Pascal as a sudden, 
1. For a more detailed discussion of this incident see: Victor Giraud, 
Blaise Pascal, (Paris: Hachette, 1910), pp.37-63. 
2. Leon Brunschvicg, Pierre Boutroux , Felix Gazier (editors) Oeuvres de 
Blaise Pascal publiees suivant l ' ordre chronologigue avec document~ 
complementaires I introductions, et notes (Les Grands ecrivains de 
la France) 14 vols. 3rd series, (Paris, Hachette, 1904-14), IV, 8. 
abrupt ex perience rather than interpreting it as the growing awareness 
of God which evolved during his months of anguished seeking. 
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In any event 1 the second convers.ion did represent a definite turning 
point in the life of Pascal. Whereas the first conversion had been pri-
marily an .intellectual ex perience, this conversion was a dee ply emotional 
ex perience. It was personal not only in the sense that Pascal felt .its 
effects inwardly I but that .it was a realization that God ex.isted for him. 
Religion was no longer a universal philosophy 1 it was a personal relation-
ship. 
v. Pascal and Port-Royal 
Shortly after the conversion ex perience of 1654, Pascal undertook 
the obligations of the promise which he had made at this time to become 
submiss.ive to Christ and to his spiritual director. But this promise 
was not without its problems when it came to carrying it out. First, 
of course, was the natural resistance which a man of his .independence 
felt in submitting himself to another individual for guidance in a very 
personal matter. Related to this fact was the reluctance of M. Singlin 
to have such an able person as his student. But M. Sing lin, because 
of his ab.ility .in matters of religion as well as h.is influence at Port-Royal, 
seemed to be the natural director for Pascal, and incidentally the only 
one at Port-Royal acceptable to Pascal. As Singlin was ill when Pascal 
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first came for spiritual guidance I there was a delay in the plans. There-
fore 1 in the interim period I he decided to turn to the one who seemed 
at the moment to be most understanding of his new decision. This was 
his sister 1 Jacqueline. 
Another problem which faced Pascal was that of .interpreting his 
experience and its consequences to others. Upon his return from Poitou 1 
the Due de Roannez was the first among his friends to learn of the decision 
which Pascal had made. Shortly thereafter I the Duke was converted 
under Pascal's influence. In this conversion 1 the cycle of their relat.ion-
ship had been completed; the Due de Roannez had introduced Pascal to 
the world, now Pascal introduced him to God. 
From the social perspective 1 the conversion of the Duke seemed to 
come at a particularly inappropriate time 1- for it prevented his marriage 
to a woman who was considered to be one of the most "desired" ladies 
in France. This fact appears to be directly related to an attempted murder 
of Pascal by one of the ducal attendants. Historical evidence is still 
lacking to give this account credibility. A letter from Jacqueline to her 
sister Gilberte at this time makes no mention of the attempted murder 
of her brother; instead it indicates that he was not in Paris at the time 
the event is reported to have taken place. 
It was after a brief stay at Vaumirier I the country residence of the 
Due de Luynes 1 that Pascal made a retreat at les Granges I the place 
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of res.idence of the solitaires at Port-Royal-des-Champs, near Paris. 
Pascal's f.irst sojourn there lasted only two weeks. Though he was 
to return to this spot for many subsequent retreats; Pascal was not actually 
1 
one of the solitaires. He did not consider himself one of them, nor 
was he considered such by Port-Royal. He was not, in the strict sense 
of the word, a fully-convinced and fully-trusted member of the inner 
2 
circle of leaders. He had not completely renounced the world and thus 
his retreat from it was not f.inal or complete. 
Port-Royal demanded of its members a simple, unquestioning faith 
which surrendered or .ignored the vain strivings of the restless human 
mind. But this somewhat pietistic Evangelicalism could not content a 
mind like Pascal's which had already had to maintain its faith in the 
1. The solitaires of Port-Royal were devoted laymen who had come to 
believe that the world was evil. They lived a monastic-like existence. 
Though they did not officially take the vows of poverty, chastity and 
obedience, they ahdered to them faithfully. 
2. There are those who conte.rrd that Pascal did indentify himself with 
Port-Royal and its solitaires. For ex ample, see: Jean Laporte; 
Le Coeur et la Raison selon Pascal, (Paris: Editions Elz.ivir, 1950). 
For a refutat.i.on of this position see: Victor Giraud, Blaise Pascal, 
Etudes d'histoire morale; (Paris: Hachette, 1910); Henr.i Bremond, 
Autour de l'humanisme:d'Erasme a Pascal, third edition, (Paris: 
Gras set, 1936); Jacques Chevalier, Pascal, (New York, Longmans, 
Green, and Company, 1930); Jean Mesnard, Pascal, L'homme et 
l'oeuvre, (Paris: Boivin et Cie., 1951). 
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m.idst of scientific research and worldly scepticism. 1 Neither he nor 
Nicole, a Jansens.ist, who had also come to Port-Royal with a mind set 
in another mould could simply accept the full Jansenist dogma as un-
questionably true and defend it without examination. When Pascal said 
:in his Provinc:iales that he was not of Port-Royal, he spoke more truly 
than the friends he was defending realized. 2 
It was less than two years after Pascal's second conversion and his 
first retreat at Port-Royal that he was called upon to make a public de-
claration of h:is faith. The occasion was the d:ispute between the 
J ansen:ists and the Jesu:its which had reached a ne w :intensity over such 
doctrinal questions as original sin, free will, grace, and the nature 
of man. The Jansen:ists needed a capable protagonist who could speak 
out boldly against the Jesuits, without compromising on basic issues, 
as well as one who possessed a captivating style in controversy which 
would not be choked by the ponderous issues which were at stake. Pascal 
seemed to fit this description. Arnauld and Nicole, who had been only 
moderately successful .in defending the Jansenist cause in the debate, 
1. D e nzil Patrick, Pascal and Kierkegaard, A Study in the Strategy of 
Evangelism, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1947), I, 60. 
2. Blaise Pascalr Dix-septieme lettre ~crite par !'auteur des lettres 
au provincial, :in Oeuvres Completes I ed. Jacques Chevalier r (Paris: 
Librairie Gall:imard ,--' 1954), p. 867. 
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approached Pascal with a request to launch a new attack. "You who are 
young, 11 said Arnauld, "you must do something." Pascal did. On January 
2 3, 165 6, his first Lettre provinciale, (Letter to a Provinc.ial) appeared. 
These letters, which number eighteen, plus a fragment of a nine-
teenth, covered a span of slightly more than one year. The last one 
was dated March 24, 1657 ~ They discuss a number of themes associated 
with the .immediate defense of Arnauld and Port-Royal: casuistry, p:robabilism, 
11 s uff.icient grace" and "efficac.ious grace" . They move from witty, dis-
interested letters typical of the man of the world to letters which were 
bitter attacks upon personalities involved in the struggle between the 
Jansenists and the Jesuits. The letters evolved into a serious battle 
of words, often waged with acid indignation. 
Beneath all of the polemical appearance of the letters there remains, 
however, the heart of a single solitary Christian who, writing to defend 
a cause, was at the same time giving the world a glimpse of the inimi-
table way in which his ex perience of God .in the second conversion had 
transformed his life. Pas cal was now speaking in behalf of his faith .. 
vi. Pascal and the Church 
Pascal was born a Catholic, and a Catholic he died. But between 
birth and death, in the comparatively few years which intervened, there 
.is more to be said of Pascal's relation to the Church than simply that 
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he was a Catholic. For the question must be pursued further in order 
that one may discern Pascal's obedience to the Church as well as his 
expectations from it. 
Though Pascal considered himself a loyal Catholic, his religion 
was based primarily upon the fear of God and the love of Jesus-. In this 
respect he was not disloyal to the Jansenists. He preached no cult of 
the saints r and manifested a merely courteous regard for the Virgin whom 
1 
he mentions perfunctorily only a few times in his writings. He did 
not, however, disapprove of the usual Catholic devotion to the Virgin; 
she simply had no place in his private religious devotion. It was Christ 
who was the center of Pascal's religion, not the concept of God, nor 
the Virgin, nor any of the saints, nor any doctrine of Jansen or Saint 
Augustine. In the love of Christ he discovered the answer to his mental 
and spidtual troubles as well as an object for the emotional needs of his 
passionate heart. This discovery, however, did not come to Pascal 
early in life. It was only after his second conversion that he came to 
a full realization of its significance. 
From the time of his first conversion in 1646, Pascal had varying 
relations with Jansenism. His strongest ident.if.ication with this movement 
1. Morris Bishop, Pascal, The Life of Genius, (New York: Reynal and 
Hitchcock, 1936), p. 176. 
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was ex pressed in hi s retreats to Port-Royal and later, his defense of 
Jansenism in the Provinc.ial Letters. During the last period of his life, 
however, Pascal w.ithdrew from Jansen.ism, and became less and less 
associated with its .influence. This dissociation did not come simply or 
without struggle. It involved the question of the Formulary which came 
1 
to a climax in the year 1661. As Pascal was a layman he was relieved 
of the official task of affixing his s .ignature to the formula drawn up by 
the Assembly of the Clergy. This formula accused Jansenism of propound-
.ing condenmed propositions and demanded the signatures of all loyal 
members of Port-Royal.-
Though freed from a personal decision, Pascal was grieved at the 
sight of friends such as Arnauld and Nicole signing the formula. Accounts 
of the incident usually indicate that he fainted with grief at this s .ight. 
Considering the last few years of Pascal's life and the important 
question which emerges from them concerning his relation to the Church, 
the following conclusions can be drawn: First, Pascal broke with the 
theologians of Port-Royal. Though i nterpretat.ions differ on the reason 
for this break, it seems likely that it was because of his own interest 
.in the matter of grace rather than because of their zealousness in the 
1. For a detailed description of the Formulary and the Signature, see 
Jacques Chevalier, Pascal, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co. , 
1930), Appendix V, pp. 318-330. 
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1 
matter. In other words r he was more interested in the matter of grace 
as a personal concern than in sharing it as a theological problem with 
the Port-Royal theologians. Second, Pascal became more concerned 
with the state of his own soul and its salvation. Third,- in an attitude 
of complete submission to ·the Church and the Pope, Pascal died as ·a 
. 2 good Cathohc. 
These statements which summarize Pascal's relation to the Church 
in the period immediately preced.ing his death and at the time of his 
death actually add very l.ittle insight to what is already known about 
his att.itu'des toward the Church. In the fi!-st place it is futile to attempt 
to base Pascal's dissociation from his friends at Port-Royal on the theory 
that it was their Jansenism that caused the break. A closer examination 
of the facts indicates that it was bas.ed rather upon his own relentless 
.interpretation of th.is theological view which made him highly intolerant 
of other's .interpretations of it. Furthermore,. when it .is said that Pascal 
was completely submissive to the Church it need not imply that this 
1. Pere Beurrierr the parish priest who was summoned to administer the 
last r.ights to Pascal at the time of his death, states in his unpubl.ished 
Memoirs that Pascal broke with the theologians at Port-Royal because 
of their zealousness in the matter of grace. Gilberte rejected this 
.interpretation, as have many critics. 
\ . 2. These conclusions are based upon the statements made by Pere Beurr1er 
in his unpublished M~mo.irs. 
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was a sudden development coming shortly before the time of his death, 
nor that .it was antithetical to an identification with the Jansenist move-
ment. There is no evidence to support the bel.ief that Pascal ever opposed 
the Church. Therefore these statements from Beurrier provide no new 
discovery. Perhaps the most .important considerai.ion to bear .in mind 
in this connection .is to remember that these conclusions were drawn up 
by a man who was deeply concerned with preserving for posterity a record 
of a man who fulfilled his own specificat.ions for a loyal Christian. 
Since these specifications were quite briefly: simpl.icity and submission, 
.it seems obvious that there were many facts which were glossed over in 
recounting these closing days about which so much controversy has 
appeared. 
Much misunderstanding about this period .in the l.ife of Pascal can 
be avoided if it .is kept .in mind that Pascal was not a member of the 
clergy and therefore did not have to state formally his position on these 
matters of much debate. This does not imply that Pascal was neutral 
about them, but it does refute the idea that in his closing days of life 
p·ascal made a retraction of his faith. Since we have no sufficient basis · 
for concluding that Pascal was in a position to have to make a formal 
declaration concerning h.is faith, it seems absurd to conclude that for 
personal reasons he would reverse his stand in matters of rel.ig.ion, and 
in so doing repudiate all he had suffered and fought for. 
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Thus, in conclusion it may be sa.id that though the religious life 
of Pascal was filled with many periods of storm and stress during which 
he was called upon either pr.ivately or publicly to declare his faith and 
to justify his position, he never went outside the fold of the Catholic 
fa.ith in these declarations. He was born a Catholic and a Catholic he 
died. 
vii. The Death of Pascal 
The closing years of Pascal's life are filled with numerous accounts 
of his charitable deeds to the poor. Gilberte in her b.iography dep.icts 
vividly such events as his alms to the young g.irl whom he found begging 
outside Sa.int-Sulpice; his insistence upon having a poor family come to 
share his home; and his desires to be moved on his death bed to the 
hospita.l where he might die among the poor. 
During this time when frequently the pain which Pascal was suffering 
reached almost unbearable heights, P'ere Beurrier came often for conver-
sations. Pascal ins.isted upon receiving communion, but usually he was 
denied it on the basis that he was not yet .in .imminent danger of death. 
The doctors, not always in agreement, failed to be over-anxious about 
the state of his .illness and often blamed his most serious attacks of pain 
and fever upon the purges with which he was being treated. 
Before his death he had received visits from his friends at Port-
79 
Royal -- Arnauld and Nicole - who risked their lives in emerging from 
their hiding places to visit him. He had also prepared his will in which 
he bequeathed a great portion of h.is belongings to the poor and needy. 
On the seventeenth day of August, 1662, his health took a sudden 
turn for the worse. His pains increased and the doctors were summoned 
for consultation. Pere Beurrier also was summoned. These preparations 
are recorded for us in the words of Gilberte Perier, and her description 
provides a suitable benediction for his life: 
... The preparations were not useless., they served sooner than 
we had thought. For about midnight he was seized by so violent 
a convulsion that when it was over we thought that he was dead. 
And we had this extreme grief , with all the others, that we thought 
to see him die without oommunicat_ing • . . But God, who wished 
to recompense so fervent and so just a desire, suspended this 
convulsion as if by a miracle, and restored him his entire judgment, 
as if he V:Lere in perfect health. So that when Monsieur le Cure 
Li3eurrierr7' entered the room with Our Lord, crying to him r "Here 
is the One whom you have desired so much!" , the words succeeded 
in awakening him. And when Monsieur le Cure' approached to give 
him communion., he made an effort, and half-raised himself unaided 
to receive it with more respect. And Monsieur le Cure, having 
questioned him, according to custom, on the principal mysteries of 
faith, he devoutly answered to everything: "Yes, Father, I believe 
all that and with all my heart!" And finally he received the holy 
viaticum and extreme unction with such tender emotions that he 
shed tears. He answered to everything, and at the end even thanked 
Monsieur le Cure', and when he blessed him w.ith the Holy Sacrament, 
. he said: "May God never abandon me!" which were practically his 
last words. For after having made his thanksgiving, a moment after-
wards the convulsions took him again,. and did not let him go, and 
did not leave him aga.in a moment's freedom of mind. They lasted 
until his death which came twenty-four hours later , to wit, the 
nineteenth of August, 1662 r at one · o'clock in the morning, he 
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being aged thirty-nine years and two months . 1 
vi.ii. Summary 
Pascal lived in an era of doubt. He was surrounded by free thinkers 
and open scoffers, as well as scholars whose attacks upon religion, 
though less open, carried them far af.ield from the type of assent which 
would traditionally be labeled belief. Be ing reared in a home which 
enjoyed social prestige as a result of its royal descent,.· Pascal fell heir 
to a mixture of free thought and traditional respect _ for the formal aspects 
of organized religion. 
From his earliest years Pa.scal was encouraged to investigate openly 
and freely the nature of his w<;:>rld and the nature of man. However, in 
matters of religion he was taught a different approach which rather than 
emphasizing relentless pursuit of truth, encouraged subm.ission to truth 
as it had been revealed in Christ, .in the Gospel and through the Church. 
It was between these two poles of interest and methods of achieving 
knowledge that Pascal carried on the majority of the activities which are 
of concern to us in this study. 
Considering the life of Pascal .in terms of this double focus enables 
1. Gilberte Perier, La Vie de M. Pascal, ed. Louis Lafuma, (3 vols. i 
Paris: Editions du Lux embourg I 1951) r Documents I p. 47. 
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the reader to estabLish a connecting bond which lends. a unity to the 
diversity which would otherwise be lacking if only separate aspects of 
his life were considered devoid of any external reference. The diversity 
of his interests and activities. when interpreted as parts of the whole 
of h.is Life can be seen in this perspective, not as antagonistic and con-
flicting goals, but as subordinate to a larger and more inclusive goal 
than any of them considered alone. 
Such explorations as. Pascal's participation in the world during his 
worldly period can be fully understood and appreciated only as they are 
woven into the pattern of his whole life and as they are interpreted from 
the perspective of his later adoption of them. At no time does it appear . 
that Pascal was disloyal to his faith,. but during the worldly period, 
if at any particular period of his life,- he gained an intimate appreciation 
of some of the more characteristic aspects of scepticism to which he 
later addressed himself in h.is Pensees. 
Without this preview of the major influences upon the life of Pascal 
it would have been impossible to understand even isolated elements in 
the thought of Pascal, to say nothing of it as a comprehensive whole. 
And it is only by combining theae influences with his reflections about 
them that a representative presentation of the place of doubt in the life 
and thought of Pascal can be achieved. 
CHAPTER III 
DOUBT IN THE THOUGHT OF PASCAL 
The thought of Pascal as it is preserved for us in his scientific 
treatises r in his reflections upon philosophy and religionr and in his 
personal letters I reveals a man of intense and varied interests. It is 
this variety of interests which has often encouraged posterity to ascribe 
to him the role of a genius. Pascal's genius, however I is reflected 
not only in the variety of his interests I but more particularly in the 
clarity of his expression of some of the crucial problems in these areas. 
Since the contributions of Pascal to science I philosophy 1 and religion 
are significant in themselves 1 and because they rest upon highly differ-
ent premises 1 it is first necessary to consider these contributions indiv-
idually. Later 1 a collect.ive interpretation of his thought in these three 
areas will assist one .in grasping some of the significant relationships 
which exist among these diverse reflections. 
The first writings of Pascal were contributions to the realm of 
science. Consequently 1 it is natural to consider them first. Somewhat 
later in his life he turned to a study of the philosophers and recorded 
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some of his reflections upon their systems. Finally, his interests were 
concentrated upon religion. These will be discussed in turn. 
1. Pascal and Science 
If Pascal were alive today,. his approach to science might be quite 
different from what it was in the seventeenth century in which he lived. 
Today a scientist, through his training and his laboratory experience 
inherits pretty much in package form the scientific method which will 
guide his future works. Such was not the case in the time in which 
Pascal lived. There was no such ready-made and accepted methodology, 
for the influence of the scholastic theological mind still held sway. 
Respect for authority wa.s a primary requirement of any learned man, an 
approach which was doubly difficult for the truly scientific scholar with 
empirical and experimental interests to accept. Pascal soon joined 
those who before him had heralded the new dr.ive for the experimental 
approach in science. They were unified in their desire to reject the author-
ity of the ancients in science and philosophy and to insist on the progress 
of knowledge through experimentation. 1 Thus Pascal was convinced that; 
I. Blaise Pascal, Oeuvres, 'fraite du vide. This work which was published 
posthumously was probably written in 1647. It represents, not only 
Pascal's attempt to state formally his position concerning the use of 
reason and authority in the realm of science, but also clearly presents 
the development Q.f Pascal's thinking at this stage. 
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The common respect for antiquity .is today at such a pitch, in 
matters where it should have little force, that people make oracles 
of all antiquity's thoughts, and sacred mysteries even of it$ ob-
scurities; so that one can no longer propose novelties w.ithout peril, 
and the test of an ,LancienJ7 author is enough to upset the strongest 
reasons. Respect for authority is proper in the historical branches, 
wherein memory is the agent of knowledge . . . It is quite other-
wise with those matters which are subject to the senses or the 
reasoning process; authority there is uselessj reason alone has 
the right to judge of them. . . 1'hus·1 . geometry, arithmetic, music, 
physics, medicine I architecture, and all the sciences which are 
subject to ex periment and reasoning, must be ever augmented to 
become perfect. 1 
In this statement we see a first logical step toward the construction 
of a scientific method. P'ascal defines the limits of reason and experi-
mentat.ion 1 claiming for the former all of natural philosophy, while to 
the scientist he would give the freedom of the laboratory. The scientist, 
of course, must base his conclusions upon certain axioms 1 but he must 
avoid reify.ing abstractions. ·The scie.nt.ist is also permitted to ma.ke 
deductions 1 but in doing so he must remember that the agreement of an 
experiment with an hypothesis does not necessarily establish a truth. 
It was at this point that Pascal was very .insistent upon the necess-
.ity of repeated experiments. This very insistence provided one of the 
basic differences between Descartes and himself. Though they accepted 
many doctrines in common, there was one basic difference concerning 
1. Ibid. 
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their view of science. Pascal argued from experiment to generalizations, 
whereas Descartes argued from metaphysical hypotheses to conclusions 
which a successful experiment proves true. Thus, for Descartes, 
experiment is a check to decide between several possible deductions. 
Though this method of science would seem satisfactorily arranged 
and carefully carried out, it was for Pascal inadequate. Observation 
and reason in the final analysis proved inadequate. To them Pascal 
added what he called the "spirit of f:l.nesse" -- in some cases, "the 
heart" . Intuition is a word that has been substituted for both terms, 
in a hopeful attempt to embody all that Pascal meant in those instances 
where he employed them. 
In this "spirit of finesse" Pascal did not find something opposed 
to organized reason and systematic logic; rather it was something which 
surpassed them, in fact, often provided the spring-board for the begin-
nings of reason and logic. He regarded intuition as something of a wh.im, 
even an unconscious prompting which might even point to conclusions 
far beyond the limits of our understanding. This theory of intuition 
was to become one of Pascal's most essential and fruitful ideas. In 
Pascal's system of knowledge, it developed into his theory of orders. 1 
1. See p .. 115 of this study. 
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Thus, in science, intuition, (spirit of finesse) is an order of 
thought, beyond and above logic, and incommensurable with it. The 
truth of logic may contradict the truth of intu.ition -- no matter . what 
is i:vlcomprehensible, may none-the-less be true. And the resolution 
of opposites, the reconciliation of all data, may be impossible even 
in the order of intuition. But they must be resolved, if only in the 
order of charity, the order of God. 
In the evolution of his own. thought, Pascal represented something 
of the importance of the doctrine of the orders. For his study of physics 
ended with a dissatisfaction with science, its methods and purposes. 
As he wrote in one of his Pensees: 
We make an idol of truth itself; for truth outside of charity is 
not God; it is his image, and an idol wh.ich we must not love nor 
::1~r=~o~~~ ft111less must we love or adore its contrary, which is 
Pascal's dissatisfaction was not so much with science~ se as 
the fact that he had come into contact with what he considered to be 
larger truths . But science did not fore sake him, nor in reality, did 
he fore sake it. His scientific investigations had taught him how to 
observe, to define, and to describe what he had seen in ways that were 
crystal clear. By its method of induction he was later to speak to the 
1. Blaise Pascal, PensEtes (ed. BrunschviCg) Number 582. 
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minds and "hearts" of those who were "outside the faith". Through 
science his eyes had been opened to a new and wonderful way of under-
standing the universe. At the same timer coupled with the splendors 
which it unlocked to his perception, it laid before him the realization 
that the small things in life can be described and analyzed. But for 
that order which far surpasses this smaller one and takes us into the 
realm of the real content of lifer there are no adequate words or ex-
pressions. 
Therefore it was inev.itable that 
Pascal's whole mentality was poles apart from that of Descartes. 
Descartes is a speculative intellectualist who is happy to remain 
in the sphere of abstract theoretical reason; Pascal is passionately 
concerned with the concrete practical problem of man and his destiny. 
Descartes sees. the world as a homogeneous whole; Pascal sees the 
world as a heterogeneous compound of contradictory elements. 
Descartes considers man as a self-sufficient whole; Pascal considers 
him as the term of a relationship . 1 
Descartes had provided an excellent example of the geometrical 
method which Pascal himself well knew how to handle. But life had 
taught Pascal the total inadequacy of such a method for the purpose he 
had in view. He was conv.inced that there wa.s a falseness in the spec-
ulat.ive rationalism of Descartes. "I cannot forgive Des.cartes," he 
1. Denzil G. M. Patrick, Pascal and Kierkegaard: A Study in the Strategy 
of Evangelism, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1947L I, 149. 
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says, "in all his natural philosophy, he would have Liked to do without 
God; but he could not help making Him give a fillip, to set the world in 
motion; after that, he has no more use for God." 1 He clearly discerned 
the fatal seed of deism which Descartes was sowing a.nd which was to 
lead through the pantheism of Spinoza to the naturalistic monism of 
Heg el. 
Pascal therefore rejected the Cartesian method. He ·saw that the 
first principles from which Descartes sought to deduce everything were 
really arbitrary hypotheses.; that they completely failed to do justice 
to the infinite distance which separated the different orders of reality; 
and that in any case, they could not lead to anything but rational truth. 
Descartes found the means for combatting the danger of despair only 
in his sovereign and conscious thought and reason. Descartes used 
a method which had been used in the past, among others by Anselm, but 
Descartes used it without the pre-supposition of faith. Thus his attempt 
to prove God through merely logical means was bound to come to failure 
since God is thus dependent upon man's own sovereign think.tng. To 
Descartes the existence of God serves as a means by which to assure 
the reality of his own ego and to make his system logically complete. 
1. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, (ed. Brunschv.tcg) Number 77. 
But such a God was for Pascal but the product of human reasoning --
a metaphysical phantom. 
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Thus, more than Descartes, Pascal may be identified with the modern 
conception of the scientific method. He was basically an experimentalist, 
especially in physics. His well-known disagreement with Descartes on 
the subject of atmospheric pressure offers a concrete and classic ex -
' ample of the conflict between the two ideas -- the ex perimental and 
the deductive. Descartes I maintaining on philosophical grounds that 
extension was the essence of matter, was forced to conclude that the 
apparently empty space in the barometric tube was filled with "subtle 
matter". Pascal, refus.ing to accept dogrratically the statement that 
"nature abhors a vacuum" had demonstrated ex perimentally in the ex-
periment of the "Puy de Dome" that the vacuum ex isted. 
This ex per.irnental approach provided the basis for his thought con-
cerning the nature of truth and our ability to arrive at it. The sceptical 
or critical aspect of Pascal's thought does not therefore, as in Pyrrho, 
take the form of a prelim.inary doubt-- an adm.iss .ion that we cannot 
prove our knowledge 1 without prejudice to the fact that knowledge may 
nevertheless be true. It .is rather an "experimental scepticism "1 not so 
much a questioning of the affirmation as affirmation itself tending towards 
denial. 
There is, according to Pascal, an order which transcends reason's 
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categories. Re ality must remain unattainable by reasoning. But this 
scepticism is not final; there yet remains the "idee de la verit~", the 
----
"idea of the truth", the demand for absolute truth. In this sense the 
man of science is the man of faith r but the faith is the anxious fa.ith of 
the seeker who is never completely satisfied. The sense of reality is 
regarded as something anticipated rather than something possessed--
something ·sustaining,. yet eluding our 'intellectual conceptions. 
The proper role of reason then is not to build up theories,. but to 
recognize the facts. Its work is not to reconstruct reality, but to sub-
mit to it as it is, for reality is the work of a more mighty hand than 
our own: "submission and use of reason, in which true Christianity 
1 
consists." 
2. Pascal and Philosophy 
Pascal was not a philosopher in the strict sense in which the term 
is most often used today. He was not primarily interested in speculating 
on the ultimate structure of reality merely for the sake of knowing what 
it is. But Pascal did feel the need for a unified view of the universe 
and consequently turned to those who professed to possess it -- the 
philosophers. Those who influenced him most were: Epictetus, Montaigne, 
1. Blaise Pascal, Penstes, (ed • Brunschvicg) Number 2 69. 
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and Descartes. 
i. Pascal and Epictetus 
N eo-Stoicism was a popular philosophy in France during the seven-
teenth century. However, Pascal seemed little impressed by the expression 
which it found in DuVair, its chief exponent. 1 Instead he turned to the 
fountain-head of Stoicism, Epictetus. The best description that we 
possess of Pascal's. indebtedness to this early thinker is presented in 
2 his Entretien avec M. de Sao;i.. 
Pascal discovered in Epictetus' expression of Stoicism a pious 
sense of the divine and an optimistic philosophy which regarded the 
universe as the work of God. Man was .interpreted as an .integral part 
of the universe r who through reason and will ought to relate himself 
to the universe and consent to the will of God. The picture of man which 
was disclosed in Stoicism was, to be surer an exalted one; for this 
philosophy emphasized the importance of man's reason and his virtues, 
thus inevitably creating in man a sense of his own worthiness, or pride. 
1. Fortunat Strowski, Histoire du sentiment religieux en France au 
XVIIe si~cle, Pascal et son temps, (Paris: Plon, 1908), II, 319, 
states that Pascal was one of the very few outstanding thinkers. 
of the seventeenth century in France who did not have anyreminiscences 
of DuVair in his writings. 
2. Blaise Pascal, Entretien avec M. de Saci, Oeuvres Compl~tes, ed. 
Jacques Chevalier, (Par.is , L.ibrairie Gallimard, 1954), p. 560. 
Man's happiness is not to be sought in the exterior world according 
to the Stoical position, but within man himself. 
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Though some of the ideas concerning man's merit as they were ex -
pounded by Epictetus impressed Pascal greatly, there were many others 
which he found difficult to accept. In Epictetus he found things which 
he knew by his own experiences were simply u.ntrue to the facts of li.fe. 
Epictetus had said, for ex ample., "As for me, I have never been prevented 
from doing what I wanted, or forced desp.ite myself to do what I did not 
want. "- But Pascal had been too deeply tormented by his inability to 
regulate his heart, and too deeply impressed by Jansen's denial of the 
freedom of indifference to fallen man ,- to accept so superficial and 
arrogant an optimism. 
Pascal furthermore refuted the idea that happiness is within us, 
just as he would in time refute the idea proposed by the Pyrrhonists 
that happiness is outside of man. Yor Pascal, "happiness is neither 
without us nor within us; it is in God, both without and within ... l 
Pa.scal saw beyond the rationalism of Epictetus to the pride which 
it engendered, thus ultimately leading to a cyclic ego .... centrism without 
God. Knowledge of self as insp:ired by Epictetus was deceptive, he 
1. Blaise Pascal, Pens~es, (ed. Brunschvicg), Nuniber 465. 
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felt, and ultimately useless, for it portrayed only one aspect of man's 
nature. Recognizing man • s earlier greatness, but ignoring his corruption 
as the result of the Fall, EpiCtetus considered human nature to be so 
sound as to be in no need of healing. 
Epictetus and the Stoics . had indeed seen the dignity in man's nature 
which had frequently been overlooked by other philos·ophers and theolo-
gians. And it was this emphasis which attracted Pascal to Stoicism. 
But it was also this emphasis· which Pascal rejected as an inadequate 
interpretation of man. Having accepted an emphasis of Epictetus, Pascal 
felt compelled to reject him as a philosopher because hi.s position ad-
mitted of no reconciliation with a philosophy such as he found in Montaigne 
which stressed the opposite aspect of man • s nature. It was the irreconc.il-
able polarity of these two philosophers that caused Pascal eventually 
to reject both and move on to a realm -- not of philosophy, but theology --
where the two could be combined into one interpretation of the totality 
of man. 
Thus the influence of Epictetus upon Pascal can best be stated .in 
the latter's own description of the former to M. de Saciz 
There, sir, • . . are the high lights of that great mind who knew 
man's duties so well. I would dare to say that he would have de-
served adoration l).ad he known his own limitations r in as much as 
he would have had to be God to teach both one and the other to men. 
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But, being only dust and ashesr he loses himself in the presumption 
of VJ_hat man can do, after having so well understood what he should 
do. 
Pascal's rejection of Epictetus rested not only on the assumption 
that the Stoic concept of human nature was incomplete, but also upon 
the conviction that the means of fulfilling man's destiny which it ex-
pounded were false. Since Pascal rejected reason as the means of "salv-
ation" he was compelled to condemn a philosophy which was wholly dependent 
upon reason. Here the doubt which Pascal expressed is more akin to 
scepticism, for it asserts that reason is important. Pascal, of course, 
did not reject reason in science or in religion. In religion, it was simply 
inadequate. It is on this basis that Pascal rejected reason as a means 
of reconciling the opposites in man's nature, believing that only on the 
religious plane could such a. reconciliation be accomplished. 
ii. Pascal and Montaigne 
Having discussed his relation to Epictetus in his conversation with 
Monsieur de Sac!, Pascal turned to a discuss.ion of his other favorite 
philosopher,. Montaigne. Philosophers of today would be likely to accept 
Pascal when he admits Epictetus to their number, but would not follow 
him when he does the same for Montaigne. Yet,. the very fact that Montaigne 
/ 
1. Joseph Bedi.er ; , "Etablisserr;ent d'un texte critique de l'Entretien de 
Pascal avec M. de Saci", Etudes Critiques (Paris: Colin, 1903), p. 55. 
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was not a ph.ilosopher in the strictest sense of the term, played an irn-
portant part in Pascal's turning to him. Pascal was attracted to Montaigne 
because, 
He offered no system, and attempted ho vindication of religion 
on grounds of reason accessible to all men , But he put before his 
readers with a singular depth of insight and wealth of illustration, 
the spectacle of human life without reason; and this is just what 
Pascal wanted, if he was to estimate the value of religion to human 
life; and to make this estimate 1 rather than to understand for the 
sake of understanding Las does the philosophw the nature of that 1 
which gives unity to all our various experiences 1 was Pascal's aim. 
It was in Montaigne that Pascal found the renewal of the point of 
view held much earlier by the Pyrrhonists 1 and it was actually through 
Montaigne that he carne to know the position which is most generally 
2 
referred to as Pyrrhonisrn or scepticism. This does not imply that he 
borrowed without reservation or accepted whole-heartedly the conclusions 
which Montaigne presented. It is, in faot, quite possible that Pascal 
read Montaigne not so much to borrow from him as to destroy him. 3 
1. Clement C. J. Webb, Pascal's Philosophy of Religion, (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1929), p. 24. 
2. Pyrrho of Ells, born c. 360 B.C., was the founder of the school of 
thought known as Pyrrhonisrn, which held that knowledge of anything 
absolute is unattainable. Consequently the only sound attitude in 
all questions is one of complete scepticism, or suspension of judg-
ment. This did not preclude suspension of action, whi<=:h should be 
based upon custom and tradition. Such bases, however, .it was 
admitted, might be wrong. 
3. This point of view is presented by T. S. Eliot I Selected Essays, 
(London: Fab er and Faber, 1949), p. 149. 
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Yet in the Pens ees I at the very end of his life I we find pas sage after 
passage almost "lifted"· out of Montaigne, down to a figure of speech 
or a word. Perhaps it is an indication of Montaigne's. greatness that 
before Pascal, or any one else,. for that matter, could attack him, he 
must first be thoroughly infected by his thought. 
Dispensing momentarily with Pascal's motives for studying Montaigne, 
let us consider what Pascal found to be the essence of his thought. 
Michel de Montaigne was nominally faithful to the Church 1 yet it was 
he, who, perhaps more than any of his contemporaries, turned to the 
r.igorous reflection of his own self. 
Montaigne aimed to "love life" and to "cultivate it", finding Nature 
a "gentle guide" and r·egulating his life "after the ordinary human pattern, 
1 
without miracle, without extravagance.,; Thus 1 as Sa inte-Beuve said, 
he may have appeared a very good Catholic -- except for his not having 
been a Christian! Perhaps the only divinity that he acknowledged was 
Socrates 1 the prototype of all such nKnow thyself" disciplines; though 
the discipline of Socrates. differs. centrally from that of Montaigne in that 
Socrates's study of himself never delivered him into a preoccupied self-
indulgence of willful introspecti on. Montaigne' s overtures to "custom" 
as the guide in moral conduct were consistent with his "universal doubt ... 
I. Michel de Montaigne, Es sais, Oeuw es Completes de Michel de 
Montaigne (Paris: edited and published by Louis Conrad, 1932), 
III I 3. 
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Nor did he concede to custom any more than a wise man's deference to 
its accumulated wisdom -- particularly when its wisdom accorded with 
his own. For by his "universal doubt .. he appraised all things. He 
succeeded even in doubting his ' own doubt without at the same time 
contradicting his standpoint. F'or if he doubted he would at any rate 
know that he doubted, and so break the universality of his premise; 
but this Montaigne avo.ided by giving his sceptiC.ism the famous interrog-
ative form: "Que sais-je?" --'What do I know?" Thus, as Pascal points 
out in h.is Entretien avec M. de Saci, 
His uncertainty revolves upon itself in a perpetual and restless 
circle, alike opposed to those who affirm that everything is uncertain 
and to those who affirm that everything is not so, because he will 
affirm nothing. Thus Montaigne emerges in a 'pure Pyrrhonism' . 1 
Montaigne achleved a noble, Stoic evaluation of mind by means 
of resting all upon his initial doubt I but this d.id not apply in all his 
life 1 for in the rea.lm of moral combat he was like a man floating or 
wavering in indecisiveness. 
The scepticism of universal doubt which Montaigne proposed was 
a doubt based on pride, not on humiUty; that fact accounts for the latent 
rationalism that pervades the system. "All inclination and submission 
is due to them" ff. e. , the ecclesia.stical authoritiey I says Montaigne, 
, 
1. Joseph B~dier, "Etablissement d'un texte critique de l'Entretien de 
Pascal avec M. de Saci" 1 Etudes Critiques (Paris: Colin, 1903), p. 55. 
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"except the mind's. My reason is not framed to bend or stoop; my knees 
I 
are." Pascal detects that, since Montaigne has shown that appearances 
are equal on both sides and that it is therefore impossible to know where 
to fix one's belief, he ha5 destroyed all that passes for most certain 
among men. 
Implicit in Montaigne' s destn1ctive negation (which constructs 
nothing in its place) , is a kind of vanity which has been pointed out 
by many of his critics. None, however, has stated the case more 
clearly than Emerson in his essay on Montaigne, or the Sc·eptic, in 
which he comments: ''The f.trst dangerous symptom I report is the levity 
. . 2 
of intellect, as if it were fatal to earnestness to know too much ... 
Pascal's indebtedness to Monta:igne is based not so much on the 
fact that he provided the framework. for his own thought, but rather that 
he provided the "shock" which was necessary for his intellectual and 
spiritual development and which became for him a point of embarkation 
rather than a haven of refuge. P'ascal seems to have the ability to quote 
Montaigne to confound his audience of unbelievers. The reader finds. 
himself .. caught up" as it were, by the insights of Montaigne as he 
I. Michel de Montaigne, Essais..L O.e uv'res Compl~tes de Michel de Montaigne 
(Paris: edited and published by Louis Conrad, I932} III, 3. 
2. Ralph Waldo Emerson , Repres.entative Men, (Boston: James R. Osgood 
and Co • , · 18 7 5} , p . 17 3 • 
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is expressed in Pascalian clothing I only to find that suddenly the tables 
are turnedr the nuances of thought have lost their profundity.· as Pascal 
has stripped them of their cleverness 1 and the reader is left grasping 
for an interpretation which will surpass that to which he had so desper-
ately clung. 
Just as Pascal had found in Epictetus "an incomparable skill for 
troubling the repose of those who seek it in external things .. 1 I he found 
Montaigne, 
.•. unsurpassed for confounding the pride of those who cling to 
their opinions and who think they can find in the sciences impreg-
nable truth . . . [as well as being!" . . . incomparable in his ability 
to confound the pride of those who boast of real justice without 
faithr to disabuse those who cling to their opinions ..• and to 
convince reason so thoroughly of its limitations and its vagaries 
that one is inclined to regard mysteries as repugnant while making 
good use of its principles. 2 · 
Pascal discovered in .his reading of Montaigne the corrective which 
was needed to supplement the interpretation of human nature which he 
had received from Epictetus. Pascal appreciated the theoretical recog-
nition in Stoicism that man is great if he conforms to the divine order 1 
I. Leon Brunschvicg I Pierre Boutroux 1 Felix Gazier (editors) Oeuvres de 
Blaise Pascal publiees suivanU~rdre cbronologique avec documents 
complementaire&, introductions_., et notes (Les Grands ecrivains de 
laFrance) 14vols. 3rd series, (Paris: Hachetter 1904-14), Oeuvre::; 
. N 1 55-56. 
2. Ibid. 
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but he could not forgive Epictetus for his blindness to man's shortcomings 
which consequently delivered him J.nto the sin of intellectual pride. 
Pascal discovered in Montai.gne the foolishness of his attempt to 
state the case of man, that is, to portray himself as a congeries of 
whims, reasons, and contradictions. Just as Epictetus' s picture of 
man in his pride was unreal, so was Montaigne' s in which he saw only 
despair in man. Pascal, of courSE!, saw beyond both these limitations 
of perspective. His viewpoint was not a synthesis of the extremes of 
the good in each of these philosophies, but rather a perspective above 
them. Pascal found in the Christian revelation the missing terms, the 
perspective transcending the partial grasp of both Epictetus and Mon-
taigne. For he found in Christ one who stands above the terms and yet 
stands withi n the human condition. 
Thus, Pascal, in the final analysis, found in Montaigne no satis-
fying guiding principle for his practical life. What he found instead 
was a doctrine which called for no effort, one which <anyone could realize. 
This, again, he knew to be untrue to life by his own experience. Though 
the wisdom of Montaigne was der:lved from the ancients, "his weakness 
was derived from the autonomou s self-sufficiency of the Renaissance, 
the skeptical vanity of which h~~ was shrewd enough to see through but 
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vain enough to share. " 1 
iii. Pascal and Descartes 
Pascal's description of Descartes as "useless and uncertain", 2 
while representing his final asseBs:ment of his great contemporary, hardly 
conveys the complex indebtedness which he felt to Descartes. 
Descartes expressed a characteristic of the age in which he lived, 
which was to look at the facts of experience without preconceptions 
and without reference to antiquity for their interpretation. Descartes 
proposed the method of doubt, of calling into question all experiences. 
He advocated the seeking of truth by each ind.ividual. 
Because Pascal shared with him an interest in scientific method, 
he was naturally drawn to Descaites. There were other reasons also for 
this interest. Both men were mathematicians. Both were loyal sons 
of the Church in France and as such, members of the Roman Catholic 
Church. Both took a similar attitude toward authority in matters of 
science and religion. Both were as ready to admit authority in the latter 
as they were indisposed to admit it in the former. 3 In the realm of 
1. Stanley R. Hopper, The Cris.i.s of Faith, (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury 
Press, 1944}, p. 73. 
2. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, (ed . Brunschvicg) Number 78. 
3. Clement C.J. Webb, Pascal's Philosophy of Religion, (Oxford, The 
Clarendon Press, 1929), p p.lZ·-19. 
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science and religion, therefore, there was no basic antagonism, between 
Pascal and Descartes; though their approach did vary. In the realm of 
philosophy, however, Pascal found Descartes "useless and uncertain." 
In seeking to establish a durable and sound basis for the construction 
of a philosophy, Descartes started with doubt itself. In fact, he carried 
doubt to its ultimate conclusion, by doubting his ab.ility to doubt. To 
doubt, he concluded, is to think, and to think is to exist. Thus the 
essence of his system is expressed in his famous saying, "Cogito, ergo 
sum". He even went on from this t o posit the existence of God, for 
he discovered the self-evident, innate idea of the perfect. In having 
thus established the existence of God he was able to trust his immediate 
perception of the physical world, since God, its primal cause, is not 
malicious nor capr.icious but perfect and therefore trustworthy. 
From this point, Descartes was able to conclude that doubt is not 
permanently poss.ible, that is,. it J.s superseded by the unshakable con-
viction that 
. . . no opposing reason can be brought against me which should 
make me ever call it in quest:lon . . . and thus I have a true and 
certain knowledge of it. And this same knowledge extends also to 
other things which I recollect: having formerly demonstrated, as 
the truths of geometry. 1 
1. Rene Descartes, Philosophical ·works of Descartes, trans. E. S. Haldane 
and G.R.T. Ross 2 vols. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1931), 
I, 184. 
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Descartes d.id not hesitate in h:ls system of thought to extend his 
method of mathematical reason to all areas of knowledge. He took geo-
metrical certitude as the type of aJl certitude, whereas Pascal asserted 
that this certitude exists only in the clear mid-point between the mysteries 
of the infinite. Descartes' system was a deduction everywhere from 
simple and clear ideas, overcoming probability by necessary knowledgei 
but since mathematical knowledge alone is necessary 1 because it bears 
within itself the inevitability of clear ideas, all knowledge must there-
fore be mathematical. 
Descartes developed by means of purely logical methods, a meta-
physical system which might be easily harmonized w.ith revealed religion. 
Descartes' method was that of reason, free and independenti .if he arrived 
at the Heavenly City it was rathE~r with an air of surprise. By finding 
his way without the light of revelation 1 he was, in effect, denying the 
1 
necessity of revealed religion. 
In thus turning the mind inward. upon itself 1 in shutting it off from 
the objects of knowledge, Descartes has committed "the original sin 
. 2 
of modern ph1losophy." Actually in his system there is a ceaseless 
1. Morris Bishop, Pascal, The Li:Ee of Genius, (New York : Reyna! and 
Hitchcock 1 1936), pp.34-35. 
2. Jacques Maritain 1 Three Reformers I (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1936) 1 p. 14. 
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process which ultimately revolves. only around itself. When Descartes 
assumed on the basis of his ''Cogitq, ergo sum" that he ex.isted, he 
was going further than the assumption merited. 'Nhat he should have 
said, and at this it would seem unnecessarily redundant; "I think,. 
1 
therefore I am a thinker. " 
It was at this point that Pascal was most criticq.l of Descartes' 
assumptions. For to be a thinker means merely that one is delivered 
into knowing. That .is, that he knows the facts. But for Pascal, truth 
was more than mere knowingi it was subjective. This is not to say that 
Pascal was not concerned with objective reality. Certainly this was 
not true in his work as a scientist, and neither was it true in his 
theological interest. The d.istinction to be made here is one of "orders" . 
Pascal insisted that in the realm of human destiny it was essential to make 
a distinction between that truth wh:lch man seeks and that knowledge 
which possesses him. Pascal seemed to sense in the method of Descartes 
a bas.ic ignoring of the central problem of human destiny because it could 
not cope with it. Pascal perceived the inadequacy of using rational 
proofs alone to convince the unbel:lever. He regarded thinking,. by it-
self, as important to overcome the inner contradictions which he observed 
in man and which he felt must bE~ reconciled in order for man to be truly 
1. Ibid. 
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free. 11 So long as de.ity is merely an idea to be · entertai~ed, we are 
dealing with a philosophical .idol ,, not with the God of Abraham, Isaac, 
. l 
and Jacob. 11 
Of Pascal, it could justifiably be said, that the end of life is not 
knowing, but living; and furthermore, that the end of living is to arrive 
at some relationship with truth, and not merely at "thought which con-
ceives itself. 112 Descartes did not think in these terms. For him the 
act of thinking grasps only .its own thought. It is no wonder, therefore, 
that we find such cr.iticisms of his :method as in the following statement 
which was made by Unamuno: 
The defect of Descartes' Pis course on Method lies not in the 
antecedent methodical doubti not .in his beginning by resolving to 
doubt everything, a merely intellectual dev.ice; but in his resolu-
tion to beg.in by emptying h.imself of h.imself, of Descartes, of the 
real man, the man of flesh and bone, the man who does not want 
to die, in order that he might be a mere thinker -- that is, an 
abstraction. 3 
Unamuno also suggests that the doubt that we find in Descartes is a 
comic doubt, for he acted as if he doubted without really doubting. 
I. David Roberts, Ex.istent.ialisrn and Religious Belief, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1957), p. 48. 
2 . Hopper, Stanley R. The Cris:is of Faith, (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury 
Press, 1944), p. 78. 
3. Miguel de Unamuno, The Traq!f: Sense of Life .in Man and .in Peoples, 
trans. J. E. C. Flitch, (London: Macmillan and Company, 19 31) , p. 34. 
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-while Descartes, in philosophy as in science, proceeded by deduction 
-- using ex amples like experiments. only for verification -- Pascal, in 
philosophy as in science, would first make his ex periments upon the 
human soul, and from them demons1rate that only the Christian hypothesis 
satisfactorily accounts for the observed facts. He would not prove 
God, for he saw the inadequacy of formal proofs of God, but he would 
show man that the phenomena of his wor ~d are consistent, with God's 
existence, and with that alone. 1 
Pascal rejected philosophy, for he realized that without God's 
guidance, man~ s quest for knowledge was as naught. Ther·efore, he 
despised those philosophers who attempted, in ways he considered 
completely futile, to find reality by reason alone. Presumably Pascal 
was at this point considering philosophy in the light of the Jansenist 
attitude toward it, for Jansen considered philosophy to be the mother 
of errors and of heresies. Evidence of this attitude toward philosophy 
may be found in his Pensees in whJch he writes, "We don't think that 
all philosophy is worth an hour's trouble." 2 The basis for much of his 
antagonistic attitude toward philos.ophy was h.is refusal to ascribe 
1. Morris Bishop, Pascal, The I.:ife of Genius, (New York: Reyna! and 
Hitchcock, 1936), p. 105. 
2. Blaise Pascal, Pensees , (ed .. Brunschvicg) Number 79. 
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unqualified power to reason, as does Descartes, who proposed reason 
as the very basis of religion and of life. 
Since Pascal questioned the power of reason, not in scientific 
inquiries but in the realm of discerning the destiny of man, he saw its 
limitations, and consequently denounced philosophy. He concluded 
that there are two excesses: to exclude reason entirely, and to admit 
1 
only reason. 
Of the criticism he made of those who used reason entirely, none was. 
more direct than that which he addressed to Descartes. This was because 
he considered the deductive reasoning of Descartes to be particularly 
ins.idious, and deceptive. He suggested that if reason is to be used, 
it should be inductive reasoning :ln which there may be observation and then 
subsequent classification from these observations into predictive structures. 
Thus it may be said that throughout his work, Descartes stands for 
the scientific position, whereas :Pascal is identified with his own adapt-
ation of the scientific method. vVhHe to Descartes, religion and ethics 
are a thing apart, almost indiffer,~nt,. to Pascal they are humanity's 
chief concern. 
It i s true, of course, that Descartes was a theist, a Roman Catholic 
and a Christian. But he was a theist primarily because of a philosophical 
l. Ib.id. Numbers, 253, 82. 
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argument which he insisted should be convinci ng to e very unprejudiced 
mind which could follow it indep,:::ndently of any specifically religious 
experience. Also, he was a Roman. Catholic more because of its being 
the :religious tradition of his coun try men rather than because of any 
personal ex perience which conv.inced him of its value. 1 
Opposed to this position of Descartes' was Pascal's assertion that 
apart from the specifically religious - - and he would insist that it be 
Christian -- ex perience of an inherent contradiction in human life wh.ich 
could discover its solution only :Ln the Christi an doctrine of the Fall 
and the Redemption, there was no evidence, even in theism , which 
could really satisfy the mind. 
Pascal, therefore, rejected t he Cartesian method. He saw that 
the first principles from which n,:::scartes sought to deduce everything 
were really arbitrary hypotheses; that they completely failed to do justice 
to the infinite distance that separated the different orders of reality; 
and that in any case they could not lead to anything but rational truths, 
bri nging out what reason already implicity contained, but not pointing 
to Jesus Christ. 
Pascal's own method took account of the imponderable elements 
I. Clement C. J. Webb, Pascal's Philosophy of Religion, (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1929) , p. ~:0 .. 
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in human nature -- those real and very fundamental constituents of person-
ality with which abstr"act mathematical or logical reasoning is inadequate 
to cope. His concrete and practical mind, trained by physics, enlarged 
by contact with Mere, and rendered subtle by his work on infinitesimals, 
grasped the crucial fact that human beings attained certainty, not only 
by ma~matical demonstrations, but also by another more subtle, but 
no less sure method. 
iv. Summary 
Pascal was not learned or widely-read in philosophy. His readings 
in the area were largely confined to Epictetus and Mont aigne. Neither 
was Pascal a great philosopher. 1:ven as he reflects on his religious 
experiences, it is not philosophical e xactness which characterizes 
his reflections, but rather a profound concern for submission to God. 
He was not interested in "these experiences as philosophical or even 
theological problems .l2ill:... se. H1:') makes it quite clear in his Memorial 
that it is the God of Abraham, I~:aac and Jacob of whom he is speaking 
and not the God of the philosophers or :the savants. 
This ignorance of philosophy on the one hand and the abhorrence 
of it on the other are associated in that it was not Pascal's inability 
to comprehend the ph.ilosopbers that caused him to be ill-informed in 
this area of .knowledge. It was rather the false hope which he sensed 
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in their evaluation of man and the deceptive means of self-discovery 
that they offered to man. Pascal then does evidence in his attitude 
toward philosophy a basic doubt concerning reason. For in his criticism 
of the intellect he is not content to show reasoning as merely defective, 
or simply limited in its scope, but asserts that it is actually self-des-
tructive. 
But Pascal does not stop then~, either in his · life or thought. Just 
as he could not rise to the heights of dignity suggested by Epictetus, 
so he refused to wallow in the mire of despair and defeat with Mon-
taigne simply because he believed reason to be impotent. 
Therefore his doubt was of the kind that did not go in circles, but 
compelled him to seek his affirmation at a level which he believed far 
surpassed any rational proof, and to find his ultimate verification in the 
validity of relig.ious experience. 
The reason about which, in his doubt, he spoke disparagingly and 
rejected as a demonstration for the existence of God, was accepted as 
a means of demonstrating to man the value of the historical proofs of 
Christianity. Therefore, though Pascal refuted reason as the means 
of salvation, he did not say that faith was unreasonable. For he con-
sidered it quite reasonable that men should arrive at a point by means 
of reason where they would be willing to submit to the dictates of religious 
exper.ience. 
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In a manner similar to the way ;in which Pascal had been compelled 
to study the science of man as a natural outgrowth of h.is study of natural 
sc.ience, and the questions which it raised, so his study of religion 
was an outgrowth of his experience :in philosophy. So regarded, the 
doubt which, though of a different nature in both science and philosophy, 
nevertheless compelled him to seek an interpretation of his existence 
in the realm of faith. 
3. Pascal and Religion 
Pascal has often been described as a scientist and a saint. He 
has long been held in high esteem as a scientist, but a recognition of · 
his pre-eminence in the realm of reUgious thought has lagged behind. 
When he has been cited as an outstanding man of religion it has often 
been because of his personal experience of religion, rather than his 
thought about the religious life. Only in relatively recent years has 
his .importance as a religious thinker been recognized. 
Pascal wrote relatively little in the area of religion. A side from 
his Penstes wh.ich represent his unfinished Apologie de la Religion 
Chretienne, there are the Lettres. Provinciales and some shorter works. 
Included in this latter grouping would be his Memorial 1 Priere pour le 
. " / I' " bon usage des maladies,. Mystere de Jesus, Ecrits sur la Grace, and 
a Lettre d'un avocat. 
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It is primarily in the Pensees. that his most exhaustive reflections 
on religion are to be found. Even these were written for a particular 
occasion, namely, the conversion of the libertines or free thinkers. 
However, their scope is greater than the immediate cause to which they 
were addressed. This is not as true of the shorter works and even of 
the Provincial Letters. 
Two foci are apparent in the H:lligious writings of Pascal,. a concern 
for the state of his own soul and a concern for the souls of others. The 
shorter works, for the most part, have grown out of specific personal 
experiences in his life and represent his· reflections upon them. In the 
Pens~es he is more concerned with the religious welfare of others, 
particularly their doubt. 
It might appear that as Pascal speaks to others concerning their 
doubt, the focus is diverted from h.ls own doubt. Yet no writer can be 
isolated from his work and no wr.itin.g can be fully understood without 
relating it to its author. There seems ample evidence to believe that 
though Pascal did not identify himself with the libertines, he neverthe-
less knew the.ir position and the problems which they faced in accepting 
religion. It is further evident that t he solution which he offered to their 
doubt is the solution which spoke not only to their needs -- but to his 
as well. Therefore, in his Pen sees,. he spoke not only to the doubt of 
others,. but he expressed his own struggle with belief and the answers 
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which he had found acceptable in it~ 
Because the focus of this study automatically limits our investi-
gation of Pascal's theology and religion in general, and because Pascal's 
writings concerning doubt in others are inextricably related to his own 
solution of doubt, it seems advisable in considering his relation to 
religion to evaluate it in the context of his major religious writings. 
It is for th.is reason that Pascal's relation to religion will be included 
in chapter four; where Pascal and the doubt of others will be discus sed. 
4. The Relation of Science, Philosophy and Religion 
In the Thought of Pascal . 
The contention of the writer is that the thought of Pascal, diverse 
as it is in content, nevertheless embodies a basic unity. This unity, 
which appears primarily by implication and only then when one has 
investigated all areas of the thought of Pascal, finds its fulfillment 
in the pursuit of :meaning. This unity, likewise, is not merely some-
thing wh.ich Pascal, by means of his theory of knowledge, imposed upon 
his world. It .is rather an expression of Nature which he felt was per-
petually inclined towards unity in its establishment of relationships 
between things apparently remote from each other. 
Pascal's reflections represent no idle entertainment of ideas. He 
was involved in all his research and in all his speculations in a very 
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personal way, seeking out not only truth in the abstract, but truth which 
he hoped would be concretized as meaningful interpretations of h.is world. 
In the area of sciencer Pascal sought by ruthless ex perimentation 
the basic laws which would interpret the changes which were to be ob- · 
served in the physical world. He refused to accept on the basis of 
traditional belief or authoritarian control the popular interpretations 
or those which were not usually questioned because they carried the 
sanction of learned speculators. This is what can be called his ex -
pression of doubt i n science. Its form, to be sure, is. quite different 
from the poubt which he expresses in philosophy and religion. It 
grows quite naturally out of a neutrality which can be dislodged only 
when conclusive evidence has been reached as the result of repeated 
questionings about the inter-operation of significant physical variables. 
The doubt of Pascal as expressed in science r therefore, is not the type 
which cynically denied the possibility of knowledge, but which pursued 
its unhampered ex pression by means of an objectively oriented method 
of investigation. 
It was this type of searching, questioning, and denying that led 
Pascal .in the realm of mathematics to assert that reality far surpasses 
our ability to conceive of it. By this he did not so much. deny the 
validity of the search for an explanation as he asserted the infinite 
nature of the universe. Because mathematics shares in this proces s 
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it is based upon the idea of the infinite, and reveals to its students 
the two infinites to be discovered in all things -- namely, the infinitely 
1 
great and the infinitely small. 
It was this idea of the two inf.inites which led Pascal to posit the 
2 
existence of a discontinuity of orders in which elements within these 
different levels I or orders I were qualitatively different from each other 1 
because "a unit added to infinity does not increase it any more than 
would one foot added to an infinite length. " 3 
The crucial significance of this position for our study of Pascal is 
that it served as the preliminary assumption for his later conception of 
a similar disproportion between bodies and minds and between minds and 
charity. "All the bodies in the universe cannot give rise to even the 
least of minds; and w.ith all that minds can produce I they can never 
4 give rise to the least impulse of charity." 
1. Leon Brunschvicg 1 Pierre Boutroux, Felix Gazier (editors) Oeuvres de 
Blaise Pascal publi~es suivant l'ordre chronologique ayec documents 
complementaires I introductions I et notes (Les Grands ecrivains de 
la France) 14 vols. 3rd series r (Paris; Hachette, 1904-14) Oeuvres, 
IX, 255-256. 
2. Pascal's theme of the three orders refers to t]J.e order of body, of 
mind and of charity. 
3. Blaise Pascal, Pense'es, (ed. Brunschvicg) Number 233. 
4. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, (ed. Brunschvicg) Number 793. 
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Another derivative from Pascal's use of doubt in science which is 
closely related to his theory of the different order of infinity is his 
emphasis upon the role of probability in science and even in the realm 
of religion. The famous pari or wager argument of Pascal, 1 applies 
the rule of chances to the question of the existence of God. 
Much confusion has resulted from this argument because it has been 
considered out of context and emphasis has been plac·ed more upon its 
metaphysical implications thah upon its psychological purpose. In the 
wager argument, of course, Pascal was emphasizing more an attitude of 
mind-- a willingness to act even without definite proof-- because of 
the necessity of action in the ethical life, than he was actually betting 
on God's existence as a theological proof. Thus, even though the 
emphasis is quite different in the religious application, nevertheles:;;, 
he was stressing the necessity of a personal decision, a subjective 
evaluation, which initially grew out of his research in physics. For 
here he had learned one of his basic principles of science and of religion. 
This principle was the supremacy of experience. 
In the same manner as Pascal had called for an attitude of "let us 
investigate" in discussing the issue of the existence of a vacuum, he 
called upon his readers to put religion to the test. The basic distinction 
I. See pp, 170£. of this study. 
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between "research'" in the two areas lay in the fact that in the realm 
of science the truth about a phenomenon can be established only by 
experimentation. In the realm of religion, the existence of truth is 
not dependent upon men's experience of it, but of course it has no 
validity for him until he empirically avails himself of its power. In the 
realm of religion Pascal believed that it was not sufficient to establish 
the truth, but that in addition men must be made to accept it. It was 
to this end that he employed all his powers as a scientist, a philosopher, 
and as a man of religion. 
Important as science was to Pascal both in the interests with which 
it provided him as well as in supplying the hasis for a more general 
theory of knowledge, it was not sufficiently inclusive to occupy all 
his efforts. Nor did it provide him with all of the interpretations which 
he sought for his world. For as Pascal said, 
"When I began the study of man, I realized that these abstract 
sciences &eometry and physicy were not his proper sphere, and 
that in investigating them I was wandering further from my true 
state than otb.ers in ignoring them. 1 
By thus doubting the final significance of science, Pascal was 
compelled to study man by the science of man, and in his day this meant 
philosophy, The fact that man was considered by Pascal to be a thinking 
, 
I. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, (ed. Brunschvicg), Number 144. 
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being endowed him w.i.tJ:l powers which made him profoundly more power-
ful than the universe which might s.eek to crush him. Set overagainst 
this greatness, however, is the concept of the depravity or wretchedness 
of man. 7hese two aspects of man's nature represent the two infinities 
which have been mentioned above and which are to be found in all of 
Pascal's discussion of the orders of infinity . 
Pascal believed that philosophy could assist in the process of inter-
preting this polarity of man for it presumes to evaluate man in much the 
same way that science under-takes to analyze the physical world. It 
was for this reason that he responded to the contributions to the under-
standing of man as they were presented in such philosophers as Epictetus 
and Montaigne. He had been reluctant to accept certain views of man 
as they had been presented by isolated Christian doctrines which saw 
man as totally depraved. Pascal's observing mind gave him sufficient 
evidence to substantiate this assumption about man, but it also provided 
him with evidence to refute this bias.ed approach. Thus, again it appears 
how Pascal's doubt, or the reluctance to accept only one interpretation, 
forced him to seek another. The same process repeats itself in reverse 
in his contact with the sceptical philosophy of Montaigne. Thus a basic 
interest in discovering the truth about man initiated Pascal's search 
for a clarification of that interest and a specification of man ' s true goal 
in life. 
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This same basic interest in truth, call it doubt or a suspended 
neutrality of the mind, in turn necessitated a consideration of opposite 
v:iewpoints to explain the diversity found in the nature of man. As these 
two points of view in and of themselves were insufficient and provided 
no bas:is on which they might be integrated, Pascal once again experi-
enced the driving force of a doubting attitude which would not relinquish 
its efforts until it had been resolved on a level where incongTUi tie s ,ahd 
opposites could be assimilated. 
Th.i:s level for Pascal was found on the plane of the religious. Since 
his chief thoughts concerning the significance of this area are construed 
as reflections in behalf of those whom he hoped to convince with the 
proof growing out of his experience of the Christian religion, they will 
now be considered in a special section dealing with his apologetic 
design and purpose. 
CHAPTER N 
PASCAL AND THE DOUBT OF OTHERS 
1. Pascal and the Libertines 
One gains a greater appreciation for the significance of the Pensees 
if he understands at least some of the distinctive characteristics of 
those for whom this apologetic work was written. This refers, of course, 
to the libertines or free-thinkers of Seventeenth Century France. 1 
The libertines presented a serious and complex problem to be sure, 
not only as viewed by Pascal, but in the threat which they presented 
to the whole religious life of France itself. Their influence had permeated 
1.. For a detailed discussion of the libertines in France in the seven-
' tee nth e:;entury, see the following works: F. Bruneti~re, Etudes 
critiques sur l'histoire de la litterature fran~aise, 3eseries, 
(Paris: Hachette, 1987)r p. 113t F. Strowski, Pascal et son temps, 
(Paris: Plon, 1908), III, 126£., Jacques Rennes, Pascal et le Libertin, 
(Paris: Librairie Valois, 1950)t F. T. Perrens, Les Libertins en France 
au Dixseptieme si~cle, (Paris: Leon Chailley, 1896). A helpful 
magazine article is: M. Blanchet, "L'Attitude religieuse des Jesuitss 
et les sources du pari de Pascal",. Revue de metaphysigue et de 
morale, 26, 1919, pp. 477-516. 
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France by the beginning of the seventeenth century. Their number has 
been estimated at roughly fifty thousand in Paris alone at the time of 
the reign of Louis XIII. Their doctrine was a combination of the Stoicism 
propounded by DuVair and of the Epicureanism which had found expression 
in the writings of Montaigne. They based much of their doctrine upon 
the synthesis of these two views as they were incorporated into the 
/ 
Traite de la sagesse published in 1601 by Pierre Charron. Charron had 
insisted that wisdom and religion are to be distinguished and separated 
from each other. In a similar manner the libertines contended that 
virtue and religion may exist independently of each other. They insisted 
upon man1~S natural goodness and his ability to conduct his life without 
any formal type of organiz.ed religion. This attitude was fostered and 
supported by the revival of Stoicism and the triumph of new scientific 
. . 
discoveries during the first half of the seventeenth century wh.tch had 
c·ontributed to the increasing gulf between reason and faith. In this 
atmosphere, even though tbe libertines had often been reared in the 
Christian tradition, they found themselves ensnared in the web of free 
thought, with little solid ground-work for their religious beliefs.. 
Pascal seemed to. sense the unique and terrifying position in which 
the libertines found themselves. They would no longer accept the author-
ity of the Catholic Church or divine revelation. Nor was this the whole 
of it. For concerning natural religion, which is der.ived from reason, 
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they held a hostile or an indifferent attitude. The extent of this indiff-
I 
erence is expressed in Pascal's Pensees in which one hears the libertine 
say: 
I know not who created me, nor what the world is, ·nor what 
I myself am. I am in terrible ignorance of everything . . . As I 
know not whence I come, so I know not whither I go. I know only 
that, in leaving this world I fall either into annihilation or into 
the hands of an angry God, without know.ing to which of these two 
states I shall be forever assigned. Such is my state,. full of weak-
ness and uncertainty. 1 · 
As one catches gLimpses of the libertines throughout the Pensees, 
in their conversations w.ith Pascal, he can hardly identify them with the 
stubborn and resolute scoffers who had inherited the naturalistic philo-
sophy of the Renaissance. 2 The apathy toward religion wh.ich was to 
be found in the attitudes of the libertines threatened to jeopardize the en-
tire Christian position. This apathy,. was in a very real sense, more 
insidious and dangerous than open hostility as it made itself known by 
holding up to ridicule all the traditional beliefs of Christianity. 
The kind of free thinker whom Pascal knew and with whom he was 
concerned in his apologetic work, was epitomized in the person of Damien 
1. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, (ed. Brunschvicg), Number 194. 
2. The Dictionnaire de l'Acadernie defines the libertine in this manner: 
"Libertin, qui fait profession de ne point s'assujettir aux lois de 
la religion,. soit pour la croyance I soit pour la pratique. En ce 
sens 1 qui a vieill.i, il ne s' employait guere que substantivement." 
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Mitton, who was "fashionably indifferent to relig.ion .. and who sought 
to find refuge from his disillusionment in. "distraction" (divertissement). 1 
B.ishop has described the libertines as "cheap poets and sorry wits ... 
[jNhsiJ found a special piquancy .in challenging God in song, .in the midst 
of their whoredoms . " 2 
In our own day we would probably call the libertines atheists, for 
they more or less openly professed atheism. 3 In the seventeenth century, 
however, there was not only ecclesiastical censure of avowed atheism, 
but it came under the judgment of the civil authorities as well. If: may 
well have been this social stigma associated with atheism that caused 
the libertines to refrain from using a term with which most of us are 
more familiar than with the term libertine which they adopted. 4 The 
problem of classifying these "scoffers" of religion presented an equally 
l. Jean Mesnard, PascaL L'homme et Poeuvre, (Paris: Boivin et Cie., 
1951) 1 P• 158 • 
2. Morris Bishop, Pascal, The Life of Genius, (New York: Reynal and 
Hitchcock, 1936), p. 34. 
3. For a more detailed discussion of this subject see: H. Busson, La 
Pensee religieuse franfaise de Charron a Pascal, (Paris: Vrin, 1933) I 
pp. 42 f. 
4. Morris Bishop, Pascal, The Life of Genius, (New York: Reyna! and 
Hitchcock, 19 3 6) , p. 2 60, lists the six banners under which the 
enemies of orthodoxy marched, as being: atheists, deists, Pyrrhonists, 
Stoics, Epicureans, and Protestants. 
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diffkult challenge in their own day. And their contemporaries, perhaps 
in much the same manner that we still do today, persisted in indiscrimi-
nately associating the libertines at one t.ime with the deists, at another 
time with the heretics or the atheists. We can be relatively safe in 
assuming that in their search for a sense of values 1 they had turned to 
Epictetus and Monta.igne for assistance and .inherited as a consequence, 
an ethic chiefly concerned with man's temporal well-being. 
The doctrines held by the free thinker s and expressed in libertinism 
were not merely intellectual doctri nes confined to the realm of thought 
alone; they were also reflected i n actions. Libert.inism applied both 
to freedom .in thought and relax ation in morals. Following as it did the 
period of religious conflict and struggle in France, libertinism expressed 
itself in exercisi ng the long-repressed appetites and passions, which 
in their struggle for sat.isfact.ion, paid little attention to the poss.essions 
of others or to the future consequences of their quest. Living for the 
moment became the important goal for this movement. 
It was to theselibertines that Pascal addressed his apologetic writ-
ings, for he sensed in their insidious ambiguity of thought and their 
license of morality 1 a real danger not only to those whom they attacked 
but to themselves as well. It was therefore to the libertines even more 
so than to the ardent sceptics or the avowed atheists that Pascal address.ed 
his apology. 
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Pascal, in writing to the free thinkers r was not at the disadvantage 
of addressing an unknown audience. He knew rather well their character-
is tics, their cleverness in matters of thought, and their suspension of 
the teleological in their ethic. Pascal, during his worldly period, had 
come to know in a first-hand manner, the l:lbertines whom he addressed. 
He knew them more through first-hand experience than he did through 
their writings, and thus in attacking them he knew at which point they 
1 
would be most vulnerable. 
To state that Pascal attacked his readers may appear to be too 
aggressive a statement ·of his action and in other respects may mislead 
one in .interpreting Pascal's method of approaching the problem of doubt 
in others. For Pascal wisely perceived that though the libertines' con-
elusions were to be attacked, not everything in their thought patterns 
had to be refuted. In this sense, therefore, Pascal regarded their know-
ledge of Epictetus and Montaigne as a helpful preparation for his own 
message to them. For he too had studied both these writers and had 
found in both a profound insight into the nature of man. However, he 
was led to conclude that the insights of both, taken either individually 
or together, did not represent a complete picture of man. Therefore, 
he felt that a knowledge of these philosophers on the part of the 
1. Jean Mesnard, Pascal, L'homme et L'oeuvre, (Paris: Boivin et Cie., 
1951), p. 168. 
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libertines could be meaningfully used as a means to point the way to 
the Christian religion. 
. I 
Throughout the Pensees there appear the arguments which Pascal 
based upon his own observations of the libertines' sometimes cynical 
and sometimes hostile attitude toward religion. By knowing the argu-
ments which the libertines would bring forth in opposition to Christianity, 
he was more able to anticipafe their objections by arguments and per-
suasions of his own des.ign which would forestall, if not confound, them 
and consequently make them more amenable to the appeal which Christian:-
ity had to offer. Implicit in all his conversations with the libertines was 
the hope that he would ultimately convert them to Christianity and not 
merely make them curious about its intellectual aspects. 
In order to achieve this ultimate purpos.e Pascal realized that his 
approach to them could be no ordinary approach. He realized that the 
only argument to which they might possibly listen was··_the argument of 
the ancients . No traditional apologetic argument would be convinc.ing 
enough to win them, and more than likely it would only challenge their 
intellectual pride and make them more difficult to convince. However, 
before this could be accomplished, he had first of all to win their con-
fidence. 
Re alizing that one of the most impervious obstacles to an acceptance 
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of the dogmas of religion was intellectual pride, Pascal hoped to make 
it less obdurate by showing the libertine that the Christian religion 
is not contrary to reason. Furthermore, it is to be highly respected 
because of the searching analysis it contributes to the understanding 
of man and his true happiness. If this impression could be created among 
the libertines, Pascal felt that much of the hatred and fear which they 
otherwise harbored against religion might be removed. With insight 
that has out-distanced not only his contemporary apologists, but those 
before and after, Pascal understood that the emotions represent continuums 
of reactions. Therefore, if fears could be removed and transformed into 
curiOs i t'y half of the battle would be won. 
This may seem to lend itself to a pragmatic interpretation of religion, 
and the pragmatic element was present in the apologetic plan of Pascal; 
he realized that unless he could offer something to the libertines which 
would be for their gain,. they would not listen to him. The matter should 
not and does not end here, for this is not the whole of religion. But 
without a "vested interest" to cause the doubter or scoffer to give an 
attentive ear to the apologist, it is doubtful if even the most persuasive 
arguments would avail. 
Evidencing insight and originality in the matter of the approach 
for his apology, Pascal avoided the traditional appeals to Christianity 
based upon formal proofs of God such as an appeal1D Nature, and turned 
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instead to an analysis of man himself as the point of embarkation. With 
this as a starting point, Pascal hoped .to complete his purpose by indi-
eating to the libertines that their true happiness was in a sense not an 
end in itself at all, but rather a by-product which resulted from a right 
relation with God. He hoped to prove to them that this relationship could 
be secured by means of the Christian religion. 1 
One need not be a trained psychologist to asses the psychological 
validity of Pascal's approach to the libertines. By meeting the libErtines 
on their own level, he was not only able to speak effectively to their 
concerns, but he was also able to empathically feel the resistance which 
they naturally felt towards anyone who would try to change their position. 
Thus, it was because Pascal appealed to their curios.i t y · at the level 
where it was most easily aroused, that he could hope to speak with any 
degree of effectiveness to them and eventually win them to his position. 
His apology, then, was addressed to the libertines in a very per-
sonal manner, and therefore eliminated the impersonal character so typical 
of the traditional proofs of Christianity which had been used by other 
apologists . 
One should not conclude, however, that merely because his appeal 
I. Marie Louise Hubert, Pascal's Unfin.ished Apology r (New Haven: 
Yale Univers.ity Press, 1952), p. 118. 
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to the libertines was personal .in nature that it thereby flattered them 
or played up to them. Pascal was quite intolerant of their philosophy 
and even more intolerant of their behav.tor. He did not condemn their 
ambitions, however, as they were reflected in their thoughts and actions. 
What was far more significant for h.i.s purposes was the fact that he 
understood the goals which they were seeking and he saw that rather 
than as s.i.sting them .i.n the achievement of their goals, their religious 
indifference was hindering them. 
Instead of concluding that the antagonism which the libertines ex-
pressed toward religion was their real motive and therefore the point 
where he needed to focus his attention, he sensed its defensive char-
acter and realized that such antagonism was not so much a revolt 
against the object itself, (in this case, religion) but that it was more 
accurately assessed as what they considered the proper or fashionable 
thing to do. 
It was precisely at th.i.s point that Pascal's first-hand knowledge 
of the libertine was indispensable. For he accurately perceived that 
rather than run the risk of losing the esteem which they were seeking, 
but were in the danger of losing, they would change the.ir present atti-
tude. It was this realization which caused Pascal to focus his attention 
at this facet of their concern and appeal to their own self-interest. 
In depicting the risk which the libertines were running in their 
religious indifference 1 Pascal added to the personal character of his 
attack. And there need be no reluctance in labeling his approach as 
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an attack. He denounced the actions of the libertines in a very caustic 
manner. He called their carelessness "foolishness" 1 "blindness" 1 
"extravagance" I "stupidity,.. 1 Elaborating upon these labels I Pascal 
proceeded to point out to the libertines how they have been deceived 
by basing their beliefs upon philosophies such as that of Montaigne 
which have not even raised some of the basic questions which he assert-
ed must be included in a releva:nt philosophy of life. 
Pascal worked on the premise that once the libertines were convinced 
that the intellectual basis for their assumptions was invalid, they would 
be intellectually -and emotionally amenable to an approach which would 
supplant their previous fallacious presuppositions with a foundation 
for a happier life. It is highly questionable if Pascal could have made 
any impression upon the libertines had he chosen a more formal present-
ation such as the scholastic argument for the immortality of the soul. 
A further important factor to consider in Pascal's relation to the 
libertines as an apologist, is that he was a lay apologist. This is 
not always an asset for obvious reasons. However, in this particular 
situation it seemed to strengthen his cause. For in being a lay writer 
1. Blaise Pascal, Pense'es, (ed. Brunschvicg), Number 195. 
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rather than one of the ordained clergy 1 he was able to speak more as 
one man to another man,. without any particular doctrinal axe which he 
was compelled to grind or dogma which he felt he must defend. This 
made for a lack of defensiveness which is so often present in the apolo-
getic works of professional theologians who feel that they must refute 
the objections of their readers at all cost. Rather than being on the 
defensive, Pascal confronts the libertine with his doubt, and if an ob-
jection is raised as a result, he changes it at once into a positive argument 
in such a manner that its negative value becomes repugnant. 
This is another evidence of the astuteness of Pascal's understanding 
of his audience and the level at which they lived. It is .such understand-
ing that has insured his enduring reputation as a defender· of the faith 
and an enemy of its scoffers. And it places him in a unique position as 
one who thoroughly understood his adversaries.. Thus, Victor Giraud, 
in praising Pascal as an apologist has said, 
. . . Of all the apologists of Christianity l;le is perhaps the only 
one whose thought has imposed itself even upon those whom he did 
not manage to convince. 1 
' 1. Victor Giraudr La Vie heroigue de Blaise Pascal, (Paris: Cres r 1923) I 
p. 2 32. 
2. Pascal's Psychological Apologetic: The Pens~es 
L The Plan of the Pensees 
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The Pensees are organized to fit into an over-all pattern in which 
Pascal appeals to the libertine on the basis of man • s misery without 
God, and man's happiness with God; or stating it in a slightly different 
manner: That nature is corrupt, and for this corruption th:ere is redemp-
tion, as indicated in Scripture. 1 By laying bare the conflict which is 
inherent in man, both in his individual nature and in his relation to · 
other men, Pascal realized a ready audience. In order to arouse in 
the indifferent libertine an active interest in pursuing his here- to· fore 
guarded acknowledgement of a need for God, Pascal appealed to two 
basic aspects of his character. The first of these was the faculty of 
introspection. "The second was the even more basic desire of the in-
dividual to satisfy his egocentric self-concern as. it was revealed in 
this introspection. 
What is revealed to the unbeliever as he looks into his life is not 
a satis.fying portrait. An honest assessment reveals to man only his 
misery and his disillusionment, and this is precisely what Pascal knew 
he could use as a means of getting the libertine to consider seriously 
his destiny. The multi-dimensional analysis which Pascal gives of 
1. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, (ed. Brunschviog), Number 60. 
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this condition of man describes him as being unable to comprehend his 
dual nature of body and spirit, as being disillusioned about the true 
goal for his life, and above all, being led into deception by the oper-
ation of the distinctively human functions -- reason and imaginat.ion. 
Pascal elaborates further on the ambiguity of man Is nature and destiny 
by indicating the shortcomings which are inherent in man's self-love 
as well as in the mabits and customs by which man has attempted to simp-
lify the perpetual adjustments demanded in a complex and everchanging 
world. Self-love, though it demands the best for man, does not guar-
antee the achievement of the good, since it is basically selfish. It is, 
therefore, frequently beguiled by the forces which threaten to overtake 
it in the process of honest self-evaluation. This ultimately leads only 
to a failure to accept realistically the truth about one's self or to seek 
the true good which will solve this dilemma. 
Thus in a summary statement, Pascal presents man as being: 
... nothing but disguisement,- falsehood, and J:lypocrisy, both 
in himself and in relations to others. He does not want to be told 
the truth, he avoids telling it to others; and all these dispositions, 
so far removed from justice and reason, have a natural root in his 
heart.l 
The solution to this dilemma which has been accepted by the liber-
tine is not a satisfying one. It is only an avoidance of the problem 
1. Ibid., Number 100. 
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which in itself ultimately complicates the realization of self-knowledge 
by imposing additional barriers. The futility of trying to lose ro:urselves 
by running away from ourselves is stated succintly by Pascal in his 
Pen sees, when he says; 
The only thing that consoles us for our miseries is diversion, 
and yet it is the greatest of our miseries. For this it is which chiefly 
keeps us from thinking of ourselves, and which makes us lose our-
selves insensibly. Without ·it we should be bored, and that boredom 
. would drive us to seek a more solid means to get out of it. But 
diversion amuses us, and makes us arrive insensibly at death. 1 
There is, therefore, in diversion, a subtle and insidious kind of 
doubt which Pascal recognizes as being destructive because it does not 
destroy completely, but which only removes the incentive to attack the 
motivating source of the distraction. 
It should appear quite obvious from what has been stated earlier, 
that Pascal is not content with leaving the matter of the evaluation of 
man at this point. , This is not the whole of man's potential. Rather 
Pascal is thinking here in terms of man without God. He is r in present-
ing such a portrait of manr preparing the foundation for the theological 
assumption apparent throughout his apology.; namely: that man, as the 
result of original sin, stands in need of divine redemption. Having 
courageously confronted the libertine with the fact of his condition 
1. Ibid. , NumbeiJ 18 3. 
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apart from Godr Pascal can now begin to build upon this in the direction 
of a more positive interpretation of man • s nature. 
With this in mind, Pascal then begins to describe the possibility 
of acknowledging man • s greatness as well as his misery. 
It is dangerous to show man too much how he is equal to the 
beasts, without showing his greatness. It is also dangerous to 
show him his greatness too much without his baseness. It is still 
more dangerous to let him remain ignorant of both. But it is very 
advantageous to show him both. 1 
That part of man's being which constitutes his greatness according 
to Pascal is his ability to think. However, the distressing fact is that 
man has not used this power creatively to seek his true end in life, 
instead he has sought diversion and distraction to keep him from think-
ing. This has resulted in a kind of indifference, or doubt, for which 
Pascal has little sympathy: 
... This negligence in. an affair where they themselves, their 
eternity, their all, are concernedr irritates. me more than it arouses 
my sympath~; it astounds and horrifies me, it is a monstrous thing 
to me ... 
And a bit later he speaks to the central issue of doubt when he 
states, 
It is thus certainly a great misfortune to be in doubt about this; 
1. Ibid., Number 418. 
2. Ibid. , Number 194. 
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but it is at least an indispensable duty to seek, when one is in 
this doubt; and so he who doubts and does not seek is both very 
unhappy and very unjust; if in add.ition he is calm and complacent, 
if he makes profession of it, if finally he prides himself upon it, 
and makes this very state the subject of his joy and vanity, I have 
no words to describe so extravagant a creature . . . I 
Just as Pascal was discontent with the man who was aware of his 
misery but did nothing to correct the situation, so he considered it in-
appropriate for any philosopher, much less an apologist, to leave man 
to grovel in the mire of his existence. The next obvious step for Pascal, 
therefore, was to indicate to him how he could resolve his predicament 
by seeking God. This was not an easy task, for even though he had 
now aroused the self-interest of the previously .indifferent libertine, 
the fact remains that God does not reveal himself in the manner that 
many apologists of the past have indicated -- tbat is that God is in every-
thing. Instead Pascal believes that God is a hidden God and becomes 
known to man only as his blindness is removed by the intervention of 
Jesus Christ. 
Furthermore, it has been Pascal's experience as a scientist and 
as a philosopher that one does not arrive at truth directly, but only 
as one removes all negative instances in an effort to find the one true 
solution. In order to lead his reader to an exploration of the numerous 
I. Ibid. 
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attempts which have been made to analyze the nature of man as well 
as to make suggestions of how to meet these needs 1 Pascal invites 
him first to attend to the philosophers. The position of the Stoics and 
the Pyrrhonians 1 which Pascal had investigated as an answer to his own 
philosophic questions 1 are reviewed in turn. Both eventually are re-
j ectedl however; not because of their irrelevancy 1 but because of their 
inadequacy to explain man's total dilemma. They both represent extreme 
views which say something true about man's nature, but because the 
Pyrrhonists see only the misery of man, and the Stoics see only his 
grandeur, these views are judged inadequate by Pascal. 
All their principles are true I those of the Pyrrhonians, of the 
Stoics, of the atheists 1 etc. But their conclusions are false I be-
cause the opposite principles are true also. 1 
The seemingly unresolvable dilemma offered by these two extreme 
views of the philosophers,- re'presents to Pascal at once both the offer-
ings as well as the limitati'ons of any explanation of man's nature based 
purely upon reason. He 1 therefore 1 feels compelled to reject reason 
in his quest for a solution to the enigma of man. However 1 in realizing 
the inadequacy of reason he does not identify this rejection with a total 
disavowal of reason. Instead he recognizes the service rendered by reason 
in carrying man to the logical pos.ition where he must seek a more com-
1. Ibid. 1 Number 394. 
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prehensive view than is possible on the basis of purely logical-rational 
premises. He pays tribute to the role of reason in the following manner: 
The last step of human reason is to acknowledge that there 
is an infinity of things which go beyond it; it is merely feeble if 
it does not get the length of knowing that.l There is nothin~ so 
much in conformity with reason as this disavowal of reason. 
Having reached the limits of reason 1 Pascal feels compelled to lead 
his reader to an investigation of the indications of God which are avail-
able to him. To do this he begins by inquiring about the contributions 
which have been made by the various religions. On the basis of varied 
criteria 1 including the loyalty and sincerity of their adherents 1 miracles 
and fulfilled prophecies 1 Pascal concludes that all religions are inferior 
to Christianity. In searching for the roots of this religion he observes 
the particular contributions which have been made by Juda;Lsm to religion. 
Especially impressive to him is the book by which they live which arti-
culates some of the basic contradictions to be found in man's nature. 
For this book rec·ounts the story of man's corruption I that is I his fall 
from his previous state of bliss as a consequence of his own pride and 
arrogance. 
Pascal in his apology does not regard this corruption as an insur-
mountable barrier to man's happiness. Rather he describes it as providing 
1. Ibid. , Number 2 67. 
2. Ibid. 1 Number 272. 
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the means by which man may be introduced to the only proper understanding 
of the contradictions which are within his nature, and which threaten 
to keep him in a constant . state of anxiety. He states: 
For after all, if man had never been corrupted, he would in 
his innocence enjoy both truth and felicity with assurancei and 
if man had never been anything but corrupt, he would have no idea 
of either truth or beatitude. But, unhappy as we are, and more 
so than if there were no greatness in our condition, we have an 
idea of happiness, and cannot reach iti we perceive an image of 
the truth, and possess only falsehood; incapable of being absolutely 
ignorant and of knowing certainly, so manifest it is that we have 
been in a degree of perfection from which we have unhappily fallen. 1 
It is only the Christian religion, according to p·ascal, which is 
capable of reconciling these two seemingly contradictory aspects of 
man's nature. It alone confronts him with a realistic view of himself 
by including both his greatness and his wretchedness. The solution 
which it offers is not to crush either of these by the power of the other, 
or by driving out the one by the other, by the wisdom of the worldr "but 
by driving away both by the simplicity of the Gospel. " 2 
Such an invitation for self-understanding seems to Pascal irresistible. 
To be able to find our happiness. in such a source of power as is claimed 
by the Christian religion, is man's true good. This represents a crucial 
point in Pascal's apology, for the moment for decision has arrived. It 
l. Ibid., Number 434. 
2. Ibid. , Number 435. 
is at this point that Pascal employs his famous wager argument. 
As the place of the wager argument is crucial to the problem of 
this study, it has been assigned a special place at the end of this 
chapter where it will be discussed in detail. 1 Suffice it to say that 
having found reason inadequate as a means of salvation or as proof 
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of God's existence, Pascal is obligated to call upon a different approach 
to convince his reader of the worthiness of his appeal. To bet on God's 
existence is most relevant to his apologetiC purpose. 
Having convinced his dubious reader of the necessity of wagering 
for God r Pascal is nearing the point in his apology at which he consid-
ered it appropriate to display what he called the objective proofs of 
Christianity. There still remains, however, one main barrier whi ch 
he considered it would be necessary to remove before his reader could 
apprec.iate these proofs in their fullest significance. This barrier is 
the doubt on the part of the reader, who, even though he now seems 
willing to admit his need for God, and likewise is willing to bet that 
he exists, still is not sufficiently convinced that there is any reciprocity 
in such interest. What evidence, he asks, do I have that God is in-
terested in or would be able to enter into relationship with me? 
l. See p ... 170 of this study. 
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For this obstacle to belief Pascal has an answer. Acknowledging 
that man is base and that this baseness leads him to be sceptical not 
only of the existence of a higher order, but especially doubtful of any 
manifest interest from this order in his own destiny, Pascal reminds 
his reader that he is not in a position to pass judgment upon what God 
can and cannot accomplish. Pascal concll..1des that: 
... There is thus undoubtedly an insupportable presumption in 
these kinds of reasonings, although they seem to be based on an 
apparent humility which is neither stncere, nor reasonable, if it 
does not make us confess that,. not knowing by ourselves who we 
are, we cannot learn it except from God. 1 
Having reached this point in his argument, Pascal now feels ready 
to make the transition from the subjective to the objective part of h.is 
presentation. To have begun with the latter he recognized would have 
been ineffectual with his particular audience of free thinkers. However, 
to remain on the subjective level without bolstering his argument with 
objective, historical evidence would have ultima,tely invalidated his 
earlier approach. Throughout his appeals to historical evidencer both 
from the Old Testament as well as. from the New Testament and the wit-
ness of the Early Church, there is one dominant theme: Jesus Christ. 
In citing Old Testament expectations of the fulfillment of the long-
1. Blaise Pascal, Pense'es, (ed. Brunschvicg} Number 430. 
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awaited Messiah, Pascal relies heavily on the testimonies of the prophets, 
with their repeated similar announcements, and their continually evolving 
and deepening sense of the Divine presence in their midst. In varying 
degrees of clarity, all of these prophetic writings seem to point to the 
fulfillment of their hopes in the person of a Divine Son. 
The part played by the Old Testament prophets must be regarded 
as an important preparation for the coming of Christ, for it was the 
prophets who announced his coming throughout the world. Stress is 
placed by Pascal upon the varieties of interpretation which are possible 
in analyzing the Old Testament prophecies. Consequently he says .. God 
gave the proofs this character so as to hide Himself from those who 
tempt Him for the sake of carnal things, and reveal Himself to those 
who seek Him for the sake of spiritual things ... l 
This statement from Pascal is indicative of his c·oncept of God ras 
a hidden God. Because of this nature, God will be misunderstood by 
many, but this misunderstanding he feels is a necessary consequence 
of a God who, in order to have any meaning, must be somewhat of a 
mystery to all and a pqrticularly disturbing mystery to those who seek 
him .in the wrong fashion. He contends that: 
If there were no obscurity, man would not feel his corruption; 
1. Ibid., Number 643. 
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if there were no light, man would not hope for any remedy. Thus 
it is not only just, but useful for us, that God should be partly 
hidden, and partly disclosed, since it is equally dangerous for man 
to know God without knowing his misery, and to know his misery 
without knowing God. 1 
The Old Te stament finds its fulfillment in the message of the New 
Testament in which the prophecy has been fulfilled in the person of Jesus 
Christ. In many instances Pascal draws parallels between the manner 
in which Old Testament figures such as Joseph have prefigured the life 
and sufferings of Christ. 2 . Such pre-figurings of the mission of Christ 
are used by Pascal as evidence of the divinity of Christ. And it is this 
div.ine sonship which places us under an obligation to know God through 
this means. 
In Him and through Him we thus know God. Apart from that 
and without Scripture, without original sin, without a Mediator 
who is needed 1 promised, and come, one cannot prove God absolutely, 
or teach either good doctrine or good morals. But through Jesus 
Christ and in Jesus Christ, one proves God, and one teaches morals 
and doctrine . . Jesus Christ is thus the true God of men. 3 
Furthermore, not only does Christ serve as the true revealer 'of God 
to man, but He also serves to reveal man's true natur'e to him. And 
this represents for Pascal one of the basic concepts of Christianity. 
1. Ibid., Number 581. 
2. Ibid. 1 Number 768. 
3. Ibid., Number 547. 
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Through Christ, who stands mid-way between man and God, it is possible 
to reveal to man both h.is weakness and his strengths) to use the former 
to reinforce his spiritual status by not only revealing his helplessness 
when left to his own devices, but by implying the basis for his strength 
when he is properly related to God. 
Scriptural sources attest to the work of Christ. Far from being 
deceptive because of their diversity, they are considered by Pascal 
to bear even greater witness to Christ because of the.ir manifold expresstons 
of the varied effects which his influence has had upon the writers of 
the gospels. The history of the Christian Church also proclaims the 
importance of Christ. Pascal regards the history of the Church as being 
"The history of the truth. " 1 Its growth and expansion reveals the per-
petuation of the Judaeo-Christian message. The fact that this Church 
has been maintained espec.ially in times when it has met with great 
opposition from outside forces is another evidence in Pascal 1 s consid-
eration of its divine nature~ 
The concluding section of Pascal 1 s apologetic work concerns the 
nature of the Christian life. It is at the level of personal living, that 
the truths of religion are put to their real test and it is only as man 
personally exposes himself to the mediating power of Christ that ·he 
l. Ibid., Number 858. 
145 
can legitimately feel any assurance of lasting consolation in this life. 
Without Jesus Ghrist, man must be in vice and misery; with 
Jesus Christ, man is free from vice and misery. In Him is all 
our virtue and our felicity; apart from Him there is nothing but 
vice, misery, error, darkness, death, despair.l 
In order to realize the meaning of this experience Pascal calls for 
a conversion of his reader in which he will accept annihilating himself 
before 
That Universal Being whom one has irritated so many times, 
and who can legitimately ruin one at any time; in acknowledging 
that one can do nothing without Him, and that one has merited 
nothing from Him but disgrace. It consists in knowing that there 
. is an invincible opposition between God and us, and that without 
a Mediator, there can be no commerce §etween Him and u.§/:.2 
Pascal stresses the necessity of a proper regard for and attitude 
towards the person of Christ. He reminds the reader that carnal and 
kingly expectations will only deceive him, for Christ did not come in 
this role. Furthermore, his lowliness and his lack of worldly possessions 
need not be barriers to a true acceptance of his mediating love. The 
order of charity which in the realm of human values surpasses the orders 
of bodies and minds is not in the least approached by them. For as 
he says in one of his famous statements concerning the orders of reality: 
... All bodies and minds together could not supply one motion 
l. Ibid. , Number 52 3. 
2. Ibid., Number 470. 
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of true charity: that is impossible, of another order, supernatural. 1 
Hav.ing reached this great note of affirmation, Pascal confronts his 
reader with the fact that in spite of all its great attributes of wisdom, 
miracles, etc. Christianity ultimately has only the Cross as its final 
witness to truth·. It provides the true meeting point for God and man, 
and it is only in man's acceptance of its symbolic meaning as the meet-
ing point for redemption that the evidence of Christianity speaks to him 
w.ith any real conviction. 
H. The Significance of the Pensees for the Problem of Doubt 
With this general expository presentation of the development of 
Pascal's thought in the Pensees before us, we are now in a position 
to look at this material more critically and analytically in its particular 
focus upon the problem of this study. 
First and foremost in importance in th.is connection is the realiz-
ation that whatever particular means Pascal uses in the various parts of 
his Apology, they are all directed to a conversion of his readers -- the 
free thinkers, the libertines. Therefore he is always concerned with the 
expression of doubt in their lives, even though he is not always ex plicitly 
addressing himself to the problem per se. Thus it follows that the positive 
1. Ibid., Number 793. 
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aspects of his apology in which he is enumerating the laudable qualities 
of the Christian religion is just as immediately focused upon the problem 
of doubt - though he seldom uses the term - as in the negative aspects 
of his apology in which he is critically describing those ex pressions of 
doubt wh.ich are the observable effects of man's alienation from God. 
Thus, whether he is analytically pres.ent.ing the problems posed by doubt 
in the · libertines or systemat.ically presenting a solution for them , he is 
in all instances concerned with the problem of doubt. 
Pascal continually reflects in his Pe nsees not only a clarity of 
ex pression concerning the basic antinomies of man's nature, but in his 
apologetic approach he manifests a profound practical psychological 
understand.ing of human motivational processes. Particularly striking 
.in this respect is his realization that his appeal to the doubter must 
be relevant to his self-seeking interests. Without an initial appeal to 
the doubter's self-interest, it is questionable if he would have even 
caused him to turn his head in the direction of interest in religion. 
An important aspect of this initial appeal to the libertine was an 
honest exhortation for man to examine realistically his personal assets 
and liabilities. Pascal apparently realized that a sound and meaningful 
religion can find expres s.ion .in the individual only when there has been 
an objective evaluation of self. This Pascal stresses by encouraging 
man to look at both his strengths and weaknesses both in the realm 
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of personal experience and in the writings ·of the philosophers and their 
theoretical attempts to justify now one and now another attribute of man's 
nature . . 
There are certain imminent dangers in this approach which Pascal . 
used. Too frequently the utilitarian approach to religion, the appeal 
to man to accept religion as a means rather than as an end, has been 
used to the exclusion of a presentation of rel.igion .as a natural fulfill-
ment of man's lasting search for meaning in life. Pascal, however, 
did not allow his apologetic work to sink to the leve.l of a completely 
utilitarian appeal; religion was not regarded by him merely as a matter 
of existential expediency. His presentation of its historical develop-
ment as a witness of man's experience of truth is of extreme importance 
in that it puts religion in the. perspective of an ultimate reality which 
is to be experienced rather than as an auto-suggest.ive- "cathartic" which 
is to be administered to make life more pleasant. . This latter chara.cter-
istic of religion is always a potential hazard when an apologist begins 
his presentation.by an appeal to man's self-:-:interest. Pascal wisely 
avoided it with the objective part of h.is apology. 
The note which dominates Pascal's Pensees is that of .personal 
experience. Many of the ideas which are expressed in his thoughts 
are so vividly portrayed that interpreters of Pascal have often been 
misled into the delusion of believing that the thoughts of the doubter 
149 
were really the expression of Pascal's own doubt. A careful textual 
analysis of the Pensees reveals the fact that though there may be more 
of a description of Pascal's own search for a vital religious experience 
than appears on the surface, there nevertheless is not the kind of 
identification between libertine and Pas·cal tl;lat the exponents of the 
"Pascal as sceptic" brand of thought have .insisted. 
This dilemma of properly differentiating between the expression 
of Pascal's personal concerns and those of the libertine can be more 
clearly understood if we consider Pascal's presentation .in the light 
of several .important psycholog.ical concepts. The f.irst of these is .intro-
spect.ion. Pascal had great ability in introspective analysis. He pene-
trated deeply in his probing of human motivation, and what he saw he 
described vividly. His ability to reflect creatively about his own life 
aided him immeasurably in presenting a vivid portrayal of not only his 
own personal concerns, but the universal concerns of all men. Hi.s 
.introspective ability, therefore, seems enhanced by an ability to project 
himself into the situation as it was being experienced by the doubter. 
This is an ability which is much des.ired and greatly emphasized in any 
astute psychologist. The ability to identify sufficiently with others 
in order to be able to empathetically see their problems and to succintly 
state them in such a way as to clarify them for the seeking individual, 
rightly entitles one to the title of psychologist par excellence. Pascal 
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deserves such a title. 
The ability to empathize with others may be overridden with a too-
subjective identification with the subject. Therefore the objective 
outlook it essential, first in the individual's own understanding of him-
self and subsequently in his ability to look objectively at others. Pascal, 
both in the general directionality of his plan and in his specific appeal 
to man to look realistically at his dilemma, incorporates this perspective. 
It is interesting to note that Pascal is stressing the same kind of 
need for objectivity when he asks man to consider both his misery and 
his greatness, that Erich Fromm is encouraging in the objectivity which 
he postulates as a basic requirement for the purposive orientation to 
life. 1 Man is able to relate himself to another in a creative, wholesome 
way only to the extent that he has an objective understanding of himself --
his needs as well as the contributions which he can make. This is 
particularly true as it relates to the "other" in the religious relation-
ship in which man's need is so great; however, his lasting ability to 
respond to an answer to this need is proportionate to an undistorted self-
appraisal. Masochism in religion is just as dangerous as an undiluted 
narcissism. 
1 . Erich Fromm 1 Man for Rims elf (New York: Rinehart and Company, 
Inc., 1947), p. 84. 
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One of attitudes which offered the greatest challenge to Pascal 
was the libertine attitude that religion was opposed to reason. Having 
set out to convince the doubter that relig.ion was a vital force in man's 
happiness, the author of the Pensees was obligated to show that there 
was no direct opposition to reason .in religion. Pascal, therefore, conceived 
of faith as a reasonable act. 
Pascal did not attribute to reason the power of salvation. Reason 
was .interpreted .instrumentally and not as a final goal .in itself .in the realm 
of religion. Reason had a vital function to play in making man understand 
his need for something beyond reason as well as the .impotency of reason 
alone .in reaching this something -- namely, faith. Thus by using reason 
to ultimately refute itself Pascal was encouraging the role of doubt .in 
his listener. Through reason man would come to understand the dire 
state of his condition as a rational being, pure and simple -- great in 
his supremacy over the physical world but helpless in the spiritual 
realm. The doubt .implied in Pascal's definition of reason was an existen-
tial doubt which questioned not the existence of God, but the possibility 
of a divine-human relationship between this God and man. The basis 
for such a doubt was not because of the aloofness of God or the .inade-
quacy of the means with which he had provided man. Rather it was built 
upon the assumption that man's alienation was an implicate of his sinful-
ness. The indifference which could assist man in a complete understanding 
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of his dilemma by removing all false assumptions and all false conclus.ions,. 
could in the end itself assume a falsity more basic than any other. It 
was this doubt which "terminated" in a never-ending suspension of judg-
ment which Pascal hoped to cure in his reader by confronting him with 
the possibility of a doubt which ended in faith rather than in doubt --
a doubt which brought. life to its possessor by first depleting itself rather 
than destroying the doubter by leading ultimately only to a cyclic pursuit 
of nothingness. Pascal therefore justified doubt only as a means; he 
never condoned it as an end. Doubt could cleanse thought, . but it could 
not complete it. 
It seems fair to say of Pascal that he sought hope through despair. 
For the doubter he promised assurance only when he (the doubter) had 
examined critically aU avenues of desperateness in his life. It was 
only as these dubious aspects of man's being had been explored that 
the need for their removal and the plan for their attack could be articul-
ated. Pas cal did not Speak of these outgrowths of man's. indifference 
as the defense mechanisms of doubt. Yet the delineations of man's 
spiritual dilemma in the words of Pascal, sounds strangely like the 
Freudian description of the psychic war of the defensive neurotic. The 
doubter who listens to Pascal hears himself described as one suppressing 
his longing for God. He recognizes his need; fears that it may mean that 
religion is true; and consequently suppresses the need lest it lead to a 
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realignment of life. Distractions, though less cruel, than suppression 
but often more costly, blind man to seeing himself, but do not blur the 
eventual realization that ethical indifference only intensifies and elabor-
ates the narrower indifference of the intellect. 
The doubt of denial .is another form of man's misery: 
... As men have not been able to cure death, misery, ignorance,.. 
they have taken to not thinking about them so as to become happy. 1 
But even worse than denying our faults Pascal would remind us, 
"we live in an imaginary existence in the idea of others. ,.z Fantasy 
is an extreme form of doubt in which the libertine feels his agony but 
refuses to acknowledge hims.elf; not indifferent to a cure, he resists 
recognizing the cause. The libertine thus tries to create an appear-
ance which is not real,.. only to find that instead of untying the Gordian 
knot of his existence he only ensnares himself more inextricably by 
confusing hate for self with love for others. Consequently, the ambi-
valence toward the self is projected upon other men and upon God thus 
producing even greater misery. The libertine cannot live happily by 
himself for he is afraid of himself and must therefore seek the dis-
traction of others. But he cannot live happily with them because he 
1. Blaise Pascal, Pense'es, (ed. Brunschvicg), Number 171. 
2. Ibid., Number 147. 
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is not willing to look honestly at himself. Doubt therefore affects not 
only a valid intra personal relationship, but impairs our interpersonal 
relations on both the human and divine level. 
Pascal lays down the condition that if man hopes to do anything 
to improve his fate, he must first try to understand his present predic-
ament. In essence, man can live positively, only after he has critically 
evaluated his negative qualities. Whereas the libertine had been content 
to bask in the indifferent attitude expressed by the oft-quoted statement 
of the sceptic: " ... I know not whence I come ... LOiJ ... whither 
I go" 1 Pascal made it clear in his early Pensees how he felt about the 
"whence" and "whither" of man's existence, and boldly suggested that 
man must not be content with a passive, indifferent or fatalistic doubt 
as the final solution to his destiny. 
The paradox of Pascal's use of doubt in the religious quest at this· 
point is that he encouraged its use in order to lead man to see his misery 
so vividly that he would seem to be at the brink overlooking the abyss 
of self-destruction. Having led the libertine to this point he would 
show him how this aspect of his human condition could prepare him 
to pursue a new level of existence, namely, the order of charity. 
The libertine is encouraged not to feel too hopeless as the result 
1. Blaise Pascal, Pens~es, (ed. Brunschvicg), Number 194. 
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of his period of introspection. · In the first place, the fact that he is 
able to reflect on his condition is an indication of his superiority. The 
freedom of self-evaluation need not force one to accept as final all that 
he sees in himself. Rather it should serve as the starting point for a 
new birth. Also, as suggested by Pascal, man's ability to reflect upon 
a higher and happier existence indicates that he has known a more lofty 
existence from which he has fallen. But such a fall need not be a per-
manent condition, for r'edemption through the new Adam -- Christ --
enables man to regain his freedom. It is by this means that doubt does 
not deceive the libertine if it is properly used to prepare him for belief. 
A theme which appears and reap}?ears in the Pens~es is a concept 
related to the above consideration. Pascal suggests that it is just as 
dangerous for man to know only his misery as it is for him to know only 
his greatness. Implicit in both of these extreme views is a potential 
doubt which stands as a barrier to the goal of self-realization in the 
Christian tradition. If man remains ignorant of his greatness and his 
opportunity for happiness as defined by Pascal, the doubt which he 
expresses can best be understood as a destructive doubt of uncertainty 
and despair. On the other hand, if man senses only his greatness, but 
does so on false grounds (which in the thought of Pascal would be on 
any basis which fails to see also his wretchedness) he runs the risk 
of expressing another facet of the libertine doubt. In this ;,: the 
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libertine lapses into a pernicious self-love, a false sense of security 
which obviates the need for a continual concern for one's own destiny, 
and ultimately leads to a disavowal of one's need for salvation and 
of the existence of any divine means for accomplishing such a feat. 
In the person of Christr Pascal finds expressed the ideas of both 
man's weakness and his strength. Standing within the condition of man 
and yet sharing in the divine heritage as the Son of God, Christ provides 
the meeting point for these two extremes of man's nature. 
Thus by allowing us to accept without despair our desperateness, 
He provides a way for it to actually lead to our delivery. This ability 
to combine within himself both extreme truths as a part of the whole 
truth about humanity won for Christ the .dist.inction as Savior of the 
world in the estimation of Pascal. Other saints and revered religious 
and philosophical figures had spoken eonvincingly about the depths 
of man's perversity as well as the heights of his achievements. But 
none save Christ had combined within himself both of these dimensions. 
Christianity was not regarded as saying anything particularly new about 
man's sinfulness, nor did it describe any more glowingly man's dign.ity 
than had the Stoics. What it did contain in its good news was the 
possibility of combining these into a religion which did not chase one ~ 
and reject the other. Rather it became a relig.ion of wholeness in which 
by e xpressing the contradictions and contrasts within man IS nature it 
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did not save man by forcing him to deny either aspect of his being 1 but 
rather welcomed both as necessary conditions for his salvation. 
False rel.igions and philosophies are those which reveal the truth 
about only half of man's nature. They · are wrong only because they 
are incomplete. Christianity .is true, according to Pascal, because 
it minimizes the importance of man's weakness by als·o speaking of 
his strength. , Thus 1 in reality it does not minimize it . at all, for it 
utilizes it as the means to strength. Because man is a being of oppo-
sites, a religion which would explain him must be one of opposites .. 
Christianity 1 by the criteria of contrasts, is the only one to meet the 
test. · It builds its foundation not by destroying other prophecies· but by 
fulfilling them. It does not condemn man without giving him an opportun-
ity for confidencei it does not plead for a denia] of self without providing 
the true conditions for that self-hood. This is the pers.pective which 
Pascal has expressed in his defense of Christianity I and it is in this 
perspective that the doubtful reader is invited to participate. 
3. Doctrines of the Pens~es Crucial to Doubt 
i. The Doctrine of the Heart 
"The heart has its own reasons which Reason does not know1 a 
thousand things declare it." 1 "Tis the heart I not reason I that feels 
God. This is faith: God .felt by tbe heart, not by reason." 2 Such 
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phrases as these are representative of the emphasis which P'ascal placed 
upon the heart in his writings. In order to understand their meaning 
we are forced to seek an adequate definition for the heart,. including 
the important task of clarifying the concept of reason as .it was used 
by Pascal. Without understanding the relation of the heart and reason, 
much that is central in the apologetic work of Pascal might be mis-
construed and misinterpreted. 
In our attempts to define the meaning of Pascal's words, it is 
essential that we not read into them the sense which they have acquired 
since the seventeenth century. This would only lead to the classific-
ation of Pascal as an anti-intellectual psychologist of sentiment. Nor 
must we press the terminology too hard. Of Pascal's terminology it 
can be said that it was fluid, yet crystaHized. Pasc.al used different 
terms for the same reality when speaking in different contexts. and in 
discussing items from different points of view. 
We must keep in mind the fundamentally concrete and synthetic 
1. H.F. Stewart, Pascal's p·ensees, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1950), 
p. 3431 Pens.ee, 626. 
2. Ibid., p. 3451 Pensee, 627. 
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character of Pascal's mind in interpreting such terms as the heart, and 
not apply to his thinking only the measuring devices of our abstract 
analytical psychology without remembering the essentially Biblical 
character of his thought. 
As Chevalier has. suggeqted1 in understanding the phraseology of 
Pascal (and of any other writer for that matter) it is essential to rid 
ourselves of our own preconceptions about the vocabulary which he 
has used. He suggests that in order to accomplish it would be well 
to look at the four following terms: heart, feeling, knowledge, and 
reason. 
It is understandable how these terms might become confused; in 
some instances being taken synonymously, as in the case of heart and 
feeling. In other instances, as perhaps in the case of the heart and 
reason, it is likewise not too difficult to see how the two terms, be-
cause of the implications which they have for most people, might well 
appear to be diametrically opposed to one another. A closer examination 
of these terms reveals that both the attempts to make them identical 
and the attempts to set them in opposition may be fallacious. 
To reduce the heart to feeling, is reducing the former to limits 
1. Jacques Chevalier, Pascal, (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 
1930) 1 P• 267 o 
160 
which it naturally transcends. This does not imply that the heart does 
not share in feeling, nor does it _ negate the intuitional or "feeling" as-
pects of the heart. It simply insists that the heart is more than feeling 
and cannot be explained merely in terms of the latter. 
To say that the heart participates in feeling seems. justifiable, 
for it is intuitive and it is spontaneous~ There have been many critics 
who would describe the heart in terms of intuition. And what do we 
mean by intuition? Often it has been translated as a. "hunch", a 
"feeling it in ones bones". Bishop supplies a more descriptive and 
more accurate definition when he describes the heart (and intuition) 
as: 
Intuition tells us these simple things.. Le. g. timff It does 
more; it leads us, by a kind of miracle, through an impenetrable 
wilderness of disordered facts. Sudd'enly we perceive our journey's 
end, and the straight way thither. Suddenly a message is written 
on the sky. We know not how, we know not why.. We can only be 
sure that laborious reason, proceeding from axiom to deduction, 
never found this beautiful truth for us . . . Reason plots the 
curves, traces the analogies., draws the safe conc'lusions. But 
above reason is intuition, guiding reason in its choice of signifi-
cant meaning ... One may call it, perhaps, subconscious 
reasoning. Is this a vain, chimerical, dreamer's fancy? Many 
a scientist will confes.s that he has. been guided to his best work 
by strange moments of whim, or inspiration, or chance, or upsurge 
from the subconscious. Forgetting logic ... he has found a 
deeper logic. He has treated his emotions and inspirations as 
facts -- as indeed they are -- and has come to a synthesis which 
would have been impossible without them." 1 
1. Morris Bishop, Pascal, The Life of Genius, (New York: Reyna! and 
Hitchcock, 1936) r pp. 76-7_7. 
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Pascal believed the heart to participate in feeling, because what-
ever else it might be, there was no question in his thinking but that 
it was the organ of love. And since God was to be loved and not known 
merely in the rational sense, the heart was indispensable in the man-
God relationship. But to identify the heart with feeling in interpreting 
Pascal would be going too far; for Pascal was suspicious of feeling and 
felt one could not rely upon it as an accurate and adequate means to 
knowledge. Even though Pascal had exper.ienced feeling and used the 
term in expres5ing the influx of God's power as he described it in his 
Memorial: II Certainty . Feeling . Joy . Peace. " 1 r yet he is cognizant 
of its dangers when it comes to disc·erning it rightly from such other 
functions as imagination and fanta.sy. 
Now that the word heart has been considered negatively in the sense 
of saying what it is not, let us now define the term "heart" in a positive, 
affirmative manner. In reality it is necessary to recall the Hebrew con-
cept of the heart in order to understand Pascal's use of the term. Un-
fortunately this. aspect of defining the term has often been neglected. 
Even Lhermet, who has made an exhaustive study of the relation of 
Pascal and the Bible, has confined his examination to a comparison of 
Pascal and Pauline doctrine. And his statement that "the heart has 
1. Blaise Pa5cal, Pensees r (ed. Brunschvicg) Number 282. 
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escaped in a certain measure the original conception" I is far from the 
thought of either of the writers he is interpreting. 
The Hebrew conception of the heart represented it as bei.ng the 
concrete center of human personality, and included thought, feeling 
and will to such an extent that. no thought, feeling, or expression of 
the will which does not proceed from the heart is really genuine, while 
all that does proceed from the heart, whether it be good or evil, reveals 
the true condition of a man • s most inmost being. The heart, Biblically 
speaking, has an integrative function. It coordinates every power of 
man's nature in the service to which it owes its allegiance, or if it 
is divided against itself, it dissipates these powers in self-destructive 
conflict. 
It is in this fashion then that Pascal adopts the use of the term 
heart. It is the most secret center of our being; it is not only one of 
the instruments of feeling and of morality, but one of the instruments 
of knowledge, and as it were, the origin of all our intellectual oper-
ations. 2 By the heart, Pascal appears to understand the seat of feeling, 
of intuitive and ax.i.omatic knowledge, of what remains of our original 
1. J. Lhermet, Pascal et la Bible, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1931), p.- 301. 
2. Jacques Chevalier, Pascal, (New York! Longmans, Green and Company, 
l930L p. 269. 
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blessedness, of our capacity to know and love God and of our affinity 
to the order of charity or grace. He correlated it also w.ith l' instinct, 
one of the two things (the other being experience) which reveals to man 
his whole nature. Heart or .instinct explores the world of spirit, and is 
itself the spiritual organ in man. 
Pascal makes a distinct.ion between the heart and reason in the 
Pensees which is similar to the distinction made by the Greeks between 
pure thought and discursive thought. The latter is conceived of as being 
that faculty which takes slow, analytical steps, which reduces every-
thing to its origin and its causes, and which has no concern whatsoever 
for the spirit of fines.se or intuition. 
In contrast, but not .in opp-os.ition to th.is 1 is the heart. Cheval.ier 
has compared it to the 11 eyes of the mind . . . Uke the eye it knows 
.its object at a glance. •• 1 Bishop uses this striking analogy in relating 
the function of heart to reason. "Intuition LBishop's synonym for the 
hearJ/ flies to its conclusions 1 makes a landing I signals to logic to 
come plodding overland to the found goah 112 
In Pascal's view, the heart seems to play an instinctive role. In 
fact, Pascal seems to identify the role of heart with instinct. In the 
1. Ibid o 1 p o 2 7 0 o 
2. Morris Bishop, Pascal, The Life of Genius, (New York: Reyna! and 
Hitchcock, 1936), p. 94. 
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margin of the Pensees, Number 237, he has joined the three words 
"Heart, instinct, principles ... to form a working diagram. Using the 
heart, or instinct, in this sense he assumes that it is innate, that it 
has been instilled in man by God 1 and that it represents man's search 
for his true goodness 1 which of course it is assumed has been corrupted 
by the Fall. ·Pascal's use of the term heart leads us to conclude that 
it represents for him the direct apprehension, (including both knowledge 
of and feeling) 1 of principles. In this sense it is absolutely essential 
as a corrective for scepticism 1 for it is those natural principles which 
one cannot really doubt 1 and thus which consequently prevent the reason 
h . i . 1 from denying everyt mg . n our eXlstence. 
A careful examination of the relation of the heart and reason as they 
appear in the Pens~es eliminates an assumption which might easily be 
made upon a cursory glance at the references to heart and reason; namely 1 
that they are in opposition to one another in their vital functions. Pascal 
did not regard these two functions as mutually exclusivei rather, he in-
sisted that both are necessary to a full understanding of and possess.ion 
of truth. Since truth is the object of the intellect, it seems quite fitting 
that what Pascal terms the "heart'~ and "reason" should both pertain 
to this one faculty 1 constituting merely two different modes of operation 
1. Chevalier, loc. cit. 
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of the intellect. Pascal clarifies their relation as follows: 
We know truth, not only by reason, but also by the heart; it 
is in this latter way that we know first principles Ce. g. time, motion, 
space, etc.J and it is vain that reasoning, which has nothing to 
do with it, tries to attack them. "1 
When Pascal contrasts reason with the heart-, he is thinking primarily 
of discursive reason which proceeds syllogistically. By the heart he 
does not mean an irrational feeling or sentiment of some sort~ rather 
he means the direct, concrete, intuitive apprehensive of truth in a 
manner which affects the whole personality. The heart for Pascal does 
not exist side by side with discursive reason on the same plane; it moves 
in a different dimension, transcends and subsumes abstract reasoning, 
and indeed forms the living center of personality, holding thought, feel-
ing and will together in a vital synthesis. 
Thus, when Pascal defines faith as "God felt by the heart, not by 
the reason'' he intends to convince his reader that abstract, theoretical 
reason can never be the organ of man's complete knowledge, understanding 
or relation to God and that it is only an apprehension of God which emerges 
from the center of man's being (namely the heart) and affects every area 
of his life that is worthy of being called faith. One may in a certain 
sense speak of this apprehension as being immediate, direct, or 
1. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, (ed. Brunschvicg) Number 282. 
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spontaneous, to indicate its character as a response of the whole per-
sonality. On the other hand, the role which Pascal attributes to appre-
hension in the acquisition of religious tr.uth, comes through Jesus Ghrist 
and is indirect in the sense that God remains hidden; it is reflective in 
that natural spontaneity, having been broken by sin, cannot lead directly 
to God, but must prepare to meet him through penitence. 1 
It is important, however, to note that the truths grasped by the 
heart are objective facts. Pascal is not .implying that faith is merely 
a matter of feeling, and certainly he is not imp-lying that faith, as far 
as its objective, actual, content is conoeth.ed is posited or created 
by feeling. The principles to which the. heart is attached in respect 
to faith are facts which are without and above us and serve to establish 
the external superior fact of Revelation. The heart discerns on the one 
hand this significance, and on the other, their significant relationships 
to one another. The heart then does not effect the proofs,. but it grasps 
their significance and brings about their synthesis. 2 
Faith and doubt are thus acts of the will, and acts of the heart, 
rather than acts of knowledge. And in making this statement,., these 
1. Denzil G. M. Patrick, Pascal and Kierhegaard, two volumes, (London: 
Lutterworth Press, 1947), I, 194. 
2. Ibid. 
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attitudes of faith and doubt are not to be construed as opposed to in-
tellect because they arise from the heart. This power is not opposed 
to intellect, nor is it even different from the intellect. Rather, as 
Chevalier has stated it: "It is its loftiest part; it discerns and it loves, 
and in .it knowledge and feeling, far from being mutually hurtful,. are 
mutually helpful. 11 1 
To state it in a slightly different way, reason is the faculty adapted 
to natural things.; the heart is the faculty adapted to divine things. God 
has ordained that things which are divine shall enter first the heart, then 
the reason; not in the reverse order--· "afin d'hum.ilier notre Raison superbe 
et de guerir notre ~ corrompu. 11 2 
In an illuminating pas.s.age,. Fletcher has shown the manner in which 
reason serves the heart in the preparation of man to receive the love 
of God: 
Yet the reason is an intellectual light valid in its own field, 
worthy of respect as being man • s. highest natural faculty, as that 
which distinguishes him from the lower creation, and as being 
symbolic of the spiritual light of grace. It is consequently a 
legitimate -- indeed, the only legitimate -- approach to the unquick-
ened spirit of the unbeliever, since it helps him to know his. own 
nature, and then to seek knowledge transc·ending himself. It can 
1. Jacques Chevalier I Pascal, (New York: Longmans r Green and Company r 
1930), p. 27"2. 
2. E. Boutroux, Pascal, (Paris.: Hachette 9th ed., 1924),. p. 99. 
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lead him towards the Kingdom of God, though not into it; and it can 
prepare the heart of men to recognize a nd receive God • s grace when 
it appears. 1 In short .. la philosophie, la science, la raison, la nature, 
devront done, chez Pascal, tenir leur place et jouer leur role dans 
~etablissement de la foi. u2 . 
Though Pascal rebuked reason on many counts., he did not refuse 
to employ .. l'art d'agreer .. or (attractiveness of presentation). In spite 
of the fact that he disdained this art in presenting such so-called "natural 
things .. as poetry 1 painting and the arts i n general, he still regarded 
it as the sine qua non in presenting "divine things ... when the goal is 
that of persuading the unbeliever. 3 
Pascal's assessment of the mental faculties was r however, that 
they are decidedly inferior to our intuitive and instinctive factors, which 
he correlated with the heart. Their role is to act as a sort of monitor 
to the two primary human faculties; namely, the heart and the senses. 
Out of the data of the former they produc·e theology, philosophy, poetry 
and imaginative literature; out of the latter, natural science. 
W i thout resorting to the evidence of the heart 1 the reason ·;,may 
demonstrate the existeno·e of God from purely "natural" considerations. 
1. F\ T. H. Fletcher r Pas.cal and The .Mystical Tradition, (Oxford : Ba.sil 
Blackwell r 1954), p . 111. 
2. Boutroux , 212.· cit. I p. 101. 
3. Fletcher, loc. cit. 
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Only the heart can feel, know, and love God. Nevertheless, Pascal 
very rightly conceived that in order for one to believe in the existence 
of God was an important and in fact an indispensable beginning in 
religion. He therefore adopted the rational and historical approach to 
faith as being better suited to most men than the direct or mystical 
approach. 
In different spheres of life and of knowledge p·ascal assigned dif-
fering functions to reason. In the realm of science r its role r naturally 
was quite different from the function it served in the r·ealm of religion. 
In the latter, Pascal attributed to reason the role of examining and 
evaluating such religious phenomena as revelation, inspiration, prophecy r 
the miracles and s0 forth. Having served this function, its contribution 
has been made and if the individual in whom it has been operative moves 
on to a state where grace can be granted, Pascal would contend that 
these above-mentioned phenomena, operating by themselves 1 complete 
the process of conversion in the individual. 1 In other words, logical de-
monstration in the mind is now replaced by direct experience in the 
heart. This is not to imply, however, that Pascal dropped the matter 
in assuming that "Reason is merely the handmaid of the two primary 
human faculties." He assumed it to be an unreliable handmaid because 
1. Blaise Pascal, Pen sees I (ed. Brunschvicg}, Number 282. 
it was constantly at the mercy of such "puissances trompeuses" as 
imagination and prejudice which greatly impair its reliability. 
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To the data of revelation, miracles, prophecy, inspiration and 
vis.ion, and to the super-rational faculties that collect those date 
(namely the heart), Pascal gave great emphasis. It therefore seems 
right, in consideration of these facts, to conclude that the two corner-
stones of his apologetic writings consist of historical and revealed 
truth, with reason acting as a mere check upon them. 
In writing of reason he ascribes to it a secondary role or function 
in the life of man. Though recognizing its validity of function in general, 
and its "spiritual" nature in particular, Pascal criticizes it severely 
when it attempts to step outside its own domain and assumes responsi-
bility where other faculties should be in command. Pascal always dis-
plays a profound respect and preference for facts as over against theories; 
and likewise, the data of the senses and the heart, to the opinions of 
reason. To give this assumption support, he contends that all knowledge 
of the universe is at bottom axiomatic, in that it all depends upon certain 
undemonstrable truths of which the heart or instinct is immediately aware. 
We may therefore trust our senses to provide us with material truth, and 
our heart to provide us with spiritual truth. Reason can do neither. 
ii. The Doctrine of the Wager 
The wager argument used by Pascal and found in his Pensees re-
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presented no completely new and radical departure from the approach used 
by many earlier apologists . 1 One finds, in fact, the wager argument 
appearing in the Phaedo and The Republic of Plato, in Against the Heathen 
of Arnobius, and the Supplication of Souls of Sir 'Thomas More, to mention 
only a portion of the works in which it is included. However, there 
is a rather distinct difference in Pascal's use of the wager, and that 
is that he used it in connection with the existence of God rather than 
as an argument for the .immortality of the soul. Because of this emphasis, 
as well as the textual similarities of the two arguments, Pascal undoubt-
edly borrowed the argument directly from Raymond de Sebonde, who was 
the only one of Pascal's predecessors who applied the wager argument 
to the existence of God. 2 
In applying the mathematics of probability to the question of God's 
existence, Pascal did not destroy the original significance of the wager 
argument. Pascal was concerned not only with persuading or convincing 
his sceptical reader, he was pr.imarily concerned with converting him. 
He did not, therefore, .intend for the wager argument to be interpreted 
1 . For a detailed h.istor.ical account of Pas cal's. wager see Jacques 
Chevalier r Pascal, (New York: Longmans, Green and Go., 1930}, p. 315£. 
2. Raymond de Sebonde, Theologia naturalis in Oeuvres compl~tes de 
Michel de Montaigne, (Paris: Louis Conard, editor and publisher, 
1932), Vol. I. 
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as a proof of God and of eternal life. He intended it rather as an ex-
hortation which he hoped would arouse in the libertine the necessary 
emotions to dispose him to belief in God. Pascal believed essentially 
in the inability of one human to produce faith in another human. But 
he did fervently believe in the importance of removing obstacles to 
faith and preparing the way for the reception of God into one's life. 
In order to create the right frame of mind for the entrance of the 
influence of God into a man's life, he saw the urgency for two main 
preliminary stages: first, the awakening of a concern about the welfare 
of a man's own soul; and second, the guiding of the unbeliever to a 
point where he would become explicitly conscious of the need for a 
choice. This was not, according to Pascal, any ordinary or pas sing 
choice, but rather one upon which one's eternal happiness depended. 
Much controversy has revolved around the apologetic technique 
of the wager as it was used by Pascal. Some critics have even ex-
eluded it from the main body of the apology and relegated it to a 
position by itself, often using it as a preface. I 
I. Fortunat Strowski 1 Histoire du sentiment religieux en France au 
xvue siecle I Pas.cal et son temps I troisieme partie I (Paris I Plon-
Nourrit et Gie., I908), III, IO, places the wager at the beginning 
of h.is organization of the Pensees. He regards it as being cold and 
mechanical though admittedly an ingenious. attempt to combine ab-
stract algebra and crude empiricism. 
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If it is divorced from its purpose, however, the wager, as well as 
' the whole of the Pensees, may assume a fallacious and even a disturb-
ing nature. Despite the adverse criticism which has been levelled at 
the argument 1 it nevertheless plays an important function in the Plan 
of Pascal's apologetic work. This is especially true because it provides 
a powerful incentive for the proud libertines to come to the acknowledge-
ment of their dependence upon God. The argument which Pascal used 
was familiar to his audience. Growing as it did out of the game of chance 
which was a familiar part of the life of the salon, it met the libertines 
on terms which they could immediately understand. 
From a ps~hological point of view, the wager is not completely 
adequate to the apology, but it is nevertheless a very imp·ortant element 
in introducing the argument of the apology proper to the libertine, since 
it points out quite vividly to him the need for choice. It strikes clearly 
at the attitude so typical of the libertine who followed Pyrrho in claim-
ing that .. everything is uncertain I so I will make no choice at all. " 
H. F. Stewart, the Cambridge University scholar and interpreter of 
Pascal, has also been bothered by the pre.sence of the wager argument 
in the Pensees. Of particular concern to Stewart because of his 
emphasis up.on the revival of the. organization of the Pensees suggested 
by Filleau de la Chaise, was the fact that this argument was not 
even mentioned by the latter., and only portions of it were included 
by the Port-Royal edition. Te mpted to relegate the argument to an 
appendix, he nevertheless, in his edition of the Pensees, embodied 
the wager at the end of the first part of the apology. 
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It was at this point that Pascal insisted that one must wageq one must 
bet, one must take a chance. Man cannot remain in a state of neutrality 
or a position of suspense concerning his own destiny. As Pascal states 
in Pensee, Number 434, "for he who thinks that he can remain neutral 
is a sceptic J2.lli' excellence; this neutrality is the very essence of the 
sect." 1 
If one remains indifferent with regard to death and the hereafter, 
he is reacting as if he did not have an immortal soul; he is deciding 
against this possibility. It is not then a voluntary choicei we must 
wager, and he who does not wager for God wagers against Him. He 
who does not renounce self renounces God. This is one is sue which 
is fairly well established: that you have to wager one way or the other. 
Pascal further supports his plea for choosing God on the basis that 
men take all sorts of risks in life without necessarily being fully aware 
of the nature of the risk or the goal which they are thereby seeking. 
In a like manner, the decision to believe that God exists cannot be 
invincibly demonstr'ated to be the right one, but in returning to his 
argument in the wager, Pascal says, 
I am proving to-you that in both cases wbether you gain or 
lose, it is advantageous, and therefore reasonable to wager for 
1. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, (ed. Brunschvicg), Number 434. 
175 
God, for if you gain, you will gain all, if you lose, you lose no-
thing. Ill 
An objection to this logic seems fitting. Does one really gain all; and 
if he loses, does he lose nothing? Sister Marie Louise Hubert, has 
answered in the negative concerning the latter question. She states: 
It is not true • . . that the person who wagers that God exists 
either wins everything or at least suffers no loss, for if God does 
not exist the believer obviously does lose something and the un-
believer does gain something. The believer, ignorant of the fact 
that he has lost the truth, relies on a false hope, and such delus-
ion is an evil. On the other hand, the unbeliever possesses the 
truth together with the advantages that flow from such possession. 
Even if God does not exist, if life is devoid of meaning, it is 
worthwhile to realize the purposelessness and emptiness of human 
existence. 2 
This objection is undoubtedly related to those who, like Chevalier, 
prefer not to refer to the so-called wager argument as the pari or wager, 
but rather to give it the title which Pascal himself used in referring 
to the cont~nt of the wager, namely 11 Infinite-nothing" or by referring 
to it as: 11 Incomprehensible. " The latter is appropriate, as Pascal's 
discussion of the wager is surrounded with the question of incompre-
hensibility together with the arguments of "infinite number" . 3 
l. Blaise Pascal, PensE£e.s, (ed. Brunschvicg)r Number 233. 
2. Marie Louise Hubert, Pascal's Unfinished Apology, (New Haven: 
Yale University Pres.s, 1952), p. 107. 
3. Jacques Chevalier, Pascal, (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 
1930), p. 24T. 
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Considering further what may befall to the one whom Pascal is try-
ing to convince of the necessity of casting his lot, Pascal moves on 
to a still different consideration of the benefits which will accrue- t o 
the one who assumes the affirmative position: 
You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, generous, a 
sincere friend, truthful. In truth, you will not have those poisonous 
pleasures, glory and lux ury; but w.ill you not have others? I tell 
you that you will thereby gain in this life and that at each step 
you take on this road you will see so great certainty of gain, so 
much nothingness in what you risk, that you will at last recognize 
that you have wagered for something certain and infinite for which 
you have given nothing . 1 
This pragmatic appeal with which this pas sage bursts forth, might 
well be considered to be an anticipation of the pragmatist movement 
in its most fundamental the·sis. In a more recent time we see such a 
writer as Wi lliam James finding in the wager a vital truth. Especially 
i n his The Will to Believe, 2 James directs his efforts against that 
rationalistic attitude which holds that on questions which the reason 
cannot decide , the only honest and manly course is simply to face the 
blank wall of uncertainty. 
In his Principles of Psychology, James has written in a manner 
reminiscent of Pascal's reminder that we should act as though we 
1. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, (ed. Brunschvicg), Number 233. 
2. William James, The Will To Believe, (New York: Longmans, Green 
and Company, 1897). 
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believed . 1 James repeatedly asserts the imp-ortance of the intimate 
relation between voluntary attention and belief on the one hand, and 
on the other, between belief and physical action 
We need only in cold blood ACT ... as if the thing in ques-
tion were real, keep acting as if it were real, and it will infa.llibly 
end by growing into such a connection w:ith our life that it will 
become real ... Those to whom 'God' and 'Duty' are now mere 
names can make them much more than that, if they make a little 
sacrifice to them every day. 2 
If Pascal is to be regarded as the precursor of such a modern move-
ment as mentioned above, it is also quite possible to see in him one 
who, in a sense, has surpas s.ed the point of view held by James (and 
Lange), the so-cailed periphery theory of emot.ions. For Pasca1 regarded 
emotion as more than a mere resultant of organic movements. He em-
phasized the importance and the role of voluntary intention in producing 
these movements which lead to faith I and regarded the will and physical 
action as powerless in themselves to constitute faith but as simply 
preparing the way for it. In this sense t hen, just as Pascal could be 
admired as an ex ponent of the intuitionist method, so with regard to 
the wager, he could be claimed as the philosopher and psychologist 
of belief. 
1. William James, Principles of Psychology (London: Holt and Company 1 
1890), p. 320. 
2. James, QQ. cit., p. 322. 
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Pascal has often been criticized for this pragmatic aspect of his 
Pensees .in the wager argument. His attempts to justify the wager argu-
ment on the grounds that one stands to gain from it and to lose nothing 
have often been refuted on the basis that whatever virtues stem from be-
lief and whatever harmful results derive from disbelief are respectively 
good and evil only because of the essential truth or falsity of the doctr.ines 
from which they spring and not from the method employed therein. 
In refutation of those who would discredit the wager as being cold 
and me chanical, one of the most convincing bits of evidence we have 
of its purpose and its validity are the words of Pascal himself when he 
writes: 
If my words please you and my argument appears forcible, know 
that they are the effort of a man who ha.s thrown himself on his 
knees before and after to pray the Infinite and Indivisible Being 
to whom he submits his own soul that He would subdue yours also, 
for your own good and for His glory that thus strength may. be granted 
to weakness .1 
On the basis of this testimony of Pascal in the Penseesregarding 
the plan of his Apology, we may make the following relevant conclusions 
about t t'le wager: 
1. Jacques Chevalier, Pascal, (New York: Longmans, Green and Company r 
1930), p. 254. 
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1. that the wager ar g ument plays an important part in his 
apologetic designand belongs to the Apolog y proper; 
2. that the psychological approach is not limited to the first 
sect ion of the Apolog y but permeates the so-called " d o gmatic" 
part as well; 
3. that reason and faith d o not oppose each other but work in 
close harmony; 
4. that the art of persuasion is never d ivorced from objective 
certitude and the Apolog y thus presents a unified whole. 1 
1. Sister Marie Louise Hubert, PascaFs Unfinished Apology: A 
Stud y of His Plan, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 
p. 117. 
CHAPTER V 
THE RELATI<O>N OF DOUBT IN THE LIFE .OF PASCAL TO DOUBT 
AS EXPRESSED IN HIS THOUGHT 
One of the g oals of this stud y is to attempt to determine the 
relationship between the experience of doubt in the life of Pascal 
and the formal expression which it found in his thought. This 
relationship is not, however, readily apparent for a variety of 
reasons. 
First. Of the many events which seem psychologically related to 
his experience of doubt, there are virtually no recorde d reflections from 
Pascal contemporaneous with their occurrence. Unfortunately he did 
not keep a personal diary to which we can now turn for a first -hand 
evaluation of the m .eaning of these experiences. Evidence instead 
must come from. his later reflections, the testimonies of his biog raphers, 
from the piecing tog ether of other materials concerning his life, plus 
general psycholog ical principles. 
Second. Doubt, historically speaking , has typically been too 
narrowly defined to provide an adequate understanding of the place of 
-180-
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I doubr in the life and thought of Pascal. In this study, doubt is defined 
as suspended judgment, a critical evaluation of possible alternatives, 
but not implying disbelief or rejection of a particular stated proposition. 
With this definition, one is more able to evaluate doubt in its fullest 
psychological and religious significance for Pascal. This is particularly 
true because, in addition to appearing to the writer as the proper inter-
pretation of this attitude of mind as expressed in Pascal, as well as the 
attitude whil.ch he was speaking to in his Pensees, it provides a work-
able explanatory hypthesis for the various functions which doubt subsumed 
in the life and thought of Pascal as the scientist, the philosopher, and 
the man of religion. 
Third. In discussing doubt, there has been a tendency to be in-
terested primarily in describing the process of its operation. From a 
descriptive point of view, this of course is justified, since the psycho-
log.ist cannot place a value judgment upon this process. But this is not 
exactly: the perspective taken in this study, in the context of the psycho-
logy of religion. Here we will consider not only the psychological process 
of doubt (with its various implications for science, philosophy and 
religion in the life and thought of Pascal), but also, the object of this 
1. See pp. 10-11 of this study. 
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doubt. It is believed that by thus combining a description of the process 
with a description of the focus which it assumes in different episodes 
and areas of Pascal's life and thought, a more adequate understanding 
of the role of doubt can be ascertained than by merely analyzing it 
operationally or functionally o 
With these perspectives before ·us, it is now possible to consider 
· some questions which are basic to this goal of associating the life and 
thought aspects of doubt, and to see some of the underlying themes 
implicit in the earlier presentations of this study in their more explicit 
inter-relationships o 
One of the problems which readily arises is: Did Pascal doubt 
more at certain times of his life than at other periods of his life? To 
answer this question, one must first distinguish between the relative 
"amount" of doubt or even its duration and the even more important 
factor of what he was doubtful about and why o For example, it seems 
inappropriate and misleading to say simply that Pascal doubted more 
as a scientist than he did as a man of religion o It is true that the 
discipline of doubt in science .imposed itself more severely upon Pascal 
than did the same discipline in religion, but this overlooks a basic 
consideration; namely: the object of his doubt in both cases o 
One must, then, always see the focus of Pascal's experience and 
thought during a particular period rather than attempting to assess his 
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doubt...2§:.g. This involves a recognition of the forces which , when 
combined, produced for Pascal,. a doubt-producing situation. In the 
psychological assessment of these situations one must first consider 
Pascal's immediate physical and psychical potentials. 
For, his respons.e to events was determined, at least in part, by 
his natural endowment. Critics of Pascal agree on one point -- he was 
a person of unusual intellectual ability. His exceptional natural en-
dowment became evident at an early age, and was challenged and 
implemented by the extraordinary educational opportunities which 
were offered to him. This endowment which was characterized by a 
great desire for clarity of thought was manifested not only in the pre-
cocious answers which Pascal gave, but more particularly in the probing 
questions which he asked concerning the nature of things, as well as 
the reasons he sought to explain his world. Growing up as he did at 
a time when a new emphasis was being placed upon experimentation 
and in an era which gave great freedom of intellectual choicer it was 
almost inevitable that Pascal should carry on the interest of the Pascal 
family .in matters of the mind. 
Thus, though in familial matters Pascal was taught a rather rigid 
respect for his elders, in matters of the mind he was encouraged to 
seek h.ts own answers. It becomes apparentr therefore, that doubt in 
these earlier years, and indeed in all of his scientific endeavors, was 
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a natural outgrowth of a basic questioning of all evidence, an elimin-
ation of all false explanations, and an acceptance of only those ex-
planations which stood the empirical test of validity. 
As the predominant interests and activities of Pascal during the 
first period of his life were in science, and because the method he used 
in his experiments required an objectivity which is part of the process 
inherent in doubt, Pascal in general reflected this attitude up until 
the time of his first conversion. 
:Even after the conversion, there seemed to be no marked change 
in his attitude. He continued to conduct his scientific experiments, 
despite the testimony from Gilberte indicating that he now turned wholly 
to religion. He continued to seek truth by trial and error, test and 
experim.ent. 
The doubt of Pascal's. worldly period was expressed in a variety 
of ways. There was first of all, the disagreement with Jac·queline • s 
desJre to enter the convent at Port-Royal as evidenced in Pascal's 
reluctance at first to allow her to enter, and later in his opposition 
to her plan as it is reflected in the argument over her inheritance. 
These expressions reflected a deeper doubt which he wa.s able to verb-
alize only much later in his conversations. with Jacqueline. . Shortly 
before his second conversion he confided to her that he felt a great 
discontent as a result of being completely separated from God and at 
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the same time feeling no particular urge to move towards God. 
This discontent which he felt was reflected superficially, of course, 
in his activities of the worldly period. "Whereas they provided him with 
a new understanding of man and his dilemma of existence which he found 
helpful in his projected apology, they nevertheless were the same kind 
of divertissements which he later condemned as the refusal of man to 
admit his need for God. Before he became disillusioned with scie nce, 
Pascal may very well have sought to deaden doubt in the pursuit of 
science. There is some evidence for the pos.ition that he found more 
satisfaction in th.is type of solut.ion than he did in seeking pleasure, 
for in the first place it allowed him an escape by which he could at 
least intellectually attempt to resolve some of the mysteries which he 
observed in his world, plus the added advantage of losing himself in 
a more continuous. quest than is represented in mere pleasure - seek-
ing which tends to distract ·only for the moment. 
Added to the doubt which Pascal employed in science is the doubt 
wh.ich he came to have concerning science itself. The paint at which 
this latter attitude of doubt emerged is difficult to discern, however. 
For example, Pascal did not relinquish his scientific activities suddenly. 
Though more sporadic in his later years, there is a keen interest in 
science much later in Pascal's life than Gilberte would have us assume. 
What did seem to change in Pascal's scientific quest was his attitude 
toward science itself. He never regarded it as the panacea for man's 
dilemma, but in his later life his activities in science lack the all-
absorbing interest which Pascal's earlier scientific exper.tments reflect. 
This was partly due to the fact that he had apparently come to realize 
the significant aspect of the teaching of Jansenism which did not con-
demn a desire for knowledge in any form, but rather emphasized that 
the arrogance which .is often associated with learning may easily lead 
to a forgetfulness of God. This Pascal had come to realize not only 
as a result of his own intellectual arrogance, of which there were 
numerous ex amples, but also as a result of his ha-ving discovered after 
his second conversion that to understand the void which exists in man's 
life and to comprehend the means of fulfilling that void, one must turn 
his attention to infinites rather than finites -- to religion ra~her than 
to science. 
Pascal's attitude toward science in his later years cannot adequately 
be described as one of mere rejection. He did not reject science so 
much as he accepted religion. It seems. inadequate, therefore, to assume 
that Pascal's objection to science was a complete condemnation. It 
was rather that his religious experience offered a. re-orientation of his 
life which made him feel diss.atisfied with science. To sp·eak of his 
attitude in science in his earlier years and his attitude toward science 
in his later years, doubt provides a meaningful principle of operation. 
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Another area in which Pascal's experience of doubt in his life seems 
associated with his expression of doubt in his thought grew out of his 
own experiences of social isolation. Though Pascal felt a close attach-
ment to his father and to his sisters, especially Jacqueline, the type 
of normal social intercourse which is a part of the life of the average 
individual was lacking in his life. Many factors contributed to this un-
usual situation: the death of his mother, the failure of his father to 
re-marry, the educational system imposed upon the Pascal children, 
Blaise's poor health, and his unusual intellectual ability. 
It has been observed that Pascal's attitude toward man throughout 
his life-time never ceased to be that of a laboratory observer . 1 In 
a sense Pascal never completely identified with his fellow men, but 
always stood apart. He never completely overcame the isolation which 
he had experienced in his early life and perhaps even came to enjoy, 
as a result of the experiences which have been mentioned. This isol-
ation was affected by both his physical weakness and suffering and his 
lack of warm, affectionate interpersonal relationships. 
Though Pascal is reported to have accepted his suffering in a beati-
fie manner according to Gilberte, as well as other biographers, it cannot 
1. Morris Bishop, Pascal, The L.ife of Genius, (New York: Reyna! and 
Hitchcock, 1936), p. 9. 
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be said that his · physical suffering and his affective aridity in the 
psychological realm left no trace of influence. Their most immediate 
results were the cloistered existence which Pascal experienced as a child 
and reflected .in his solitary tendencies later in life. Whether or not 
this was the kind of existence Pascal might have chosen, other factors 
being equal, seems at this point idle speculation. The fact remains 
that this was the pattern of life which emerged and in which apparently 
Pascal found as much happiness and satisfaction as he would have found 
in any temporal, worldly expression. These early influences help to 
clarify his longing for the good life after deathr and the nearest approxi-
mation of this here on earth, the isolated reflective life of the religious 
recluse. Though Pascal did not permanently disassociate himself from 
the world in his later life by joining the solitaires at Port-Royal, there 
is ample evidence that he did envy this life of meditation and prayer. 
His longing for this type of isolation may well clarify his ambivalent 
attitude towards Jacqueline's accomplishments as a nun. 
At an even earlier period, this isolation may also help to explain 
another aspect of his life in which doubt was a central expression. Here 
the reference is to his life and thought as a scientist. It cannot be 
denied that there are emotional influences as well as intellectual goals 
involved in the choice of an occupation. Though the road seemed paved 
for Pascal in the direction of the pursuit of science, the fact remains 
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that a complete explanation cannot be given merely in terms of early 
formal academic train.tng in the realm of mathematics, and physics. 
Nor can the influence of the father's. interests in science which in the 
~ 
case of Etienne Pascal is especially dominantr be relied upon as a single 
explanation fur the developing scientific interests of the younger Blaise. 
Vocational goals which are avoided are to be considered as well as 
the vocational goals which are included. And the combination of these 
factors r both from the point of view of their emotional as well as their 
intellectual attractions and repulsions provide the kind of total perspective 
that is necessary in evaluating the direction which one's life takes. 
In his earlier life, at least, science seemed intellectually stimulat-
ing and challenging to Pascal. It also appears to have been emotionally 
gratifying. The opportunity which it provided him to remain indifferently 
interested in explaining his world had its psychological causes and 
effects; it als-O had its advantages as well as its disadvantages. Pascal 
as a scientist was free to remain in doubt about the universe in which 
he lived, in fact he was forced by the rigors of the scientific method 
to approach it doubtfully. '!'his brought intellectual stimulat.i.on in the 
relentless and unmitigated search for truth. Even such a goal may well 
have included within it for Pascal the compulsive element of emotionality 
which thrusts one ever onward in the pursuit of finality. So frequently, 
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however, as was the case in Pascal's experience, such a compulsive 
motivation does not result in reaching any solid resting place for it 
establishes an unrealistic goal which can actually never be reached. 
The over-view of doubt in Pascal • s life and thought enables us 
to conclude that an infinite search of this sort for Pascal could never 
have been fulfilled by an infinite searching for finite goals. . Thus, 
even though science was for Pascal a never ending searchr it was still 
a search which by the very finiteness of the goals it sought could never 
give an explanation of man's desire for union with the infinite. Pascal 
".w:as thus eventually compelled to exceed science and to relinquish an 
indifferent attitude toward the here and now. That is, the scientific 
explanation of our physical world had forced h.im into what in the final 
analysis can be described only as a wagered reliance on "the beyond ... 
This attitude, which indeed grew out of the scientific doubt rested upon, 
reason which, in being used to fulfil itself, had carried Pascal to a 
plane where he no longer found reason wholly adequate. This does 
not in the ultimate sense of the word so much .decry doubt as a method 
as to deplore it as a goal. 
Without the force which impelled Pascal to continue to search for 
ultimate meaning in his world by exploding one by one the atomistic 
explanations provided by reason r it is doubtful if he would have reached 
the higher perspective from whd.:ch he could see his worlds -- the physical 
and the spiritual -- .both in their unique distinctiveness and in their 
inseparable relatedness. 
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The influence of Pascal's experiences upon his theological assump-
tions about God and man is another area which deserves our consideration. 
A rather universal attitude wh.ich has prevailed .in · man's thought as he 
has endeavored to explain the problem of suffering has been the con-
ception (at least at the level of feeling) that suffering is closely allied 
with man's t:;infulness. The cause-effect formula in this c·onnection 
has been variously construed theologically. Even when suffering has 
not been '"thought,. to be the direct result ofpersonal sin against God, 
it has frequently been "felt" psychologically to be not only the conse-
quence, but the cause of more sin. 
This means that even when we have .intellectually resented the 
suggestion that our physical suffering was a public testimony to our 
personal shortcomings, unconsciously we have not been free from the 
speculative possibility that we were after all, not ,.masters of our fate." 
Even when we dare not face the possibility of this as.sociation between 
sin and suffering occurring in our own lives -- and perhaps even because 
of this inability to face honestly this possibility -- we are willing, even 
forced ., to accept .it as a general theological axiom .for others . . Thus, 
as may quite possibly be the case in the life and thought of Pascal, 
the suffering which he could not explain in his own life because it might 
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reflect too personally on him was considered theologica.lly to be the 
natural state of man. There are, of course, personal repercussions from 
any doctrine which discusses man in general. However, a solution 
which finds its expression in a theological thought system rather than 
in a psycho-religious probing of existential barriers t may temporarily 
pacify by a refocus sing of judgment --divine and human-- away from 
the "me" and upon the "we". Eventually such an intellectualization 
of one's sin can only deliver one into deception; for the submission 
to power is then always universal and never personal( and confession 
falls short of cathars.is when the sickness of the soul is· ever within. 
This realization may help to explain why in Pascal's earlier theo-
logical writings 1 though there is a bitter denunciation of human attributes 
and an exhortation to the godly li.fe, there is little observable change 
in the life of the exhorter. Conversely, after his second conversion, 
the exhortation seems less. pronounced and the personal exploration 
has begun. Similarly, in Pascal's closing days of life when he was too 
weak to exhort, he invited a poor man and his family to share his home. 
I 
Thus I wh en Pascal writes in his Pensees that rr. • • he who doubts and 
does not seek is both very unhappy and very unjust ..• rr 2 we can 
1. See, for example, the letter from Blaise Pascal to his sister Mme. 
Gilberte P~rier on the occasion of their father's death. 
2. B_laise Pascal, Pens~es, {ed. Brunschvicg), Number 194. 
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rightfully assume that he condemns not only the street-corner scoffer, 
but also the compulsive ''Christian .. -- perhaps even his earlier self 
-- who in his disproportionate concern about "Everyman" from "Every-
where" failed to be sufficiently concerned about the destiny of his own 
soul. 
Another consideration which merits our' invest.igation is the theo-
logical doctrine concerning the nature of God which is held by Pascal. 
It is his contention that God is a hidden God; that He "conceals Himself 
from those who tempt Him, and manifests Himself to those who seek 
Him. " 1 The basic theological implications of this doctrine have already 
2 
been discussed. It seems quite possible in addition that there may 
be some relevant psycho-religious implications of this doctrine. 
It is readily admitted by theologically-oriented psychologists as 
well as psychologically-trained theologians· that our interpersonal re-
lations on the human level, and particularly our early formative relations 
with the parental figures, are highly determinative of our later interper-
sonal relations.hips both with our fellow men and with our God. The 
extreme view of this, of course, assumes that God is nothing more 
than a psychological projection or a figment of the imagination fulfilling 
1. Ibid., Number 195, 
2. See pp .. 142-143 of this study. 
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a need of the individual for security. A less extreme view, and one 
which seems to come closer to the truth, is the assumption that we 
perceive selectively in all our relationships on the basis of pa:st ex -
perience, individual constitutional differences, unconscious as sump-
tions, and highly individualized life styles which not only incorporate 
much of the past, but highly color our ex pectations of and hopes for 
the future. This view does not negate the possibility of an Objective 
Being who is quite "Other" from what our perceptions of Him communi-
cate to us. 
For the psychologist of religion, however, the primary focus is 
not the metaphysical explanation of the immutable qualities of this 
extra-mundane Being, but rather an analysis and description of the 
psychological reality it possesses for man. Such an approach does 
not create God in the sense of explaining His existence. Nor does 
it ex plain away God by suggesting that in the divine-human relation-
ship both participants, in addition to maintaining an "objective other-
ness", assume as well a 'subjective we-ness" quality which is a most 
essential aspect of the relationship. The psycho-religious approach 
should enhance our ultimate understanding of both the objective and 
subjective, or ex isting and experiencing aspects of the relationship. 
For without reducing God to a projection of man's mind it rightfully 
interprets man's dependence upon God:. Applying this theoretical 
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assumption to the life and thought of Pascal may help in appraising the 
significance of Pas·cal' s experiences of and thoughts about God in their 
relationship to doubt. 
The many voids in the affective relationships of Pascal with members 
of his own family and the lack of opportunities for normal contacts with 
peer groups caused him to rely unnecessarily upon his father for intell-
ectual a.s well as emotional satisfaction for a large portion of his life-
time. This reliance seemed to be fostered and intensified by competitive 
siblings and the early death of the mother. But, in addition to increasing 
his need for a satisfying relation with the father, these influences also 
made it more difficult for him to respond successfully to such a relation. 
This tended to create an anxious, inquisitive searching for a meaningful 
relation, expressed in Pascal's attempts to relate to the authority of 
his father and to God. 
Combined with this, however, is the self-imposed callousness of 
indifference, or doubt, which dares not bet too much on the possibility 
of fulfillment, lest the too-oft-repeated failures of the past be repeated. 
Such confusion of attractions and repulsions keeps one in a constant 
state of apprehension, which though it embodies an earnestness quite 
opposed to the indifference so central in doubt, yet imposes the rigidity 
of doubt. For, the searching can neither reject the authority by which 
one seeks to be accepted, nor risk the acceptance of the authority which 
in the past ha.s seemed so rejecting. In this. sense one s.eems predestined 
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to seek security by the accustomed ways even though those ways have 
failed to provide the solUtion for an anchorage in life. Is it any wonder 
that in such a dilemma, he should have felt the true solution was em-
bodied in Christ? For here was one with whom one could readily identify. 
The invitation was openly given to "cast his burden on the Lord." By 
mediating between God and man, Christ could take upon himself the 
responsibility of convincing man of his worthiness before God. 
The reconciliation which was promised to man by Christ satisfied 
the restlessness of the intellectual aspect of Pascal's doubt which ex-
tended itself until it had pierced beyond the scope of the finite into the 
infinite. This reconciliation brought a new sense of freedom to the 
emotional aspect of doubt which had driven Pascal inward upon itself 
to the point of no e:s.cape. Just as the catatonic stupor reveals to the 
psychiatrist that the psychotic patient has found no final and lasting 
adequate solution to his problems of adjustment, so Pascal's own 
spiritual rigidity-- derived from doubt as. well as his observations of 
the libertine to whom he spoke in the Pens~eS-- convinced Pascal that 
there was no safety in this seclusion. Nor was there any freedom in 
a frenzied existence which was intellectually too curious to stop its 
pursuit and emotionally too suspicious to begin. A life of doubt was 
no life at all. But through doubt and beyond doubt there was an eternity 
which he had never before experienced. 
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The question has frequently been raised by critics of Pascal as 
to the degree of personal involvement expressed in his Pensees. Was 
he merely speaking to the libertines or was he addressing himself in 
the disguise of a familiar scoffer of the day? 
There appears in the Pensees much of the personal struggle which 
Pascal had known at some stages of his intellectual, emotional and 
spiritual development. Pascal is not to be identified with the libertine, 
however. The position typical of the libertine is not Pascal's ultimate 
po-sition, yet the doubts which he expresses reflect a personal associ-
ation with them and a first- hand knowledge of their problems. 
Some of this knowledge concerning the attitude of doubt in the 
libertine was derived more from Pasca1' s association with men such as 
Mere and Mitton than it was from his own personal wrestling with the 
problem. He knew the typical ex pressions of the libertines as a result 
of his associations with them during the worldly period,. and it was 
this period which clarified many of the central issues to which he later 
addressed his answers in the Pensees. 
In another context1 the problem of projecting upon others one's 
own unsolved problem has been discussed in relation to the intellectual-
emotional d.imensions of doubt. It seems hardly likely that Pascal is 
l. See pp.l91-192 of this study. 
198 
projecting upon an imaginary listener a problem which he is really him-
self trying to solve. It does seem possible, however, that Pascal is 
using the libertine to express some of the basic problems of faith and 
belief which some years earlier in his spiritual pilgrimage, were burn-
ing problems for him. 
Nevertheless, in expressing any thought, and particularly in writ.ing, 
a clarification results. Whether or not this was the purpose which moti-
vated Pascal's expression ofhis faith, it inevitably became a part of 
the effect which helped him to live so nobly at the close of his life; 
to articulate from his experiences some of the basic dilemmas faced 
by man; and to state succintly solutions which he believed to be valid. 
Obviously the conclusions which Pascal reached cannot be assumed 
automatically to be relevant to aU men's spiritual needs. This may 
not be so much a weakness in the expression of these needs by Pascal 
or an inadequacy of suggested solutions as it is a reluctance of others 
to accept these solutions. 
In judging the effect of an apology for Christianity it is difficult 
to know what criteria to use. One can hardly consider alone the number 
of converts it produces without also assessing its merit in terms of 
adequacy of exposition of the central doctrines of the theological posi-
tion it is defending. In addition to these general difficulties which 
apply to all apologies, there is with Pascal's writ.ing the added difficulty 
199 
that his apology was never finished. Consequently what can be said 
of the fragments? 
On the basis of the first criterion suggested above, there seems 
to be little evidence that great numbers were ever converted as a result 
of this apology. There is some evidence that even from scholars de-
dicated to the task of interpreting Pascal,. it has had an opposite effect 
and has caused some to lose their faith. The editorial difficulties. in-
volved in presenting an unfinished apology are to be considered as an 
important part of its degree of adequacy just as they must also be con-
sidered at great length in evaluating the structure of the thoughts 
expressed. Pascal has indeed been at the mercy of numerous i ndividuals 
and schools of thought who have used him to present t h eir particular 
biases by rearranging, omitting and fals.ely interpreting what he has 
said rather than letting him speak for himself. Thus it is difficult to 
know if we are evaluating Pascal or an evaluation of him. 
In the light of these several considerations, all of which point 
to no definite conclusions but only make us more aware of the care which 
must be taken .in evaluating the work of Pascal, the most appropriate 
conclusion seems to be that though his apology has failed in its immedi-
ate purpose the Pensees have not. In addition to their clarity of expression 
and their profundity of thought there are other reasons for this appraisal 
of Pascal's influence. Pascal has expressed the contraries within man's 
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nature with perhaps more psychological insight and depth of theological 
understanding than any other apologist. As this duality of nature is 
an important basic consideration for the problem of doubt, his statements 
which clarify this duality I relating its opposites to one another and 
integrating them as necessary counter-parts of a potentially unified 
personality 1 merit our serious consideration. 
The diversified approaches which Pascal takes to the solution of 
the quest for meaning in life reveal his depth of understanding of the 
contributions which can be made by the various disciplines of thought 
as well a.s their inherent weaknesses and their potential threats. If 
Pascal has been judged a failure because he proclaimed the virtues of 
opposing philosophies and has been identified with one or the other 
because he has extolled its virtues 1 this is unfortunate. By analyzing 
particular philosophies I Pascal hoped to expose their shortcomings 1 
not to be identified with them. 
The continuity implied in Pascal's basic pattern of depicting man's 
wretchedness without God and his happiness with God, provides a meaning-
ful focus in which the libertine can be guided into even greater disillusion-
ment and ultimately into greater certainty. By systematically removing 
barriers of opposition offered by the libertine through accepting them 
as barriers rather than by defensively denying them 1 Pascal encouraged 
the participation of a previously isolated and dubious -reader. For, the 
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reader now felt supported by the empathetic concern of the apologist. 
If the reader cannot identify himself with the audience to whom 
Pascal directs the Pensees r and thus refuses to be led by the argument 
which Pascal presents in his apology, it is quite possible that he may 
nevertheless· feel the combined power and persuasion of the personal 
testimony of Pascal as revealed in his thoughts. The reader of any 
apology, of course, is the one who ultimately is either convinced or 
not. It is particularly true, however, in the case of the Pensees., that 
it is an unfinished apology, and thus necessitates on the level of personal 
experience the filling in of the existing gaps, in the process of which 
a deeper conversion may take place than in those instances in which 
a completed exposition of Christianity is either rejected or accepted 
by the read.er. Pascal's apology can be completed only by the reader, 
and this subjective, internalizing demand caused by its "in-proces.s" 
nature may provide the doubter with more of an incentive to seek h.is 
solution than in a completed system in which he is served a solution which 
he feels compelled to reject. 
One final matter, which is basic to the d.iscus.sion thus far but 
merits special consideration, is the diversity which we find in Pascal's 
life and thought, and yet the apparent unity to which this diversity seems 
to be directed. 
The diversity of interests which Pascal pursued during his lifetime 
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must be ex plained as a result of the combined forces of ex perience, 
thought, and temperament. Within the thought pattern of Pascal as 
presented in his Pensees, as well as in the accounts of his biographers, 
there is contained a viv.id description of the manner in which Pascal 
exhausted the unique qualities in science before moving on to philo-
sophy, and how he in turn explored the contributions of the philosophers 
before feeling compelled to seek his final answers in the realm of re-
ligion. · This progression is briefly summarized in a significant state-
ment by Dorothy Eastwood: 
Pascal has few characteristics more striking or more French 
than his scorn of mere groping and compromise, the courage with 
which, facing conclusion however startling, he pushes the con-
traries to their uttermost logical term. It is this characteristic 
wh.ich gained for him the reputation of a sceptic. Recent critics 
have for the most part, and with evident justice, rejected the term 
scepticism for its singular inappropriateness as applied to a man 
whose temperament, work, and life are aU distinguished in their 
ultimate character by a ringing strength of affirmation. But any 
creative effort must after all be founded on rejection; if Pascal 
climbs high, it is because he shakes from his feet the dust of the 
plains 1 and the ultimately affirmative character Of his work (affirm-
ative at a level where most people are r by comparison, sceptics) 
does not alter the fact that it has one aspect which, if taken by 
itself -- not as the term of an antithesis r but as independent and 
self-sufficing -- def.initely stamps him as a Pyrrhonist.l 
In add.ition to the logical progression reflected by such a pilgrimage 
through the various_ disciplines of thought, there is a psychological 
1. Dorothy Eastwood, The Revival of Pascal, (Oxford: The Clarendon 
Press, 1936), p. 25. 
203 
principle of continuity which gives a coherent orientation to these diversi-
fied .interests, synthesizing them eventually into one great organized 
enterprise. This psychological pr.inciple which allows us to see all 
of these various aspects as a part of the whole and unified pattern,. 
was Pascal's search for wholeness, for completeness, for unity. 
Obviously he did not seek such a goal in a unilateral manner as the 
person who may pursue his goal throughout life, never turn.ing away 
from it and never turning back. Pascal's journey is not as easily traced. 
Though he did not seek unity in diversity, he did seek it through diver-
sity. In neither of these cases was diversity the goal or the means to 
that goal. Rather, diversity of interests were implicit for Pascal be-
cause in order to reach a point in his intellectual and emotional develop-
ment where .he could reflect on what he had traversed with any degree 
of honesty, it was necessary for him to have explored widely. 
Here we see on the intellectual plane, his scientific attitude ex -
pressing itself. In this sense, Pascal never ceased using the scientific 
method even though in terms of scientific experimentation he ceased 
being a scientist in the strict sense of the word later in his life. Even 
in his Pensees, which can hardly be considered a scientific treatise, 
Pascal used the scientific method. For he isolated through the method 
of induction, from the facts which he had observed, salient character-
istics of man such as his restlessness and his misery apart from God. 
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Having established these observed facts, he proceeded to explain them 
on the basis of tentative hypotheses wh.ich corresponded appropriately 
with the data which they represented. In following out these hypotheses 
to the one hypothesis which incorporates all others, he reached the 
point at which he could ·declare that Christianity is such a hypothesis. 
Thus the same method which he had used as a youth in the scientific 
laboratory, and which he had unswervingly prescribed -to the research 
scientist, he also prescribed to the searcher for God. It should be 
pointed out, however, that in neither science nor in the search for God, 
did the scientific method produce the truth in the sense of creating it. 
It merely served to lead one systematically and safely through all false 
evidence, and to arrive ultimately at the one goal which had sustained 
the search and consequently could not be refuted. 
The desire to approx.imate that truth which would incorporate and 
explain all diversity was fostered early in Pascal's life by training in 
the rigorous scientific method as interpreted by his father. Such rigor 
was not confined to moments of formal study. It could be observed 
~ 
in the atmosphere of the Pascal household. The very decision of Etienne 
to educate his own children, and the systematic way in which he daily 
implemented this decision, helped to establish a scientific attitude in 
Blaise which was not a mere professional property but a way of life. 
Some evidence from Pascal himself, and considerable evidence from 
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his biographers, stress the fact that even his most care-free and aimless 
moments, such as those spent during the worldly period, were a part 
of an over-all pattern to investigate and to conClude -- to explore, 
record, accept or refute. Whether or not such a scientific motive in-
spir-ed the worldly period would be difficult to defend with any measure 
of psychological accuracy. We can be sure, however, that in retrospec·-
tively analyzing this period, Pascal used it immeasurably to lead the 
bewildered man to God. 
Thus when biographers of Pascal report that the home in which he 
was reared combined a strong religious attitude of austerity and an 
attitude of freedom of thought so typical of Seventeenth Century France, 
one can see how· these became for him, not opposing and mutually-
exclusive points of view, but rather synthesized and incorporated into 
his total world view. By taking the larger view, Pascal stood in a posi-
tion to condemn the smaller views of the scientists and the philosophers 
when they failed to see beyond their own limited conclusions, and their 
own doubt. Pascal condemned them not so much on the basis of the con-
clusions which they reached,. for indeed, looking at the same evidence 1 
Pascal made identical conclusions. "What did disturb Pascal and sub-
sequently elicited his wrath of judgment upon them, was that they were 
content with their conclusions .§§.. conclusions and not as stepping stones 
to a frame of reference which by incorporating opposing truths about man, 
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his world, and God r could stand secure. In this. sense it can be said 
that Pascal never condemned doubt as an element of faith. He condemned 
only that total doubt which was indifferent to ultimate cons.equences, 
and therefore ran the risk of snuffing .out the life which it purported 
to preserve. This type of doubt failed to compel its subject to press 
on to the truth impl.ied by its half truths and invited man to be content -~ 
and bewildered-- with its. impartiality toward the ultimate quest.ions. 
Pascal condemned such "impartiality•• because in its indifferent atti-
tude of objectivity it was content to take man's bewilderment as his 
true condition rather than as partia1 evidence tho.t there must be more than 
bewilderment, and to use it to point the wayi. to his completion. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The first goal of this study has been to clarify our understanding 
of the place of doubt in Pascal by considering significant external 
events and his response to them. Defining doubt as an attitude of 
suspended judgment emerging :from a questioning, critical perspective, 
a number of experiences have been considered significantly related to 
the expression of doubt in Pascal's Ufe. The Prance of the seventeenth 
century was characterized by a new freedom of thought in which an emphasis 
was placed upon the value of experience as a means to the discovery 
of knowledge. A critical empiricism coupled with the development of the 
experimental method pervaded the world that Pascal knew. This quest.ion-
ing, rigorously critical attitude was expressed by Pascal's father, 
~ 
Etienne Pascal,- and was a basic philosophy undergirding the education 
which he provided for his son. The death of Pascal's mother early in 
his life, created a void usually filled by the affection of the mother. 
He sought to fill this unmet need by developing an unusually close bond 
with the father. He thus lacked a balanced combination of intellectual 
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and emotional emphases .in his life and tended to compensate for the 
latter by an exces.sive and relentless search for truth. This tendency 
was exacerbated by his lack of physical virility and the series of ill-
nesses which affected nearly every phase of his life. Not only did he 
have more opportunity to study and reflect b'ecause of his physical ail-
ments, but their very presence precipitated a kind of suffering which, 
in demanding an explanation, caused Pascal to hold in serious question 
those attempted solutions to man's existence which did not ferret out 
the deepest mysteries of his being. 
As the member of a family of unusually gifted children, Pascal 
found himself from an early age in competition with his sisters; Jacqueline 
and Gilberte, for achievement and fame, perhaps because the father 
seemed to respect and expect this kind of performance in preference 
to filial affection. It is noteworthy that not only in his early .years, 
but in his later years as well, some of Pascal's most creative work as 
a scientist, man of letters and defender of religion was done when he 
was under most bitter attack. This .intolerance of competition and its 
related effect can be observed readily in the opposition offered by 
Jacqueline in the threat to his supremacy when she made an official 
declaration for a life of service to the Church. Pascal's period of 
greatest indifference to religion occurred at this time. 
/ 
A combination of these forces, plus an accident .involving Etienne 
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Pascal, made the family, especially Bla.ise, amenable to a strong Jansen-
ist influence in his adolescent years. The emphasis in this sect upon 
the depravity of man encouraged in Pascal a pessimistic attitude toward 
human accomplishments. 
The worldly period in the life of Pascal occurred shortly after his 
first conversion and brought him into contact with representatives of 
the libertinism and free thought which he later denounced so vociferously 
in his Pens~es. This experience of the world offered him an opportunity 
to compensate for the death of his father, which had occurred just previous 
to this period, by find.ing in such men as M~re and Mitton an imitation 
. ~ 
of the philosophy of the honnete homme and the respect for science 
which his father had embodied. By associating with them even though 
it meant a lack of concern for religionr Pascal found a new kind of happi-
ness. which it is doubtful if he ever experienced with his father. 
As a result of the worldly period,. however, Pascal became more 
aware than ever before of a spiritual void in his life, and it was this 
awareness and the attending concern which followed it that provided 
the setting for the second conversion. As no other single experience 
of Pascal, this experience changed the course of his entire life. It 
brought a certainty into his previous uncertainty, and provided a basic 
orientation which enabled him to see how each of the previous experi-
ences of his life had prepared him for the next. .. Pascal was now in a 
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position to speak in his projected Apology for the Christian Religion 
to those who were still bewildered. He never completed his plan, for 
he was overtaken by death at the age of thirty--nine. Nevertheless his 
personal ex perience of doubt in tqe Life which he had thus far known, 
plus his first-hand awareness of this attitude in others, s.o completely 
prepared him for an understanding of the problem that his Pensees stand 
today as one of the greatest living memorials to an analysis, description 
and proposed solution of the attitude of doubt that we have in our heri-
tage of religious literature. 
The second goal of this study has been to define the ·'role of doubt 
as it appeared in the thought of Pascal in science r philosophy and 
religion, and to consider the significant relationships of the expression 
of doubt in these three areas . 
Pascal as a scientist was obliged to maintain in his ex perimental 
approach to data a coldly objective respect for facts t a willingness 
to dispense with personal preferences. and to be submissive to the 
results of his findings. His expression of doubt was not of the type 
that den.ied the possibility of knowledge, but which remained in a state 
of suspended judgment until all evidence including the "contraries" 
had been investigated. 
This approach was intellectually satisfying to Pascal, for it ful-
filled the rigors which he had always been taught by his scientist father, 
and it provided the necessary precautions which prevented him from 
dogmatically taking a stand and then collecting data to support his 
hypothesis. To Pascal, th.is latter approach was not science. 
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It was through his ex perimet::rli s in science that Pascal became more 
interested in problems which lay beyond the physical realm. His re-
search in science had caused him to investigate the nature of the vacuum 
in connection with the equilibrium of fluids; his mathematical training 
had prepared hi m for his contribution to the question of probability. 
Both of these problems seemed to imply still more basic considerations 
concerning the nature of the universe, · and it was to these that Pascal 
was next to turn. He felt the necessity of studying what caused move-
ment, number, and space, in order to understand the process involved. 
Thus through the ever-questioning attitude, the search for truth, 
which rested only when it had established all other evidence as false, 
had led Pascal to conclude that science was not the end, but that it 
bore witness to a still higher order of the universe involving a new 
method -- philosophy. 
The chief contributions to Pascal's. philosophic pursuits came from 
Epictetus and Montaigne. Compelled to seek the truth about man, Pascal 
turned to Stoicism where he found a description of the greatness of man 
so glowing that he rejected this interpretation because he realized from 
ex perience that such a presentation was a partial view of man. Turning 
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to Mont ai gne he found the opp osite v1e w of man presented. Recognizing 
that a gain this was a biased present at ion of man which omitte d the 
reference to his di g nity, his philosophical search carried hi m to 
relig ion and to the person of Christ . He found in the Chri st i:an 
anthr opolog y a view which by c ombi ni n g both opposing truths about 
man, provided a basis for self-acceptance and a meeting g round on 
which man·! s weakness, when properly recognized, could lead to his 
strength by being identified with the mediating force of Christ. 
The third goal of this stud y has revolved around the relating of 
Pascal -Is own e xperience of doubt to the doub t of others. Through his 
own experiences of doubt, in science, in philosophy and reli g ion, 
particularly prior to his second conversion, as well as hi s personal 
acquaintances with the libertines during the worldly period, Pascal knew w ell 
the dilemma of the religious doubter. In a plan resembling the personal 
prog ression of Pascal from the realm of science, throug h philosophy 
and to reli g ion, Pascal directs his reader into a meticulous e x aminat i on 
of his own wretchedness, his desire for happiness, his potential for 
g reatness, and the means to the fulfillment of this g reatness by sub-
mission to Christ. Because of t he parallel in his own personal struggle 
to find certainty and the method and me ans which he sugg ests t o his 
reader, the Pensees can be interpreted as representing symbolical y 
his own strug gle with doubt . Pascal is not to be identifie d wit·h the 
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libertine who fails to find a basis for faith in the apology. Rather he 
is to be interpreted as one who has, through doubt, been brought to 
a position where he could assimilate the limited perspectives which 
he previously had been unable to accept as final because of their 
partiality and their implication of contrary evidence which could bs 
found to refute them. He found no contrary evidence aga.inst the Christian 
religion and concluded his restless search by submitting himself to its 
service. 
The fourth goal of this study has been to clarify the solutions which 
Pascal sought for doubt and to evaluate them in terms of their· adequacy. 
If an apology or defense of one's central faith can be taken as any evi-
dence of the sufficiency of the solution which one has found in answer 
to his search for meaning in life,. there should be relatively little ques-
tion that Pascal did find such a solution and one which he felt was worthy 
of the acceptance of others. This analysis seems, however, to over-
simplify the problem. Any adequate analysis and evaluation must arti-
culate the intellectual and emotional nuances which complicate a pro-
found religious experience. It is for this reason that doubt has been 
interpreted as a basic intellectual attitude as well as. a central emotional 
feeling which Pascal experienced in many areas of his life and thought 
at a much deeper level than a mere refusal to take a stand. It is the 
conclusion of this study that to understand Pascal's relentless search 
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for truth as an intellectually satisfying and an emotionally freeing 
experience r one must recognize the basic role which the orientation 
of doubt provided for him. Doubt served Pascal as an essential char-
acteristic of his instrumental behavion it never became his goaL Be-
cause in a very real sense the drama of the past is the drama of the 
present, the completed accomplishment is a realized goal only as it 
is continually renewed. Thus, the drama of doubt for Pascal was never 
fully completed, but was always cleansing and challenging his most 
certain beliefs. 
The previous studies of the place of doubt in the life and thought 
of Pascal have traditionally focussed upon the arrangement of the Pens~es, 
the philosophical aspects of doubt, or the theological consequences of 
an attitude believed contrary to the demand for faith. Such studies 
have been lacking in any concerted effort to relate the diversified elements 
of life and thought in their jux taposition as co-terminous psychological 
and theological data. This study has attempted to relate such data in 
the persp-ective of psychology and theology. 
The realization of this goal is not simple. Obvious barriers are 
encountered in attempting to be sensitive to the motives, thought pro-
cesses r and spiritual yearnings of a man who is separated from us by 
nearly three hundred years. In projecting ourselves into the time of 
Pascal, there is the danger that we may not see the world as he saw 
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it at all, but only as we see it today. By transplanting him into the 
present I we may again run the risk of making him too contemporary. 
There is no method for arriving at what we can conclusively state is 
the true Pascal. It is only hoped that in this study in which an effort 
has been made to combine psychological insight with an appreciation 
for spiritual values 1 that the place of doubt in the life and thought of 
Pascal has been clarified. 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the place of doubt in 
the life and thought of Blaise Pascal. In this study doubt has been defined 
as the absence of a definite conclusion in support of or in opposition to an 
idea -- an attitude of suspended judgment emerging from a questioning, 
critical perspective. This attitude has been examined in the context of two 
foci: life and thought. Life has referred to those events, responses and 
reflections which have .influenced or emerged from doubt. Thought as it has 
been used .in this study has emphasized Pascal's formal statements about 
doubt, particularly in h.is discussion of the doubt of others in t h e Pensees. 
The procedure has been to present and evaluate those experien.ces in the 
life of Pascal which encouraged an attitude of doubt. The following influences 
were found to be significant: the age in which he lived; family influences; 
scientific interests; education; physical illnesses; experiences of t h e world; 
philosophical interests; and religion and the church. Similarities and differ-
ences in the doubt expressed in science, philosophy, and religion have been 
discussed, and an attempt has been made to relate Pascal's experiences of 
doubt in these areas to any formal thoughts he recorded about them. 
This examination has revealed a continuity in Pascal's doubt as it has 
been expressed in science, philosophy and religion. The attitude of doubt 
has played a significant role as Pascal progressed through these areas of 
thought and experience, and resolved itself finally in his submission to 
. " Christ. Pascal's discussion of doubt .in the lives of others in the Pensees 
was influenced by his own experience of doubt. The solution to doubt 
wh.ich he proposed in this writing was the one which he had experienced 
2.30 
in his own life. 
Summarized, the conclusions of this study are as follows: 
1. Pascal was greatly influenced by the age of doubt in which he lived. 
2. Pascal's physical frailty and his unusual intellectual ability pre-
dispoped him to a life of reflective I critical thinking and doubt. This 
predisposition was fostered by an isolated education and an intellectually 
competitive home atmosphere. 
3. As a youth 1 Pascal was trained in science. The rigid discipline of 
this method encouraged an attitude of doubt in science as well as in other 
areas of thought. 
4. The worldly period in Pascal's life made an important contribution 
to his understanding of the problem of doubt. Though this was the period 
in which he expressed the greatest indifference to religious matters 1 he 
did not seriously question at any time the existence of God. 
5. As the result of his second conversion, Pascal found the certainty 
which he · had been seeking in his life and which he had not found previously 
in science or in philosophy. His projected Apology for the Christian 
Religion 1 which in its unfinished state ex.ists today as the Pensees, was 
an out-growth of this conversion experience. In this work he severely 
criticized the libert.ines or free thinkers of his day. His discussion of 
the problem of doubt in the religious life -- its motivations and its solutions 
-- represents a significant contribution to our heritage of apologetic 
literature in the Christian tradition. 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
Donald L. Colburn was born onApril1, 1926, in Waverly, Iowa, 
the son of Perley Amos and Dora Turner Colburn. He was graduated 
from Waverly High School in May, 1944, and immediately entered 
Cornell College, Mount Vernon, Iowa, from which he was graduated 
.in June, 1947. The following fall he entered Drew University, gradu-
ating with the B.D. degree cum laude in June, 1950. 
His res.idence work in Boston University Graduate School was begun 
in the fall of 1950 and completed in 1953. The summer of 1954 and the 
academic year of 1954-55 was spent in Europe for travel and independ-
ent study at the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, France. 
- Z3l ·-
232 
During the period of his graduate work Mr. Colburn served in the 
following professional capacities for the periods indicated: 1950-51,, 
boys 1 club leader with the Greater Boston Young Men 1 s Christian Associ-
ation; 1951-1953, assoc.iated with Dr. David Landau, M.D., psychi-
atrist engaged in private practice; 1952 (summer) clinical assistant, 
clinical training program sponsored by the Institute of Pastoral Care, 
Massachusetts General Hospital; 1952-5 3, leader of the evening divi-
sion of the Class in Applied Psychology at the Boston Dispensary, New 
England Medical Center. 
Since September, 1955, Mr. Colburn has served as Assistant Pro-
fessor of Psychology, Southwestern College, Winfield, Kansas. He 
holds membership in Pi Gamma Mu, North Iowa Conference of the Meth-
odist Church, Wichita (Kansas) Psychological Association, Kansas 
Psychological Association, and American Psychological Association. 
In June, 1953, he was married to Miss Lois Esaley of Hanover, 
Pennsylvania. They are the parents of a son, Christopher Allen, born 
January 20, 1958. 
